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INTRODUCTION: The Question of Death 
One of the most predominant readings of Heidegger's 
Being and Time (1927} has come to be known as the 
"existential" reading. The existential analytic of Dasein, 
undertaken in the name of fundamental ontology, is delimited 
by a series of crucial distinctions~ontic/ontological, 
existentiell/existential, inauthentic/authentic, etc. The 
"existential" reading of Being and Time reads these 
distinctions, I would suggest, as distinctions, that is, as 
two separate, distinguishable ways of being. This reading 
reads the task of the existential analytic and, therefore, 
fundamental ontology, as merely a step beyond the first pole 
of each distinction into the second pole. The analysis of 
death that opens the second division of Being and Time 
affirms, according to the "existential" reading, the 
possibility of the existential analytic by affirming the 
possibility of completing this step, that is, by bringing to 
light Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. 
"By pointing out that Dasein has an authentic potentiality-
for-Being-a-whole, the existential analytic acquires 
assurance as to the constitution of Dasein's primordial 
1 
Being." 1 But this reading-a reading that reads death 
merely as possibility-repeats, as Levinas and Blanchet 
point out, the most familiar and traditional of steps. 
Levinas consistently reads death in Being and Time as 
merely possibility. In Time and the Other (1947) Levinas 
writes: 
2 
Being toward death, in Heidegger's authentic existence, 
is a supreme lucidity and hence a supreme virility. It 
is Dasein's assumption of the uttermost possibility of 
existence, which precisely makes possible all other 
possibilities, and consequently makes possible the very 
feat of possibility-that is, it makes possible activity 
and freedom. 2 
Being toward death, in Heidegger's authentic existence, is 
not, therefore, a supreme vulnerability, but rather, 
according to Levinas, a supreme virility, "the virility of 
grasping the possible, the power to be able ["pouvoir de 
pouvoir"]" (TA 73/TO 82). Or, said otherwise in a footnote 
to the passage cited at the beginning of this paragraph, 
"[d]eath in Heidegger is not, as Jean Wahl says 'the 
impossibility of possibility,' but 'the possibility of 
impossibility.' This apparently Byzantine distinction has a 
fundamental importance" (TA 92 n.5/TO 70 n.43). Levinas 
1Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tilbingen: Max 
Niemeyer, 1957), 234, hereafter cited in the text as sz. / 
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 277, hereafter cited in the 
text as BT. 
2Emmanuel Levinas, Le temps et l'autre (Paris: PUF, 
1985), 57, hereafter cited in the text as TA. /Time and the 
Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1987), 70, hereafter cited in the text as 
TO. 
refers, in several of his works, to Heidegger's own 
description of death in Being and Time as "the possibility 
of impossibility" to describe his reading of death in 
Heidegger's Being and Time. For instance, in a discussion 
published in Wahl's book A Short History of Existentialism 
{1947) Levinas writes: 
3 
Existence produces itself in such a manner that 
each being is already hurling himself towards death, and 
this manner of hurling himself towards death is, for 
him, a possibility par excellence, because all other 
possibilities fulfill themselves and become acts, 
whereas death becomes non-reality, non-being. That is 
the sense in which Heidegger says that death is the 
possibility of impossibility. 3 
Levinas does not concede-at least in those passages where 
Heidegger is explicitly named-the possibility that death in 
Heidegger's Being and Time is to be read as both "the 
possibility of impossibility" and "the impossibility of 
possibility." The later phrase-"the impossibility of 
possibility"-articulates, according to Levinas, the fact 
that death is the "limit of the subject's virility" {TA 
62/TO 74), the "impossibility of having a project" {TA 62-
63/TO 74), of "grasping a possibility" (TA 64/TO 76). 
What is important about the approach of death is that at 
a certain moment we are no longer able to be able [nous 
ne'pouvons plus pouvoir']. It is exactly thus that the 
subject loses its very mastery as a subject {TA 62/TO 
74) • 
The step beyond inauthenticity into authenticity that would 
3Jean Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism, trans. 
Forrest Williams and Stanley Maron {New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1949), 53. 
ensure the virility of the subject and complete fundamental 
ontology is interrupted. At the very moment the subject 
would gain complete mastery, he or she is impotent. The 
production or performance of this necessary yet impossible 
step beyond articulates the trace of death as that which 
4 
merely approaches. This approach of death indicates, 
according to Levinas, that one is in relation with something 
that is absolutely other (TA 63/TO 74). 
Blanchot's reading of death in Heidegger's Being and 
Time is not unlike Levinas'. In a passage from The Space of 
Literature (1955) that is obviously a reading of Heidegger, 
Blanchot explicitly refers to Levinas' reading of Heidegger 
in Time and the Other. 
When a contemporary philosopher names death as man's 
extreme possibility, the possibility absolutely proper 
to him, he shows that the origin of possibility is 
linked in man to the fact that he can die, that for him 
death is yet one possibility more, that the event by 
which man departs from the possible and belongs to the 
impossible is nevertheless within his mastery, that it 
is the extreme moment of his possibility. (And this the 
philosopher expresses precisely by saying of death that 
it is "the possibility of impossibility.") [A footnote 
here reads: "Emmanuel Levinas is the first to have 
brought out what was at stake in this expression (Time 
and the Other • ) " ] • 4 
The passage continues with Blanchot establishing the 
proximity of this reading of Heidegger to Hegel. 
Hegel had already seen action, language, liberty, and 
death to be aspects of one and the same movement; he had 
"Maurice Blanchot, L'espace litt6raire (Paris: Gallimard, 
1955), 325-326, hereafter cited in the text as EL./ The Space 
of Literature, trans. Ann smock (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1982), 240, hereafter cited in the text as SL. 
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shown that only man's constant and resolute proximity to 
death allows him to become active nothingness capable of 
negating and transforming natural reality~of combating, 
of laboring, of knowing, and of being historical. This 
is a magical force: it is the absolute power of the 
negative which becomes the action of truth in the world. 
It brings negation to reality, form to the formless, 
definition to the indefinite. We want to draw these 
limits, mark these ends, come to the finish. That is 
the principle behind civilization's demands, the essence 
of the purposeful will which seeks achievement, which 
demands accomplishment and attains universal mastery. 
Existence is authentic when it is capable of enduring 
possibility right up to its extreme point, able to 
stride toward death as toward possibility par 
excellence. It is to this movement that the essence of 
man in Western history owes its having become action, 
value, future, labor and truth. The affirmation that in 
man all is possibility requires that death itself be 
possible: death itself, without which man would not be 
able to form the notion of an "all" or to exist in view 
of a totality, must be what makes all~what makes 
totality~possible (EL 326/SL 240) . 
For Hegel, death is productive. It is the effectuation of 
the appearance of the next shape of the dialectic. It is 
the possibility of each step of the dialectic that 
progresses ever so diligently to the notion of an "all," to 
absolute knowing. In another passage from The Space of 
Literature, Blanchet extends this reading of death as 
possibility to encompass not only Heidegger and Hegel, but 
also Nietzsche. 
Death, in the human perspective, is not a given, it must 
be achieved. It is a task, one which we take up 
actively, one which becomes the source of our activity 
and mastery. Man dies, that is nothing. But man is, 
starting from death. He ties himself tight to his death 
with a tie of which he is the judge. He makes his 
death, he makes himself mortal and in this way give 
himself the power of a maker and gives to what he makes 
its meaning and its truth. The decision to be without 
being is possibility itself: the possibility of death. 
Three systems of thought~Hegel's, Nietzsche's, · 
Heidegger's~which attempt to account for this decision 
6 
and which therefore seem, however much they may oppose 
each other, to shed the greatest light on the destiny of 
modern man, are all attempts at making death possible 
(EL 115/SL 96). 
While it is not particularly unusual to characterize Hegel's 
work as a "system" of thought, the characterization seems 
wholly inappropriate when applied to the work of Nietzsche 
and Heidegger. I would suggest that Blanchet applies this 
characterization to one specific reading of the work of 
these three thinkers~a reading which reads death as merely 
possibility. 
Blanchet, however, like Levinas, thinks that such a 
reading of death overlooks the profoundly disturbing 
questionableness at the heart of this phenomenon~the 
question of death as "the possibility of impossibility" 
turning into death as "the impossibility of possibility," 
death as possibility turning into death as impossibility, 
that is, turning into death as an absolute alterity that 
infinitely approaches (or withdraws), the "is not yet" or 
"dead time" (~temps mort). This question is what 
Blanchet, in The Space of Literature, calls "double death" 
(la double mort). This irreducible question of death will 
be explored throughout this dissertation with respect to the 
"work" of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, and Blanchet. The 
question of death not only opens up new and provocative 
readings of the "work" of these thinkers, but also raises 
the question of their proximity to one another, oftentimes 
despite their expressed intentions. It should also be noted 
7 
at the outset that the question of death will call the ideas 
of "work" and "production" into question-hence, the 
quotation marks around the term "work" both in this 
paragraph and in the title of the dissertation. 
The first chapter of the dissertation will be 
concerned with Levinas' reading of "dead time" in what is 
otherwise one of the most familiar and traditional of 
texts-Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy. Levinas' 
reading of Descartes' Meditations appears in several of 
Levinas' works. The most significant readings occur in 
"Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" (1957), Totality and 
Infinity (1961), Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 
(1974), and "God and Philosophy" (1975). For Levinas, the 
profundity of the Meditations lies in "[t]he ambiguity of 
Descartes' first evidence, revealing the I and God in turn 
without merging them, revealing them as two distinct moments 
of evidence mutually founding one another."5 This ambiguous 
or enigmatic "double origin" of the cogito and the infinite 
is "produced" in a reading that progresses through the 
Meditations. One of the most significant aspects of 
Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations is his use of the 
5Emmanuel Levinas, Totalite et Infini. Essai sur 
l'exteriorite (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 19, 
hereafter cited in the text as Tel / Totality and Infinity: 
An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), 48, hereafter cited in the 
text as TaI. 
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term "production." Production, for Levinas, is an 
essentially ambiguous term that designates both the 
effectuation and the appearance of something. What is 
produced by a reader who effectuates a reading of Descartes' 
Meditations is not, however, the unequivocal appearance of 
something in itself, as is usually the case in production, 
but rather an ambiguous or enigmatic "double origin" of the 
coqito and the infinite. What is produced in .th!.§ 
effectuation is not something that appears, but rather that 
which withdraws from (or approaches) revelation and merely 
leaves a trace of itself in this irreducible ambiguity or 
enigma. This production, as one which does not effectuate 
the unequivocal appearance of something in itself, is 
perhaps more aptly ref erred to as a productionless 
production. This productionless production, this 
"productionlessness" (compare with Blanchot's desoeuvrement 
or "worklessness") characteristic of Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations is marked by what Levinas calls "dead 
time," the interval of the "is not yet." "Dead time" marks 
the "relation without relation" (relation sans relation or 
rapport sans rapport) (Te! 52, 271/TaI so, 295) of the 
coqito and the infinite. The phrase rapport sans rapport 
articulates the fact that one "term" of the "relation"-the 
infinite-absolves itself from the "relation," withdraws 
from (or approaches) the "relation," or said otherwise, 
merely leaves a trace of itself in the production of· a 
"double origin" in which it, momentarily appearing as an 
origin, is interminably vulnerable to being reappropriated 
by the cogito. "Dead time," which marks the rapport sans 
rapport of the cogito and the infinite, also marks the 
rapport sans rapport of the cogito and the evil genius/il.._y 
Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations raises the 
question of language in Levinas' work. The radicality of 
everything said by Levinas risks being domesticated. 
9 
Levinas is aware of this when in the Preface to Totality and 
Infinity he writes: 
The word by way of preface [preface] which seeks to 
break through the screen stretched between the author 
and the reader by the book itself [ ••• ] belongs to the 
very essence of language, which consists in continually 
undoing its phrase by the foreword [l'avant-propos) or 
the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to 
restate without ceremonies what has already been ill 
understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the 
said delights (Tel XVIII/Ta! 30). 
This prefatory word (or fore-word) serves as an inaugural 
reminder that a reading of what is said in the book must 
always already be accompanied by an unsaying. Thirteen 
years later in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, this 
prefatory word (or fore-word) is not only formally 
thematized but, at the same time, written into the very 
argument and exposition of the text. This was almost 
certainly in response to readers such as Blanchot and 
Derrida who point out numerous ways Totality and Infinity 
can too easily be read. This response is called for.because 
10 
in most cases the once only prefatory word has to do all the 
work of unsaying what is merely programmatically said in 
Totality and Infinity. One notable exception, however, is 
Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations. Here there is 
an intratextual production of what is merely announced 
extratextually by the prefatory word (or fore-word). In 
fact, the reading of Descartes' Meditations produced by 
Levinas in Totality and Infinity is perhaps an anticipation 
of what he will later formalize and write into the very 
production of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, for 
this reading~which, as will become apparent in chapter III, 
plays both a decisive and a pervasive role in Totality and 
Inf inity~is heavily drawn upon in Levinas' formal 
thematization of skepticism and the saying of the otherwise 
than being in Otherwise than Being. 
One of the enduring questions asked by readers of 
Levinas' works is whether, and to what extent, Levinas is a 
reader of Hegel. Coming in the wake of Bataille's and 
Blanchot's readings of Hegel, Levinas' use of the term 
"production" certainly raises the question of Levinas' 
proximity to Hegel. Levinas, however, never explicitly ties 
his reading of production to a reading of Hegel. This task 
seems to have been left to his readers. 
Blanchet, on the other hand, explicitly reads a notion 
of production or work alongside Hegel. The second chapter 
of the dissertation will be concerned with Blanchot's 
equivocal reading of production in the work of Hegel. In 
·"Literature and the Right to Death"-which appears in I& 
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fart du feu (1949)-Blanchot reads production alongside 
death understood as possibility. For Hegel, death is 
productive. It is the effectuation of the appearance of the 
next shape of the dialectic. It is the possibility of the 
step beyond one shape into another. Blanchot takes up the 
questionableness of this reading of death in Hegel. 
I will limit my remarks on "Literature and the Right 
to Death" to a reading of two of what Blanchot calls a 
writer's temptations. One temptation-"revolution" or 
"revolutionary action"-marks the first instance of 
Blanchot's irreducibly ambiguous reading of the following 
passage from the Preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: 
"[T)he life of Spirit is [ ••• ] the life that endures [death] 
and maintains itself in it. 116 Literature begins at the 
moment when it becomes a question, that is, at the moment 
when an initial reading of this line, which reads death as 
possibility, turns into a reading of this line which reads 
death as impossibility. Death, as this turning itself, 
leaves a trace of itself, I would suggest, in the production 
or performance of an interminable step/not beyond (I.§ pas 
au-delA), an eternal step beyond that eternally returns. 
This reading of "revolution" or "revolutionary action" will 
6G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. 
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 19, · 
hereafter cited in the text as PS. 
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raise the question of the proximity of this temptation and 
Blanchot's reading in L'entretien infini of nihilism in the 
work of Nietzsche. Nihilism is another temptation of a 
writer named by Blanchot in "Literature and the Right to 
Death." A reading that raises the question of the proximity 
of "revolution" and nihilism will, therefore, raise several 
questions: What is the relationship of nihilism (or 
scepticism), named as a writer's temptation by Blanchet in 
"Literature and the Right to Death," and the nihilism of 
Blanchot's reading of the work of Nietzsche in L'entretien 
infini? What is the relationship of Blanchot's reading of 
Hegel in "Literature and the Right to Death" and his reading 
of Nietzsche in L'entretien infini? Is the nihilism of 
Blanchot's reading of the work of Nietzsche inscribed in his 
reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit? 
The third chapter of the dissertation will again be 
concerned with Levinas' Totality and Infinity. Totality and 
Infinity calls. for being read in a multiplicity of ways. 
Alphonso Lingis, the principle translator of Levinas into 
English, .suggests that Totality and Infinity is "structured, 
classically, as a phenomenology in different strata, related 
as founding and founded. "7 Granted, the structure, and 
often the vocabulary, of Totality and Infinity lends itself 
7Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement gu'~tre ou au-dela de 
l'essence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), hereafter 
cited in the text as AE. / Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus· 
Nijhoff, 1981), xv, hereafter cited in the text as OB. 
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to such a reading. But such a reading risks domesticating 
the interruptions of Totality and Infinity. It risks the 
possibility of Totality and Infinity being too easily read 
and appropriated by, for example, ethics or theology. 
Furthermore, such a reading can only be undertaken if one 
does not heed the extratextual prefatory word cited 
previously. But this once only prefatory word (or fore-
word) which, in most cases, has to do all of the work of 
unsaying what is merely said in Totality and Infinity, 
obviously leaves the work vulnerable to be too easily read 
and appropriated. It was suggested earlier, however, that 
Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations is a notable 
exception to the lack of an intratextual production of what 
is announced extratextually by the prefatory word (or fore-
word). With this in mind it may perhaps be instructive to 
remain attentive to the way this reading plays both a 
decisive and a pervasive role, on innumerable levels, in the 
very structure of Totality and Infinity. 
In Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations "dead 
time" or the interval of the "is not yet" names the rapport 
sans rapport of the cogito and the infinite as well as the 
rapport sans rapport of the cogito and the evil genius or il 
y_g. The reading of "dead time" in Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations undertaken in chapter I of this 
dissertation requires, however, a deformalization or 
concretization. This is undertaken especially in sections 
14 
II and III of Totality and Infinity where, I would suggest, 
"dead time" gets renamed at each successive stratum. The 
following passage from Derrida's "Violence and Metaphysics: 
An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas" is, with 
certain qualifications, a provisional characterization of 
the structure of Totality and Infinity. 
In Totality and Infinity the thematic development is 
neither purely descriptive nor purely deductive. It 
proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a 
beach: return and repetition, always, of the same wave 
against the same shore, in which, however, as each 
return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews 
and enriches itself •8 
A reading of Totality and Infinity which begins with "dead 
time" will call into question a simple linear reading of 
sections II and III of Totality and Infinity and raise the 
question of the proximity of Totality and Infinity and 
Otherwise than Being. "Dead time" also names the "site" of 
a certain "relationship" of the infinite and the il y a. 
The interval of death, therefore, perhaps names what in 
Otherwise than Being is referred to as "a fine risk." 
The fourth chapter of the dissertation will be 
concerned with the question of the proximity of Nietzsche 
and Levinas. In chapter III I suggest that a reading of 
Levinas that is not attentive to "dead time"-which is 
marked by or leaves a trace of itself in the performance or 
8Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay 
on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of.Chicago 
Press, 1978), 312 n.7. 
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production of a "double origin"-risks domesticating the 
interruptions located within his work. It risks the 
possibility of being too easily read and appropriated. For 
example, a close reading of justice and responsibility in 
the work of Levinas-that is, the step beyond justice into 
responsibility-reveals that Levinas' idea of responsibility 
cannot be easily appropriated by ethics or politics. 
Responsibility exceeds the order of measure and reason. It 
merely leaves an enigmatic or ambiguous trace of itself in 
this order of just boundaries. Levinas' reading of 
responsibility moves at the limit of the ethical language of 
justice. 
Nietzsche's reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound in 
The Birth of Tragedy likewise moves at the limit of the 
ethical language of justice. Reading justice in Nietzsche 
alongside justice in Levinas will, I would suggest, 
raise-seemingly despite Levinas' intentions-the question 
of the proximity of Nietzsche and Levinas. This is a 
question that would not even be considered in a too easy 
reading of Levinas that sometimes seeks to appropriate his 
work for a post-Nietzschean ethics or politics. 
The final chapter of the dissertation will.be 
concerned with a brief re-reading of Heidegger's Being and 
Time with respect to the question of death articulated 
throughout chapters 1-4 of this dissertation. I would 
suggest that Being and Time decisively turns upon the 
doubling of death--death as possibility turning into death 
as impossibility. Recall that Levinas and Blanchot 
consistently read death in Being and Time as merely 
possibility. The doubling of death calls, therefore, for 
re-reading these readings of Being and Time. I would 
16 
suggest that this doubling~which delimits the project of 
fundamental ontology, that is, both limits it and makes it 
possible9~not only opens the space/time of the clearing 
(Lichtung), but also raises the question of the proximity of 
the clearing and the "dead time" of Levinas and Blanchot. 
9See John Sallis, Delimitations~Phenomenology and the 
End of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1986) • 
CHAPTER 1 
THE EVIL GENIUS, DEAD TIME, AND THE INFINITE: 
Reading Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy 
He found the Archimedean point, but he used 
it against himself; it seems he was permitted 
to find it only under this condition. 
~Franz Kafka 
In the second Meditation of his Meditations on First 
Philosophy Descartes compares that thing for which he is 
searching, that is, that thing about which he can be 
absolutely certain, to the Archimedean point. 
Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable 
point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can 
hope for great things if I manage to find just one 
thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakable. 1 
After reconsidering the pathway of doubt undertaken in the 
first Meditation, Descartes writes: 
So after considering everything very thoroughly, I 
must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I 
exist, is true whenever it is put forward by me or 
conceived in my mind. 
But I do not yet have a sufficient understanding 
of what this 'I' is, that now necessarily exists (M 17). 
After going back and meditating on what he originally 
thought himself to be, and then subtracting from that 
1Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 
trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald 
Murdoch, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 16, hereafter 
cited in the text as M. 
17 
18 
anything which is doubtful, he finally concludes: "I am, 
then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks" (M 18). 
Descartes' Archimedean point is the coqito. 
Levinas traces a shift of the Archimedean point from 
the coqito to the infinite. The production of this shift 
doubles the Archimedean point-that is the coqito and the 
infinite are revealed as two distinct points mutually 
founding one another. Levinas discovers in this ambiguous 
and enigmatic doubling a trace of the infinite, a trace of 
that which is both the condition and the uncondition of the 
coqito. The discovery of this Archimedean point-an 
excessive Archimedean point that leaves a trace of itself in 
an ambiguous and enigmatic doubling-transforms the 
traditional understanding of the Archimedean point. This 
Archimedean point is perhaps aptly expressed by the 
following passage from Kafka's "He:" "He found the 
Archimedean point, but he used it against himself; it seems 
he was permitted to find it only under this condition." 
Levinas likewise traces a shift of the Archimedean 
point from the coqito to the evil genius. 
In both cases the production of this shift-which is a 
productionless production-is marked by "dead time." "Dead 
time" marks the rapport sans rapport of the coqito and the 
infinite, and the rapport sans rapport of the coqito and the 
evil genius or il y a. 
Levinas frequently characterizes his reading of 
Descartes' Meditations in terms of two distinct movements. 
If, in a first movement, Descartes takes consciousness 
to be indubitable of itself by itself, in a second 
movement~the reflection on reflection~he recognizes 
conditions for this certitude (Tel 186/TaI 210). 
Before undertaking a close textual reading of Levinas' 
reading of Descartes' Meditations it is necessary (and 
helpful) to situate these two movements within the context 
of the distinction Levinas makes between comprehension and 
critique. 
In the opening sections of Totality and Infinity 
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Levinas makes a distinction between knowledge or theory 
understood as comprehension [intelligence] and the critical 
essence of knowing. In its comprehension of being (or 
ontology) knowledge or theory is concerned with critique. 
It discovers the dogmatism and naive arbitrariness of 
its spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of 
the exercise of ontology; it then seeks to exercise this 
freedom in such a way as to turn back at every moment to 
the origin of the arbitrary dogmatism of this free 
exercise. This would lead to an infinite regression if 
this return itself remained an ontological movement, an 
exercise of freedom, a theory. Its critical intention 
then leads it beyond theory and ontology: critique does 
not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but 
calls into question the exercise of the same (Te! 13/TaI 
43) • 
Knowledge or theory seems, therefore, to be characterized by 
an ambiguity or enigma~two distinct movements. 
Critique or philosophy is the essence of knowing. But 
what is proper to knowing is not its possibility of 
going unto an object, a movement by which it is akin to 
other acts; its prerogative consists in being able to 
put itself in question, in penetrating beneath its own 
condition. It is not drawn back from the world as its 
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object; it can have the world as its theme, .make of it 
an object, because its exercise consists, as it were, in 
taking charge of the very condition that supports it and 
that supports even this very act of taking charge (Te! 
57/TaI 85). 
These two movements are not, however, merely opposed to one 
another. Although oriented in inverse directions, and 
therefore opposed, they seem, nevertheless, to call for 
being thought "at the same time." The movement of 
comprehension, "working on straight ahead" (Te! 61/TaI 89) 
is, as was pointed out in the passage cited above, inverted 
"at every moment [!tout moment]" (Te! 13/TaI 43, emphasis 
added) by the movement of critique. In another passage 
alluding to the temporal relationship of comprehension and 
critique, Levinas writes: "The search for the intelligible 
and the manifestation of the critical essence of knowing, 
the movement of a being back to what precedes its condition, 
begin together [commence du~ coup]" (Te! 56/TaI 84, 
emphasis added), and yet they are oriented in inverse 
directions. It seems that these two movements necessarily 
yet impossibly call for being thought "at the same time." 
Levinas discovers in Descartes' Meditations a work that 
responds to this call. 
The critical essence of knowing leads~according to 
Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations~beyond the 
knowledge of the cogito (Te! 58/TaI 85). It penetrates 
beneath knowledge understood as comprehension, beneath 
knowledge which takes itself to be indubitable of itself by 
itself. 
If, in a first movement, Descartes takes consciousness 
to be indubitable of itself by itself, in a second 
movement~the reflection on ref lection~he recognizes 
conditions for this certitude (Tel 186/TaI 210). 
In a second movement~that is, the critical reflection on 
the reflection characteristic of comprehension~Descartes 
recognizes conditions for the certitude of comprehension. 
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This certitude, Levinas provisionally states, is due to the 
clarity and distinctness of the cogito. This move is 
provisional because it remains "an ontological movement, an 
exercise of freedom, a theory" (Tel 13/TaI 43). It remains 
a move of comprehension. Were this inquiry to remain on the 
level of comprehension this move would be no more than the 
first step of what would inevitably be an infinite 
regression (Tel 13, 57/TaI 43, 85). This move, however, is 
subtended by the second movement, formally characterized by 
the critique. Levinas points out that while certitude is 
indeed due to the clarity and distinctness of the cogito, 
certitude itself is sought because of "the presence of 
infinity in this finite thought, which without this presence 
would be ignorant of its own finitude" (Tel 186/TaI 210). 
That is, without this presence consciousness would be unable 
to posit and conceive its own finitude, its own doubt (Tel 
185/TaI 210). It would be unable to be certain of its own 
doubt, unable to actualize the first movement. Levinas is 
ref erring here the following famous passage from the third 
Meditation. 
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I clearly understand that there is more reality in an 
infinite substance than in a finite one, and hence that 
my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some 
way prior to my perception of the finite, that is 
myself. For how could I understand that I doubted or 
desired-that is, lacked something-and that I was not 
wholly perfect, unless there were in me some idea of a 
more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own 
defects by comparison (M 31)? 
How could I understand that I doubted back in the second 
Meditation, how could I have posited and conceived my doubt, 
my f initude, my imperfection-which, in the second 
Meditation, established the certitude of the cogito (that 
is, I understood, I was certain, I had no doubt, that I 
doubted)-unless there were always already in me some idea 
of a more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own 
defects by comparison? Descartes here discovers in a second 
movement-that is, "after the fact" or in the critical 
reflection on the reflection characteristic of 
comprehension-the "condition" of the certitude 
characteristic of the first movement, of what was otherwise 
taken to be "indubitable of itself by itself," an absolute 
origin. Descartes discovers in the third Meditation a pre-
originary origin-the infinite. 
The infinite, discovered in a second movement, is 
discovered to be necessarily yet impossibly in the finite. 
It is necessarily in the finite insofar as it is the 
condition of the certitude of the cogito. "For," as 
Descartes writes, "how could I understand that I doubted or 
desired-that is, lacked something-and that I am not wholly 
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perfect, unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect 
being which enabled me to recognize my own defects by 
comparison (M 31, emphasis added)? However, the infinite 
is, at the same time, impossibly in the finite insofar as it 
is an in-comprehensible exteriority that is the uncondition 
of the certitude of the cogito. The in-comprehensible 
interrupts the comprehension characteristic of the first 
movement. The following passage from "God and Philosophy," 
which cites the sentence in Descartes' third Meditation 
immediately preceding the sentence cited above, articulates 
the fact that the infinite is in me insofar as it interrupts 
a "me" that would comprehend or include it (that is, have it 
in me). That is, in some way I have received an idea, I 
have it in me, before there is an "I" that is capable of 
receiving it. 
The actuality of the cogito is [ ••• ] interrupted by the 
unincludable, not thought but undergone in the form of 
the idea of the Infinite, bearing in a second moment of 
consciousness what in a first moment claimed to bear it. 
After the certainty of the cogito, present to itself in 
the second Meditation, after the "halt" which the last 
lines of this Meditation mark, the third Meditation 
announces that "in some way I have in me the notion of 
the infinite earlier than the f inite~to wit, the notion 
of God before that of myself ."2 The idea of the 
Infinite, Infinity in me, can only be a passivity of 
consciousness. Is it still consciousness? There is 
here a passivity which cannot be likened to receptivity. 
Receptivity is a collecting that takes place in a 
2The English translators of "God and Philosophy" use 
the Haldane and Ross translation of Descartes' philosophical 
works. The Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch translation 
of this sentence reads: "··· my perception of the infinite, 
that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of the 
finite, that is myself" (M 31). 
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welcome, an assuming that takes place under the force of 
the blow received. The breakup of the actuality of 
thought in the "idea of God" is a passivity more passive 
still than any passivity, like the passivity of a trauma 
through which the idea of God would have been put in 
us. 3 
This necessary yet impossible presence of the infinite in 
the finite is reflected in the prefix "in-" of the word 
"infinite." In "God and Philosophy" Levinas writes: "[I]t 
is [ ••• ] as though~without wanting to play on words~the in 
of the Infinite were to signify both the non and the within 
(DP 106/GP 160). This prefix signifies inclusion in the 
sense of immanence, insofar as the infinite's immanence is 
the necessary condition of comprehension, and negation in 
the sense of transcendence or exteriority, insofar as the 
infinite's in-comprehensible exteriority interrupts or is 
the uncondition of comprehension. 4 "The idea of God is God 
3Emmanuel Levinas, "Dieu et la philosophie," in De dieu 
qui vient a l'id~e (Paris: Vrin, 1982), 106, hereafter cited 
in the text as DP. / "God and Philosophy," in Emmanuel 
Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 160-1, hereafter 
cited in the text as GP. 
4Descartes explicitly states that the infinite is not 
the result of the formal structure of a negative judgment. 
And I must not think that, just as my conceptions of 
rest and darkness are arrived at by negating movement 
and light, so my perception of the infinite is arrived 
at not by means of a true idea but merely by negating 
the finite (M 31). 
Levinas recognizes this when he writes: "[I]t is as though 
the negation of the finite included in In-f inity did not 
signify any sort of negation resulting from the formal 
structure of negative judgment" (DP 105-106/GP 160). In a 
footnote Levinas adds: 
The latent birth of negation occurs not in subjectivity, 
but in the idea of the Infinite. Or, if one prefers, it 
is in subjectivity qua idea of the Infinite. It is in 
in me, but God already breaking up the consciousness that 
aims at ideas" (DP 105/GP 160, emphasis added). 
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The ~ in which the inf inite--necessarily yet 
impossibly in the finite, that is, both the condition and 
the uncondition of the finite~is articulated in the finite 
devolves from the two distinct movements outlined above. 
Levinas not only clarifies this issue of the articulation of 
the infinite, but also establishes the proximity of his 
reading of Descartes Meditations to his own analyses of 
death, in that section of Totality and Infinity entitled 
"Atheism or the Will." The reading undertaken in this 
section, like the reading cited above, characterizes the 
Meditations in terms of two distinct movements. But here 
the two movements are given temporal designations. The 
first movement is called the chronological order and the 
second movement is called the "logical" order. These two 
distinct times are likewise formally articulated by the 
distinction between comprehension and critique. 
The being infinitely surpassing its own idea in us--God 
in the Cartesian terminology~subtends the evidence of 
the coqito, according to the third Meditation. But the 
discovery of this metaphysical relation in the coqito 
constitutes chronologically only the second move of the 
philosopher. That there could be a chronological order 
this sense that the idea of the Infinite, as Descartes 
affirms, is a "genuine idea" and not merely what I 
conceive "by negation of what is finite" (DP 106 n.5/GP 
160 n.6). 
The English translators of "God and Philosophy" use the 
Haldane and Ross translation of Descartes' philosophical 
works rather than the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch 
translation cited above. 
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distinct from the "logical" order, that there could be 
several moments in the progression, that there is a 
progression~here is separation. For by virtue of time 
this being is not yet [n'est pas encore]~which does not 
make it the same as nothingness, but maintains it at a 
distance Ci distance] from itself. It is not all at 
once [n'est RA§~~ £.Qlll2] (Tel 24-5/TaI 54). 
rt is important to keep in mind that the passages describing 
the cogito as "not yet" and "not all at once" are 
descriptions characteristic of knowledge as comprehension 
written from the perspective of a reader/writer who has 
already progressed through the two movements of the 
Meditations. It is from this perspective, that is, after 
the discovery in the third Meditation of the metaphysical 
relation in the cogito, that Levinas describes the cogito 
during the chronological order. He writes: By virtue of 
time, that is, by virtue of the chronological order, the 
cogito "is not yet," it "is not all at once." The condition 
of the actualization of the cogit~which is, from the 
perspective of the chronological order, already assumed to 
be an actual entity, indubitable of itself by itself~is yet 
to come. This does not, however, make it the same as 
nothingness, or, the same as potency. It is, on the 
contrary, maintained at a distance from itself in the 
interval between being and nothingness, between act and 
potency. It is maintained in the interval of the "is not 
yet" (or, the "is not all at once"). It is this 
interval~an interval that marks the production of a trace 
of separation or alterity~that, I will suggest in a·moment, 
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Levinas proposes to call "dead time" (~temps mort). 
Levinas elaborates on the description of the coqito as 
"not yet" or "not all at once" in the following passage: 
Even its [i.e., the coqito's] cause, older than itself, 
is still to come [~encore! venir]. The cause of 
being is thought or known by its effect as thpuqh it 
were posterior to its effect (TeI 25/TaI 54). 
The cause of being (God) is thought or known by its effect 
(the coqito) as though the cause were posterior to its 
effect. Again, it is important to keep in mind that these 
passages are descriptions characteristic of knowledge as 
comprehension written from the perspective of a 
reader/writer who has already progressed through the two 
movements of the Meditations. 
Referring to these passages, Levinas writes: "Thus 
already theoretical thought [ ••• ] articulates separation" 
(TeI 25/TaI 54). "Theoretical thought" here refers to 
knowledge understood as comprehension which articulates, 
after the fact, not merely the reflection, but the 
production of separation. For "separation," Levinas writes, 
"is not reflected in thought, but produced by it" (TeI 
25/TaI 54, emphasis added). To fully appreciate this 
passage it will be necessary to clarify what Levinas means 
by "production." 
5If the description of the coqito as "not yet" or "not 
all at once" follow from the fact that its cause is yet to 
come, then Levinas risks confusing his readers by beginning 
this passage with the word "even," which seems to imply that 
he is introducing new material. 
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Levinas introduces the term "production" in the 
Preface to Totality aru;l Infinity. 
The term "production [production]" designates both the 
effectuation [l'effectuation] of being (the event "is 
produced [U produit]", an automobile "is produced [ll 
produit]"} and its being brought to light or its 
exposition (an argument "is produced [se produit]", an 
actor "is produced [se produit]"}. The ambiguity of 
this verb conveys the essential ambiguity of the 
operation by which the being of an entity simultaneously 
is brought about [s'6vertue] and is revealed (TeI 
XIV/Ta! 26}. 
The essentially ambiguous operation of the term "production" 
is crucial for a proper understanding of the following 
passage which, as will become apparent below, is likewise 
crucial for a proper understanding of Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations. 
The I is not a contingent formation by which the same 
and the other, as logical determinations of being, can 
in addition be reflected [se refltter] within A thought. 
It is in order that alterity be produced [se produise] 
in being that a "thought" is needed and that an I is 
needed (TeI 9-10/TaI 39). 
The alterity of the same and the other is not merely 
reflected within the thought of an "I. 11 This passage, which 
alludes to Levinas' discussion of the cogito (I think}, 
suggests that a cogito is needed in order that alterity be 
produced in being. The passage continues: 
The irreversibility of the relation can be produced [se 
produire] only if the relation is effected [accompli] by 
one of the terms as the very movement of transcendence, 
as the traversing of this distance, and not as a 
recording of, or the psychological invention of this 
movement. "Thought" and "interiority" are the very 
break-up of being and the production [la production] 
(not the reflection [le reflet]} of transcendence. We 
know this relation only in the measure that we effect 
[effectuons] it; this is what is distinctive about it. 
Alterity is possible only starting from me (Tel 10/TaI 
39-40). 
we know the relation, we can reflect upon it, only in the 
measure that we effect it (that is, bring it about). But 
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what is known or reflected upon in this effectuation is not 
the appearance of something, as is usually the case in 
production (which ambiguously conveys both effectuation and 
being brought to light or appearing). For what is produced 
in this effectuation is not something that appears, but 
rather what withdraws from revelation and merely leaves a 
trace of itself in an ambiguity or enigma. Therefore, what 
is "known" or "reflected upon" is an irreducible ambiguity 
or enigma~a trace of what withdraws from revelation. 
It is now possible to properly appreciate what Levinas 
means when he writes: "Separation is not reflected in 
thought, but produced by it" (Tel 25/TaI 54, emphasis 
added). Separation is produced by thought in that one 
effects a progression through the two movements of the 
Meditations, in the measure that one effects a performance 
of a reading of the Meditations. But what is reflected upon 
in this effectuation is not the appearance of something, as 
is usually the case in production (which ambiguously conveys 
both effectuation and being brought to light or appearing). 
For what is produced in this effectuation is an inversion of 
order with respect to the chronological order and the 
"logical" order. What is produced in this effectuation is 
the equiprimordiality of the cogito and God. 
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The ambiguity of Descartes' first evidence, revealing 
the I and God in turn without merging them, revealing 
them as two distinct moments of evidence mutually 
founding one another, characterizes the very meaning of 
separation. The separation of the I is thus affirmed to 
be non-contingent, non-provisional. The distance 
between me and God, radical and necessary, is produced 
(se produit] in being itself (TeI 19/TaI 48). 
What is produced in this effectuation is not something that 
appears, but rather an irreducible ambiguity or enigma. 
What is produced in :thi.§. effectuation is not something that 
appears, but rather what withdraws from revelation and 
merely leaves a trace of itself in this ambiguity or enigma. 
Therefore, what is "reflected upon" is an irreducible 
ambiguity or enigma~a trace of what withdraws from 
revelation. 
The effectuation of this "double origin" makes 
possible those descriptions of the cogito during the 
chronological order pointed out above~those descriptions 
which must have been written from the perspective of a 
reader/writer who has already effected a progression through 
the two movements of the Meditations. For example: the 
cogito "is not yet," or "is not all at once." Another 
example pointed out above is the following phrase: "The 
cause of being is thought or known by its effect !U! though 
it were posterior to its effect." The effectuation of an 
inversion of order, of a "double origin," makes possible the 
production of this logically absurd inversion of the 
"posteriority of the anterior" (TeI 25/TaI 54) by thought. 
"Thus already theoretical thought," on the basis of the 
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effectuation of an inversion of order, "articulates 
separation" (TeI 25/TaI 54). Returning to the sentence in 
question: "Separation is not reflected in thought, but 
produced by it. For in it," Levinas writes, reiterating the 
logically absurd inversion of the "posteriority of the 
anterior," "the After or the Effect conditions the Before or 
the cause: the Before appears and is only welcomed" (TeI 
25/TaI 54). It "appears," however, only as the irreducible 
ambiguity or enigma of the equiprimordiality of the 
chronological and "logical" orders. Therefore, what is 
reflected upon in this effectuation is not the appearance of 
something, as is usually the case in production, but the 
ambiguous or enigmatic trace of what withdraws from 
revelation. 
This productionless production or 
"productionlessness"6 characteristic of Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations is marked by "dead time." 
The interval of discretion or of death is a third 
notion between being and nothingness. 
The interval is not to life what potency is to 
act. Its originality consists in being between two 
times. We propose to call this dimension dead time [le 
temps mort]. The rupture of historical and totalized 
duration, which dead time [le temps mort] marks, is the 
very rupture that creation operates in being (TeI 29/TaI 
58). 
"Dead time" marks the "relation without relation" (relation 
sans relation or rapport sans rapport) (Te! 52, 271/TaI 80, 
6Compare with Blanchot's desoeuyrement or 
"worklessness." 
295) of the coqito and the infinite. 7 The phrase rapport 
Bil§ rapport articulates the fact that one "term" of the 
"relation"-the infinite-absolves itself from the 
"relation," withdraws from (or approaches) the "relation," 
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or said otherwise, merely leaves a trace of itself in the 
production of a "double origin" in which it, momentarily 
appearing as an origin, is interminably vulnerable to being 
7Levinas also refers to "dead time" in that section of 
Totality and Infinity entitled "The Infinity of Time." 
Being is not produced [.§..@ produit] at one blow, 
irremissibly present. Reality is what it is, but will 
be once again, another time freely resumed and pardoned. 
Infinite being is produced [se produit] as times, that 
is, in several times across the dead time (~ temps 
mort] that separates the father from the son. It is not 
the f initude of being that constitutes the essence of 
time, as Heidegger thinks, but its infinity. The death 
sentence [l'arret de ,lj& InQ!:t] does not approach as an 
end of being, but as an unknown, which as such suspends 
power. The constitution of the interval that liberates 
being from the limitation of fate calls for death. The 
nothingness of the interval-a dead time (Yn temps 
~]-is the production (production) of infinity (Tel 
260/TaI 284). 
Levinas also refers to "dead time" in that section of 
chapter IV ("Substitution") of Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence entitled "Recurrence." 
The expression "in one's skin" is not a metaphor 
for the in-itself; it refers to a recurrence in the dead 
time [le temps mort] or the meanwhile which separates 
inspiration and expiration, the diastole and systole of 
the heart beating dully against the walls of one's skin 
(AE 138/0B 109). 
Other notable references to "dead time" occur in:. 
1) Maurice Blanchot's The Space of Literature. The 
reference to "dead time" occurs in that section of 
chapter I ("The Essential Solitude") entitled "The 
Fascination of Time's Absence." 
2) Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatoloqy. The reference to 
"dead time" occurs in that section of part I 
("Writing before the Letter"), chapter 2 
("Linguistics and Grammatology") entitled "The 
Hinge." 
reappropriated by the coqito. 
The reading of Levinas' reading of Descartes' 
Meditations undertaken thus far has focused on the 
relationship of the coqito and the infinite. This should 
come as no surprise since it is to this relationship that 
Levinas continually returns when he reads the Meditations. 
But "dead time" not only marks the rapport sans rapport of 
the coqito and the infinite, but also the rapport §.All.§. 
rapport of the coqito and the evil genius. 
At the beginning of that section of Totality and 
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Infinity entitled "Truth Presupposes Justice" Levinas points 
out that taking the cogito as the "first certitude"-which 
I 
is characteristic of the first movement-constitutes "an 
arbitrary halt not justified of itself" (Te! 65/TaI 92-3) . 8 
For in the coqito the thinking subject 
ends up at the affirmation of an evidence that is not a 
final or initial affirmation, for it can be cast into 
doubt in its turn. The truth of the second negation, 
then, is affirmed at a still deeper level-but, once 
again, one not impervious to negation. This is not 
purely and simply a Sisyphean labor, since the distance 
traversed each time is not the same; it is a movement of 
descent toward an ever more profound abyss which we 
elsewhere have called there i.§ [il ya], beyond 
affirmation and negation (Te! 65-6/TaI 93). 
8In "God and Philosophy" Levinas likewise uses the term 
"halt" to describe what in Totality and Infinity he called 
the "first movement." But here he uses it in the context of 
the relationship of the coqito and the infinite. 
After the certainty of the coqito, present to itself in 
the second Meditation, after the "halt" which the last 
lines of the Meditation mark, the third Meditation 
announces that "in some way I have in me the notion of 
the infinite earlier than the finite--to wit, the notion 
of God before that of myself" (GP 160). 
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It is as if the certitude of the cogito--which is 
characteristic of the first movement-were "not yet," as if 
every attempt to actualize it were interrupted in the very 
attempt. 
With this passage Levinas joins Descartes' description 
of the evil genius in the Meditations with his own account 
of the il y a, the "there is," that he had himself offered 
in Existence and Existents and in Time and the Other. The 
evil genius was introduced by Descartes to extend the range 
of issues which might be put into doubt. But the doubt 
arising from the evil genius is not only more extensive but 
also more potent than any doubt arising from a personal 
reflection on the fallibility of our senses. This doubt, by 
tearing one out of the world, thrusts one into a world that 
is not a world-an absolutely silent world, "an-archic, 
without principle, without a beginning." It thrusts one 
into a world where "thought would strike nothing 
substantial," where "on first contact the phenomena would 
degrade into appearance and in this sense would remain in 
equivocation" (TeI 63/TaI 90). It is this equivocation 
which constitutes the potency of the doubt arising from the 
evil genius. 
The equivocation here is not due to the confusion of two 
notions, two substances, or two properties. It is not 
to be counted among the confusions produced within a 
world that has already appeared. Nor is it the 
confusion of being and nothingness. What appears is not 
degraded into a nothing. But the appearance, which is 
not a nothing, is not a being either-not even an 
interior being, for it is nowise in itself (TeI 63/TaI 
91). 
The equivocal appearance of the phenomena is neither pure 
nothingness nor a straightforward appearance in itself 
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which, as such, would bear the signs enabling one to dismiss 
it and save one from being misled by it. Appearance is 
frightening precisely because of this equivocality, 
precisely because it only might deceive one. And because 
thought strikes nothing substantial, the I in the equivocal 
spiralling movement of negation and implicit affirmation 
does not find in the cogito itself a stopping place. It 
enters into a vertiginous "movement of descent [ .•• ]beyond 
affirmation and negation," where, like the subject 
interrupted by the infinite, it dwells in the equivocal 
interval between being and nothingness. In that section of 
Existence and Existents entitled "Existence Without 
Existents" Levinas writes: 
When the forms of things are dissolved in the night, the 
darkness of the night, which is neither an object nor 
the quality of an object, invades like a presence. In 
the night, where we are riven to it, we are not dealing 
with anything. But this nothing is not that of pure 
nothing-ness. There is no longer this or .th.gt; there is 
not "something." But this universal absence is in its 
turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable presence. It 
is not the dialectical counterpart of absence, and we do 
not grasp it through a thought. It is immediately 
there. There is no discourse. Nothing responds to us, 
but this silence; the voice of this silence is 
understood and frightens like the silence of those 
infinite spaces Pascal speaks of. There is [il ya], in 
general, without it mattering what there is, without our 
being able to fix a substantive to this term. There is 
[il y a) is an impersonal form, like in it rains, or it 
is warm. Its anonymity is essential. The mind does not 
find itself faced with an apprehended exterior. ·The 
exterior~if one insists on this term~remains 
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uncorrelated with an interior. It is no longer given. 
It is no longer a world. What we call the I is itself 
submerged by the night, invaded, depersonalized, stifled 
by it. The disappearance of all things and of the I 
leaves what cannot disappear, the sheer fact of being in 
which one participates, whether one wants to or not, 
without having taken the initiative, anonymously. Being 
remains, like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere 
belonging to no one, universal, returning in the midst 
of the negation which put it aside, and in all the 
powers to which that negation may be multiplied. 9 
This reference to negation brings us back to Levinas' 
reading of doubt in Descartes' Meditations. 
It was pointed out above that taking the coqito as the 
"first certitude"-which is characteristic of the first 
movement-constitutes "an arbitrary halt not justified of 
itself" (TeI 65/TaI 92-3). For in. the coqito the thinking 
subject 
ends up at the affirmation of an evidence that is not a 
final or initial affirmation, for it can be cast into 
doubt in its turn. The truth of the second negation, 
then, is affirmed at a still deeper level-but, once 
again, one not impervious to negation. This is not 
purely and simply a Sisyphean labor, since the distance 
traversed each time is not the same; it is a movement of 
descent toward an ever more profound abyss which we 
elsewhere have called there is [il ya), beyond 
affirmation and negation (TeI 65-6/TaI 93). 
Levinas outlines here, I would suggest, two movements not 
wholly unlike those outlined with regard to the coqito and 
the infinite. 
This reading of Levinas' reading of Descartes' 
Meditations is disruptive on several different levels. 
9Emmanuel Levinas, De !'existence a l'existant (Paris: 
Vrin, 1984), 94-95. /Existence and Existents, trans~ 
Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 58. 
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First, doubling the "double origin" disrupts any linear 
reading of the Meditations that would easily step from the 
evil genius to the certitude of the cogito, and then to the 
cogito's relationship with the infinite. That is, it 
disrupts any reading that would leave the evil genius 
behind, that would treat it as merely a step on the way to 
the cogito's relationship with the infinite. Second, 
doubling the "double origin" likewise disrupts any linear 
reading of Levinas' work. One can locate such a disruption 
in the relationship of silence and language delimited by 
Levinas in the context of his reading of Descartes' 
Meditations. Briefly, the "ever renewed equivocation 
(equivogue toujours renouvelae)" (TeI 63/TaI 91) 
characteristic of the silence of the evil genius/il y a 
cannot simply be opposed (as Levinas sometimes leads one to 
believe) to the "total frankness ever renewed [franchise 
totale, toujours renouvelee]" (TeI 71/TaI 98) characteristic 
of language. By the same token, this silence cannot easily 
be inscribed in a linear reading that would situate it as a 
step on the way to the frankness of language. The "ever 
renewed frankness" is always already accompanied (haunted?) 
by the "ever renewed equivocation." In fact, the "ever 
renewed equivocation" is the "inverse of language" (TeI 
64/TaI 91), the inverse of the "ever renewed frankness" 
characteristic of language. Perhaps one should read 
"inverse" here as inverse sides of the same coin. This puts 
any simple step into the "frankness" of language, into the 
"frankness" of the "ethical" relation, into question. 
The reading of Levinas' reading of Descartes' 
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Meditations undertaken above has already begun to address, 
though not explicitly, the question of language in Levinas' 
work. Language, for Levinas, is itself the relation to 
infinity and the il y a, the rapport sans rapport. In a 
passage typical of several programmatic statements on 
language in Totality and Infinity Levinas writes that 
language is 
an attitude of the same with regard to the Other, 
irreducible to the representation of the Other, 
irreducible to an intention of thought, irreducible to a 
consciousness of ••• , since relating to what no 
consciousness can contain, relating to the infinity of 
the Other. Language is not enacted within a 
consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and 
reverberates in consciousness by putting it in question 
(TeI 179/TaI 204). 
In the Preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas addresses 
the relationship between language as this rapport sans 
rapport and the exposition of this relation in the book. 
The word by way of preface [pr~face) which seeks to 
break through the screen stretched between the author 
and the reader by the book itself [ ••• ] belongs to the 
very essence of language, which consists in continually 
undoing its phrase by the foreword [l'avant-propos) or 
the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to 
restate without ceremonies what has already been ill 
understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the 
said delights (TeI XVIII/Ta! 30). 
This prefatory word (or fore-word) serves as an inaugural 
reminder that a reading of what is said in the book must 
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always already be accompanied by an unsaying. It announces 
that the language of Totality and Infinity is not exempt 
from the responsibility which language as rapport sans 
rapport exposes one--the unsaying of what is said. Totality 
and Infinity is a book that, by way of this prefatory word 
(or fore-word), interrupts itself. 
Thirteen years later in Otherwise than Being this 
prefatory word (or fore-word) is not only formally 
thematized but, at the same time, written into the very 
argument and exposition of the text. This was almost 
certainly in response to readers such as Blanchet and 
Derrida who point out numerous ways Totality and Infinity 
can too easily be read. This response is called for because 
in most cases the once only prefatory word has to do all the 
work of unsaying what is merely programmatically said in 
Totality and Infinity. One notable exception, however, is 
Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations. Here there is 
an intratextual performance of what is merely announced 
extratextually by the prefatory word (or fore-word). Here 
there is the production of a work (Descartes', as well as 
Levinas') that is unproductive, that responds to the 
productionlessness of the work. In fact, the reading of 
Descartes' Meditations produced by Levinas in Totality and 
Infinity is, perhaps, not merely an anticipation of what he 
will later formalize and write into the very production of 
Otherwise than Being, but moreover, that which teaches him 
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the way to produce a work that responds to its own 
productionlessness. For this reading~~hich, as will become 
apparent in chapter III of this dissertation, plays both a 
decisive and a pervasive role in Totality and Infinity~is 
heavily drawn upon in Levinas' formal thematization of 
skepticism and the saying of the otherwise than being in 
Otherwise than Being. 
Early in Otherwise than Being Levinas addresses, in 
language nearly identical to his announcement of the 
prefatory word (or fore-word), the "methodological problem" 
(AE 8/0B 7) of a pre-original saying "put forth in the 
foreword [le propos ~ l'avant-propos]" (AE 6/0B 5), or said 
otherwise, of "a forward preceding languages (avant-propos 
des langues]" (AE 6/0B 5). 
The otherwise than being is stated in a saying that must 
also be unsaid in order thus to extract the otherwise 
than being from the said in which it already comes to 
signify but a being otherwise (AE 8/0B 7). 
The unsaying of the said is cast by Levinas in terms of 
conveying and betraying. 
We have been seeking the otherwise than being from the 
beginning, and as soon as it is conveyed before us it is 
betrayed in the said that dominates the saying which 
states it. A methodological problem arises here, 
whether the pre-original element of saying (the 
anarchical, the non-original, as we designate it) can be 
led to betray itself by showing itself in a theme (if an 
an-archeology is possible), and whether this betrayal 
can be reduced; whether one can at the same time know 
and free the known of the marks which thematization 
leaves on it by subordinating it to ontology. 
Everything shows itself at the price of this betrayal, 
even the unsayable. In this betrayal the indiscretion 
with regard to the unsayable, which is probably the very 
task of philosophy, becomes possible (AE 8/0B 7). 
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Levinas rhetorically asks whether this betrayal, in which 
everything is inevitably conveyed, can be reduced~that is, 
whether the betrayal can be clandestinely caught in the act 
or listened in upon, so to speak. The betrayal can be 
reduced, Levinas insists, if one is attentive to the 
ambiguous trace of "the pre-original element of saying" (AE 
a/OB 7) inscribed in the said, inscribed in particular 
betrayals of (read as a double genitive) the history of 
philosophy. 
Saying, on the one hand, is the way the otherwise than 
being is said, the way the reduction of the betrayal is 
produced. But this is not "the pre-original element of 
saying." It is, rather, that element of saying which is 
merely a particular form of the said, specifically, the way 
something (including the pre-original element of language) 
is said. 
Saying, on the other hand, is the pre-original, an-
archical or excessive element of language that exceeds 
language. It is that which is "otherwise than being." 
as excessive it inevitably gets reinscribed in the said. 
But 
It 
is however, as was noted in the previous paragraph, 
reinscribed in a particular way. Saying, as the excessive 
element of language that exceeds language, leaves a trace of 
itself in an "ambiguous or enigmatic way of speaking" (AE 
9/0B 7), "in the form of ambiguity, of diachronic 
expression" (AE 56/0B 44). 
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Saying, on the one hand, is the trace of saying on the 
other hand. 
Saying, on the one hand, that is, the reduction of a 
betrayal, 
is produced [~ produit] out of time or in two times 
without entering into either of them, as an endless 
critique, or skepticism, which in a spiralling movement 
makes possible the boldness of philosophy, destroying 
the conjunction into which its saying and its said 
continually enter (AE 57/0B 44). 
This passage echoes the reading of Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations undertaken in the previous sections 
of this chapter~specifically, the production of two 
irreducible times, the chronological and the logical order 
(Tel 25/TaI 54), and the spiralling movement of doubt (Tel 
65-66/TaI 93)~as well as raise the question of the role of 
skepticism in the production of Levinas' work. 
Skepticism is introduced in Otherwise than Being 
alongside Levinas' first formal thematization of the saying 
and the said. Here the necessity of unsaying the said, of 
reducing the betrayal inevitable characteristic of any 
attempt to convey the otherwise than being, is likened to 
skepticism. 
Skepticism, at the dawn of phi~hy, set forth and 
betrayed the diachrony of this~~;;; conveying and 
betraying. To conceive the otherwise than being 
requires, perhaps, as much audacity as skepticism shows, 
when it does not hesitate to affirm the impossibility of 
statement while venturing to realize this impossibility 
by the very statement of this impossibility. If, after 
innumerable "irrefutable" refutations which logical 
thought sets against it, skepticism has the gall to 
return (and it always returns as philosophy's · 
illegitimate child), it is because in the contradiction 
which logic sees in it the "at the same time" of the 
contradictories is missing, because a secret diachrony 
commands this ambiguous or enigmatic way of speaking, 
and because in general signification signifies beyond 
synchrony, beyond essence (AE 9/0B 7). 
But skepticism does not remain merely an aid to 
understanding the language of Otherwise than Being, and 
43 
therefore something essentially external to the production 
of the work. On the contrary, the skeptical saying is bound 
ever more closely to the saying of the otherwise than being. 
It is as though the qualification "perhaps," so prominent in 
skepticism's introduction at the beginning of the work, were 
increasingly obscured throughout the production of Otherwise 
than Being until finally, towards the end of the work, 
Levinas writes: "Language is already skepticism" (AE 216/0B 
170). That the skeptical saying becomes bound ever more 
closely to the saying of the otherwise than being is 
likewise evident in the following passage from the end of 
the work. 
If the pre-original reason of difference, non-
indifference, responsibility, a fine risk, conserves its 
signification, the couple skepticism and refutation of 
skepticism has to make its appearance alongside of the 
reason in representation, knowing, and deduction, served 
by logic and synchronizing the successive (AE 213/0B 
167). 
Notice that the equivocal qualification "perhaps," so 
prominent in skepticism's introduction at the beginning of 
the work, is here replaced by the unequivocal and emphatic 
phrase "has to." 
That section at the end of Otherwise than Being 
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entitled "Skepticism and Reason"-which is the location of 
the two passages from the previous paragraph that illustrate 
the proximity of the skeptical saying and the saying of the 
otherwise than being-is the location of the most extensive 
treatment of skepticism in Otherwise than Being. 
The periodic return of skepticism and of its refutation 
signify a temporality in which the instants refuse 
memory which recuperates and represents. Skepticism, 
which traverses the rationality or logic of knowledge, 
is a refusal to synchronize the implicit affirmation 
contained in saying and the negation which this 
affirmation states in the said. The contradiction is 
visible to reflection, which refutes it, but skepticism 
is insensitive to the refutation, as though the 
affirmation and negation did not resound in the same 
time. Skepticism then contests the thesis that between 
the saying and the said the relationship that connects 
in synchrony a condition with the conditioned is 
repeated (AE 213/0B 167-168). 
The skeptical statement is inevitably refutable when there 
is a recognition-in a "second time" (AE 199/0B 156), that 
is, in reflection or "after the event" (apres coup)-of the 
condition of the statement that states the skeptical 
signification. But the skeptical saying, does not merely 
allow itself to be walled up in the condition of its 
enunciation. It benefits from an ambiguity or enigma 
devolving from the very production of a contradiction that 
contests or negates it, that walls it up and domesticates 
it. It contests the thesis that the relationship between 
the two times integral to the production of a contradiction 
is merely a relationship of conditioned (the "first time") 
and condition (the "second time"), taken as though they both 
resounded in the same time. 
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The truth of skepticism [i.e., the statement of "the 
rupture, failure, impotence or impossibility of 
discourse" (AE 214/0B 168)] is put on the same level as 
the truths whose interruption and failure its discourse 
states, as though the negation of the possibility of the 
true were ranked in the order restored by this negation, 
as though every difference were incontestably reabsorbed 
into the same order. But to contest the possibility of 
truth is precisely to contest this uniqueness of order 
and level (AE 213-214/0B 168). 
The production of the contradiction that contests the 
skeptical statement is compromised because it presupposes 
precisely what the skeptical statement calls into 
question-the uniqueness of order and level. The "at the 
same time" of the two times of the contradiction-which for 
traditional logic re-establishes the priority of the "second 
time," the condition of the enunciation, by reabsorbing the 
"first time" into the "second time1110-is precisely what the 
skeptical statement calls into question. Here there is, in 
a sense, an inversion of order with regard to the priority 
of the two times integral to the production of a 
contradiction. With the compromise, skepticism returns, 
that is, the "first time" re-establishes its priority over 
the "second time." This compromise is, however, only 
momentary, since the skeptical statement is again vulnerable 
to refutation. 
1
°For Hegel, the "at the same time" of the 
contradictories is the appearance of a new shape on 
consciousness. The nothingness of negation, that is, the 
nothingness of the "first time," is, according to the logic 
of Aµfhebung, not consumed. It is conserved in (and 
elevated into) the new shape of consciousness which Blanchot 
characterizes as a "unity of contraries" (SL 30). 
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This perpetual alternation between the production of a 
contradiction and the compromise of a contradiction (which 
is the return of the signification contradicted), 
articulates the two inextricable moments of the production 
of a trace of saying. It articulates the production of a 
trace of that which has never been present, never appeared. 
This trace does not belong to the assembling of essence. 
Philosophy underestimates the extent of the negation in 
this "not appearing," which exceeds the logical scope of 
negation and affirmation. It is the trace of a 
relationship with illeity that no unity of apperception 
grasps (AE 214/0B 168). 
Philosophy underestimates the extent of the negation in this 
"not appearing" because the trace is neither merely the 
negation of appearance, the "not appearing" of that which 
exceeds language (as in the production of a contradiction 
that negates or refutes the skeptical saying) nor merely the 
"appearing" of that which exceeds language (as in the 
compromise of the contradiction). Each of these moments is 
merely one of two inextricable moments necessary for the 
production of a trace. 
Rather than its signification being merely refuted, 
reabsorbed, or consumed, that which exceeds language 
"conserves its signification" (AE 213/0B 167) in the 
production of a trace. It "conserves its signif ication"-at 
least momentarily-in the production of a trace, in the 
perpetual alternation characteristic of "the couple 
skepticism and refutation of skepticism" (AE 213/0B 167). 
This perpetual alternation or "spiralling movement" 
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(AE 57/0B 44) echoes one aspect of Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations in Totality and Infinity. At the 
beginning of that section of Totality and Infinity entitled 
"Truth Presupposes Justice" Levinas points out that taking 
the coqito as the "first certitude"-which is characteristic 
of the first movement-constitutes "an arbitrary halt not 
justified of itself" (Tel 65/TaI 92-93). For in the cogito 
the thinking subject 
ends up at the affirmation of an evidence that is not a 
final or initial affirmation, for it can be cast into 
doubt in its turn. The truth of the second negation, 
then, is affirmed at a still deeper level-but, once 
again, one not impervious to negation. This is not 
purely and simply a Sisyphean labor, since the distance 
traversed each time is not the same; it is a movement of 
descent toward an ever more profound abyss which we 
elsewhere have called there i.§. [il ya], beyond 
affirmation and negation (Tel 65-66/TaI 93). 
It is as if the certitude of the coqito-which is 
characteristic of the first movement-were "not yet," as if 
every attempt to actualize it were interrupted in the very 
attempt. 
Another aspect of Levinas' reading of Descartes' 
Meditations in Totality and Infinity is echoed in another 
formal thematization of the saying of the otherwise than 
being-a thematization closely bound to Levinas' 
thematization of the skeptical saying. That section of 
Otherwise than Being entitled "From the Saying to the Said, 
or the Wisdom of Desire" addresses the way the saying of the 
otherwise than being shows itself in the said. One 
particular paragraph of this section calls for close 
attention. It begins: "That the ontological form of the 
said could not alter the signification of the beyond being 
which shows itself in this said devolves from the very 
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contestation of this signification." (AE 198/0B 156). That 
the conveying of the signification of the beyond being is 
not a complete betrayal of this signification, that the 
inevitable betrayal inherent in the conveying of the 
signification of the beyond can be reduced, devolves from 
the very production of a contradiction that is the 
contestation of this signification. Following upon this 
provisional statement Levinas rhetorically asks two 
provisional questions that will eventually call for a re-
reading: 
How would the contestation of the pretension beyond 
being have meaning if this pretension were not heard? 
Is there a negation in which the sense of which the 
negation is a negation is not conserved (AE 198/0B 156)? 
The significance of all three of these provisional sentences 
can only be determined within the context of a detailed 
explanation of the production of a contradiction, including 
of course, the contradiction that is the contestation of the 
signification beyond being. 
The contradiction which the signification of the beyond 
being~which evidently is not~should compromise is 
inoperative without a second time, without reflection on 
the condition of the statement that states this 
signification. In this reflection, that is, only after 
the event [apres £QYp], contradiction appears: it does 
not break out between two simultaneous statements, but 
between a statement and its conditions, as though they 
were in the same time (AE 198-199/0B 156). 
The signification of the beyond being should, according to 
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Levinas, compromise the very contradiction that contests it. 
That this signification actually contests the very 
contradicti9n that contests it devolves from the production 
of this contradiction. The production of a contradiction, 
which refutes the signification of the beyond being and 
reabsorbs it into the said, requires two times~the 
statement of the beyond being and the reflection on the 
condition of the statement that states this signification. 
contradiction appears only in this reflection, that is, only 
after the event, when the two times are taken as though they 
were in the same time. The signification of the beyond 
being is, therefore, evidently not beyond being when, in 
reflection, it is discovered that the subject is the 
condition of the enunciation. With this delimitation of the 
production of a contradiction one gets a hint of the 
significance of the first rhetorical question provisionally 
asked at the beginning of the paragraph: "How would the 
contestation of the pretension beyond being have meaning if 
this pretension were not heard?" The contradiction that is 
the contestation of the signification beyond being could not 
be produced, and therefore would not be effective as a 
contestation of this signification, if one moment of its 
production did not include the pretension of the 
signification beyond being. still more, however, needs to 
be said on how this signification is heard without it being 
completely betrayed. Can there be a betrayal, as the second 
rhetorical question asks, in which the sense of which the 
betrayal is a betrayal is not completely conserved? That 
is, can the betrayal be reduced? 
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This delimitation of the production of a contradiction 
also raises the question of the proximity of the 
signification of the beyond being (or otherwise than being) 
and the skeptical saying. The contradiction that is the 
contestation of the skeptical saying is, like the 
contradiction that is the contestation of the saying of the 
beyond being, produced in two times-"the implicit 
affirmation contained in saying [i.e., the condition of the 
statement of the skeptical saying (AE 213/0B 168)] and the 
negation which this affirmation states in the said" (AE 
213/0B 167). The contradiction, which refutes the skeptical 
saying, is only "visible to reflection" which takes these 
two times as though they resounded in the same time. 
But the saying of the beyond being, like the skeptical 
saying, does not allow itself to be walled up in the 
conditions of its enunciation. It likewise benefits from an 
ambiguity or enigma devolving from the very production of a 
contradiction that contests or negates it, that walls it up 
and domesticates it. 
The way in which the saying of the beyond being does 
not allow itself to be walled up in the condition of its 
enunciation echoes one aspect of Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations. 
51 
The statement of the beyond being, of the name of God, 
does not allow itself to be walled up in the conditions 
of its enunciation. It benefits from an ambiguity or an 
enigma, which is not the effect of an inattention, a 
relaxation of thought, but of an extreme proximity of 
the neighbor, where the Infinite comes to pass. The 
Infinite does not enter into a theme like a being to be 
given in it, and thus belie its beyond being. Its 
transcendence, an exteriority, more exterior, more other 
than any exteriority of being, does not come to pass 
save through the subject that confesses or contests it. 
Here there is an inversion of order: the revelation is 
made by him that receives it, by the inspired subject 
whose inspiration, alterity in the same, is the 
subjectivity or psyche of the subject (AE 199/0B 156). 
The statement of the beyond being is inevitably refutable. 
The subject that merely confesses the infinite 
recognizes-in a "second time," that is, in reflection or 
"after the event" (apris coup)-that it is the condition of 
the confession. It recognizes the statement of the beyond 
being as self-contradictory. Having recognized itself as 
the condition of the confession, it recognizes itself as the 
contestation of the confession. Descartes alludes to this 
contestation in the Meditations. Early in the second 
Meditation, following the first Meditation's pathway of 
doubt and immediately preceding the discovery of the cogito 
as the absolutely originary condition of certitude, 
Descartes writes: 
Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I 
know that there is not something else which does not 
allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there 
not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me 
['···puts into my mind' (French version)] the thoughts 
I am now having? But why do I think this, since I 
myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts (M 
16)? 
Or,. said in the language of Levinas' reading of Descartes' 
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Meditations in Totality and Infinity, the "second time" 
integral to the production of a contradiction, that is, the 
reflection on the condition of the "first time"-that is, 
the pretentious statement or confession of the beyond being 
characteristic of what Levinas calls the "logical" order-is 
recognized as the chronological order. 
While the confession of the infinite by the subject 
inevitably contests the infinite, Levinas insists that the 
infinite does not come to pass, does not leave a trace of 
itself, save through the subject that confesses it or that 
contests it by recognizing itself as the condition of the 
enunciation. Or, said in the language of Levinas' reading 
of Descartes' Meditations in Totality and Infinity, the 
infinite does not come to pass, does not leave a trace of 
itself, save through the chronological order that takes the 
coqito as the cause of the infinite. But this inevitable 
refutation or contestation is obviously only ha.l.f of the 
story necessary for the infinite to come to pass, for the 
production of a trace of the infinite. Were it the whole 
story, the recognition of the contradiction would merely 
alter the signification of the beyond being, would merely 
domesticate the infinite by walling it up in the condition 
on its enunciation, thereby conceding that the last word 
belongs to logical, rational philosophical discourse. 
The other half of the story, devolving from the first 
half of the story, involves the infinite's resistance to 
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being walled up in the condition of its enunciation. 
Levinas is perhaps a bit too unequivocal when he writes: 
the statement of the beyond being, of the name of God, does 
not allow itself to be walled up. Given the first half of 
the story, Levinas would perhaps be more accurate writing: 
the statement of the beyond being, of the name of God, does 
not merely allow itself to be walled up. It does not merely 
allow itself to be walled up in the condition of its 
enunciation because it benefits from an ambiguity or enigma 
with respect to the condition of the enunciation. That is, 
the condition of the enunciation is not, as it may appear on 
initial reflection, merely the subject. The subject 
recognizes-again, in a "second time," that is, in 
reflection or "after the event" (apres coup)-that the 
condition of its confession is the infinite. or, again said 
in the language of Levinas' reading of Descartes' 
Meditations in Totality and Infinity, there is the discovery 
of the "logical" order that subtends the evidence of the 
cogito, that takes the infinite as the cause of the cogito. 
The "second time" integral to the production of a 
contradiction, that is, the reflection on the condition of 
the "first time" that is the statement or confession of the 
beyond being, is recognized as the "logical" order rather 
than the chronological order. Here there is an inversion of 
order with respect to the condition of the enunciation, an 
inversion of the two times integral to the production of a 
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contradiction. The revelation is made by him or her that 
receives it. The confession or contestation of the infinite 
is made by him or her that is always already inspired by the 
infinite, by the inspired subject whose inspiration, 
alterity in the same, infinite within the finite, is the 
subjectivity or psyche of the subject. 
The infinite can .Qnly come to pass, can .Qnly leave a 
trace of itself, in the irresolvably ambiguous or enigmatic 
"double condition" of its enunciation produced by a "double 
reading." The "double reading" of Descartes' Meditations 
does not allow the two times integral to the production of a 
contradiction to merely be thought "as though they were in 
the same time" (AE 199/0B 156). This "double reading" 
compromises the mere synchronization of the two times, it 
compromises the mere reabsorption of the "logical" order 
into the chronological order because it necessarily yet 
impossibly thinks the equiprimordiality of the chronological 
order that articulates the cogito as the condition of the 
enunciation, that is, as the condition of the infinite and 
the "logical" order that articulates the infinite as the 
condition of the enunciation (because it articulates the 
infinite as the condition of the cogito). 
The logically absurd inversion of the two times 
integral to the production of a contradiction does not, as 
Levinas writes in his reading of Descartes' Meditations in 
Totality and Infinity, "indicate an illusion" (Te! 25/TaI 
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54). It "is not," as he writes in Otherwise than Being, 
"the effect of an inattention, a relaxation of thought, but 
of an extreme proximity of the neighbor, where the infinite 
comes to pass" (AE 199/0B 156)~that is, it is the trace of 
the infinite, of the otherwise than being, of the beyond 
being. 
The significance of the three provisional sentences 
that opened the paragraph in question can now be determined. 
The paragraph began: "That the ontological form of the said 
could not alter the signification of the beyond being which 
shows itself in the said devolves from the very contestation 
of this signification" (AE 198/0B 156). That the conveying 
of the signification of the beyond being is not a complete 
betrayal of this signification, that the inevitable betrayal 
inherent in conveying of the signification can be reduced, 
devolves from the very production of a contradiction that is 
the contestation of this signification. The two times 
integral to the production of a contradiction are prevented 
by the "double reading" from merely being thought "as though 
they were in the same time" (AE 199/0B 156). There is, 
rather, a perpetual alternation between the production of 
the contradiction (when, according to the chronological 
order, the cogito is recognized as the condition of the 
enunciation of the signification of the beyond being) gng 
the compromise of the contradiction, that is, the return of 
the signification of the beyond being (when, according to 
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the "logical" order, the infinite is recognized as the 
condition of the enunciation). The infinite is inevitably 
refutable, contestable, contradictory~but it returns. The 
second provisional sentence rhetorically asks: "How would 
the contestation of the pretension beyond being have meaning 
if this pretension were not heard" {AE 198/0B 156)? The 
contradiction that is the contestation of the pretension 
beyond being could not be produced without two times, one of 
which is the "logical" order, the pretension beyond being, 
that is inevitably refutable but that returns as one moment 
of the perpetual alternation between the production of the 
contradiction and the compromise of the contradiction (which 
is the return of the return of the signification 
contradicted). The pretension is heard (at least 
momentarily) because it is one moment of the perpetual 
alternation. The third provisional sentence rhetorically 
asks: "Is there a negation in which the sense of which the 
negation is a negation is not conserved" {AE 198/0B 156)? 
The answer: yes, when the two times integral to the 
production of a contradiction are prevented by a "double 
reading" from merely being thought "as though they were in 
the same time" (AE 199/0B 156), when there is a perpetual 
alternation between the production of a contradiction and 
the compromise of the contradiction. The negation is not 
conserved (at least completely) because it is merely one 
moment of the perpetual alternation. 
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The second and third provisional sentences, presented 
in the form of rhetorical questions, serve to articulate 
characteristics of the two inextricable moments of the 
production of a trace of the saying of the beyond being. 
This trace, as has already been pointed out, is produced by 
a necessary yet impossible "double reading," by a perpetual 
alternation between the production of a contradiction and 
the compromise of the contradiction (which is the return of 
the signification contradicted) neither of which can be 
extricated or abstracted from the other. With the trace, 
therefore, the signification of the beyond being, the 
pretension beyond being, is conserved, it is heard (at least 
momentarily) and, at the same time, the negation is not 
conserved (at least completely), because both~ merely as 
moments of a perpetual alternation. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE, NIHILISM, AND DEAD TIME 
The life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks 
from death and keeps itself untouched by 
devastation, but rather the life that endures 
it and maintains itself in it. 
-Hegel 
"[L]iterature begins," Blanchot writes in "Literature 
and the Right to Death," "at the moment when literature 
becomes a question. "1 What is "literature" insofar as 
Blanchot writes that it begins at the moment it becomes a 
question? Perhaps one should begin, however, not with the 
term "literature," but with the term "question" since it 
seems, from the very beginning, to render this 
phrase-"literature begins at the moment when literature 
becomes a question"-questionable. That is, would not the 
moment when literature becomes a question, becomes 
questionable, presage the end of literature rather than its 
beginning? I would suggest that one begin with this 
ambiguous and questionable "question." 
1Maurice Blanchot, "la litterature et le droit ! la 
mort," in La Part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 293, 
hereafter cited in the text as LDM. / "Literature and the 
Right to Death," in The Gaze of Orpheus, trans. Lydia Davis 
(Barrytown, New York: Station Hill Press, 1981), 21, 
hereafter cited in the text as LRD. 
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This question-"the 'question' that seeks to pose 
itself in literature, the 'question' that is its essence" 
(LDM 311/LRD 41)-is posed to language l2Y language that has 
become literature. This question li the "irreducible double 
meaning (un double sens irr6ductible]" (LDM 330/LRD 61) of 
death as possibility and death as impossibility, that is, 
death as an absolute alterity that infinitely approaches (or 
withdraws), the "is not yet" or "dead time." "Literature," 
Blanchot writes in the concluding sentence of the essay, "is 
the form this double meaning has chosen in which to show 
itself behind the meaning and value of words, and the 
question it asks is the question asked by literature" (LDM 
331/LRD 62). This question is what Blanchot, in The Space of 
Literature, calls "double death [la double mort]. 11 
I will limit my remarks on "Literature and the Right 
to Death" to a reading of two of what Blanchot calls a 
writer's temptations. One temptation-"revolution" or 
"revolutionary action"-marks the first instance of 
Blanchot's irreducibly ambiguous reading of the following 
passage from the Preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: 
"[T)he life of Spirit is [ ••• ] the life that endures (death] 
and maintains itself in it" (PS 19). Literature .begins at 
the moment when it becomes a question, that is, at the 
moment when an initial reading of this line, which reads 
death as possibility, turns into a reading of this line 
which reads death as impossibility. Death, as this turning 
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itself, leaves a trace of itself, I would suggest, in the 
production or performance of an interminable step/not beyond 
(.1§. ~ au-dela), an eternal step beyond that eternally 
returns. This reading of "revolution" or "revolutionary 
action" will raise the question of the proximity of this 
temptation and Blanchot's reading in L'entretien infini of 
nihilism in the work of Nietzsche. Nihilism is another 
temptation of a writer named by Blanchot in "Literature and 
the Right to Death." A reading that raises the question of 
the proximity of "revolution" and nihilism will, therefore, 
raise several questions: What is the relationship of 
nihilism (or scepticism), named as a writer's temptation by 
Blanchot in "Literature and the Right to Death," and the 
nihilism of Blanchot's reading of the work of Nietzsche in 
L'entretien infini? What is the relationship of Blanchot's 
reading of Hegel in "Literature and the Right to Death" and 
his reading of Nietzsche in L'entretien infini? Is the 
nihilism of Blanchot's reading of the work of Nietzsche 
inscribed in his reading of Hegel's Pbenomenology of Spirit? 
In the first part of "Literature and the Right to 
Death"-that part which culminates in a reading of 
"revolution" or "revolutionary action" as one of a writer's 
temptations-Blanchot reads the experience of the writer 
alongside the experience of natural consciousness in Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Or more precisely, he re-writes 
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the experience of natural consciousness as an experience of 
a writer. For example, Blanchet describes work--citing an 
interpretation offered by Koj&ve in his Introduction A la 
lecture de Hegel CLecons sur La Ph,nom,noloqie de 
l'Espritl~as the realization of a plan through a process of 
transformation. It is a production that effectuates the 
appearance of something. 2 Blanchet uses the example of 
making a stove in order to get warm. 
For example, my project might be to get warm. As long 
as this project is only a desire, I can turn it over 
every possible way and still it will not make me warm. 
But now I build a stove: the stove transforms the empty 
ideal which was my desire into something real; it 
affirms the presence in the world of something which was 
not there before, and in so doing, denies something 
which was there before; before, I had in front of me 
stones and cast iron; now I no longer have either stones 
or cast iron, but instead the product of the 
transformation of these elements~that is, their denial 
and destruction~by work. Because of this object, the 
world is now different. All the more different because 
this stove will allow me to make other objects, which 
will in turn deny the former condition of the world and 
prepare its future. These objects, which I have 
produced by changing the state of things, will in turn 
change me. The idea of heat is nothing, but actual heat 
will make my life a different kind of life, and every 
new thing I am able to do from now on because of this 
heat will also make me someone different. Thus is 
history formed, say Hegel and Marx~by work which 
realizes being in denying it, and reveals it at the end 
of the negation (LDM 304-305/LRD 33). 
Reading this interpretation of Hegel alongside the 
experience of a writer Blanchet writes: "If we see work as 
the force of history, the force that transforms man while it 
transforms the world, then a writer's activity must be 
2See chapter I of this dissertation for a description 
of production in Levinas' work. 
recognized as the highest form of work" (LDM 304/LRD 33). 
For a writer not only "produces [a] work by transforming 
natural and human realities," he or she does it "to an 
outstanding degree" (LDM 305/LRD 34) insofar as his or her 
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destructive act of transformation is limitless. The writer 
can write anything. Everything is instantly accessible to 
the writer. Even an enslaved writer, given only a few 
moments of freedom in which to write, can instantly give 
himself or herself a world of freedom. But, as Blanchot 
cautions, one is called to examine the work of the writer 
more closely. 
Insofar as he immediately give himself the freedom he 
does not have, he is neglecting the actual conditions 
for his emancipation, he is neglecting to do the real 
thing that must be done so that the abstract idea of 
freedom can be realized. His negation is global. It 
not only negates his situation as a man who has been 
walled into prison but bypasses time that will open 
holes in these walls; it negates the negation of time, 
it negates the negation of limits. This is why this 
negation negates nothing, in the end, why the work in 
which it is realized is not a truly negative, 
destructive act of transformation, but rather the 
realization of the inability to negate anything, the 
refusal to take part in the world; it transforms the 
freedom which would have to be embodied in things in the 
process of time into an ideal above time, empty and 
inaccessible (LDM 306/LRD 35). 
Blanchot uses a host of terms in this passage and throughout 
"Literature and the Right to Death" that can, with certain 
qualifications, be read as synonymous with one another: 
negation, transformation, realization, and production. This 
passage describes how all of these terms, which on a first 
reading can be read in a Hegelian register, find themselves, 
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upon closer examination or a second reading, to be at a 
certain distance from that Hegelian register. At decisive 
moments in the Phenomenology of Spirit these terms are 
discovered to be at a certain distance from that work, 3 are 
interrupted, or said otherwise, are weakened. For example, 
in the passage just cited, Blanchot describes "the 
realization of the inability to negate [or realize] 
anything." This interruption or weakening of negation, 
transformation, realization, and production, is 
concomitantly the ruination of action. 
The truth is that he ruins action, not because he deals 
with what is unreal but because he makes all of reality 
available to us. Unreality begins with the whole. The 
realm of the imaginary is not a strange region situated 
beyond the world, it is the world itself, but the world 
as entire, manifold, the world as a whole. That is why 
it is not in the world, because it is the world, grasped 
and realized in its entirety by the global negation of 
all the individual realities contained in it, by their 
disqualification, their absence, by the realization of 
that absence itself, which is how literary creation 
begins, for when literary creation goes back over each 
thing and each being, it cherishes the illusion that it 
is creating them, because now it is seeing and naming 
them from the starting point of everything, from the 
starting point of the absence of everything, that is, 
from nothing (LDM 307/LRD 36). 
Literature, like every other activity in the world, 
presupposes the "movement of comprehension," the "movement 
of negation." But literature endeavors to realize or 
produce (that is, effectuate the appearance of) this very 
3For a different reading of this "distance," which is 
read throughout this dissertation as the interval of the "is 
not yet" or "dead time," see Levinas' Totality and Infinity 
(for example Tel 25, 140, 184-185/TaI 54, 166, 209-210). 
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"movement" itself. Blanchet articulates this endeavor in 
various ways and in various locations throughout "Literature 
and the Right to Death." For example: literature is 
"tempted [ ••• ] to try to attain negation in itself and to 
make everything of nothing" (LDM 314/LRD 44). Or, 
literature's "only interest in a thing is in the meaning of 
the thing, its absence, and it would like to attain4 this 
absence absolutely in itself and for itself, to grasp in its 
entirety the infinite movement of comprehension" (LDM 
315/LRD 44). Or, "[l]iterature is not content to accept 
only the fragmentary, successive results of this movement of 
negation: it wants to grasp the movement itself and it 
wants to comprehend the results in their totality" (LDM 
319/LRD 48-49). Literature endeavors to step into that 
which is the very condition of any step. This endeavor is 
tragic because the power of negation, death, is the blind 
spot of language. 
Negation cannot be created out of anything but the 
reality of what it is negating; language derives its 
value and its pride from the fact that it is the 
achievement of this negation; but in the beginning, what 
was lost? The torment of language is what it lacks 
because of the necessity that it be the lack of 
precisely this. It cannot even name it. 
4At the risk of expanding the list to the point of 
meaninglessness, I would suggest that the term "attainment" 
can likewise (again, with certain qualifications) be read as 
synonymous with negation, transformation, realization, and 
production. 
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Whoever sees God dies. 5 In speech what dies is 
what gives life to speech; speech is the life of that 
death, it is "the life that endures death and maintains 
itself in it." What wonderful power. But something was 
there and is no longer there. Something has 
disappeared. How can I recover it, how can I turn 
around and look at what exists before, if all my power 
consists of making it into what exists after? The 
language of literature is a search for this moment which 
precedes literature (LDM 316/LRD 45-46). 
5See also Maurice Blanchot, L'6criture du d6sastre, 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1980), 42 /The Writing of the Disaster, 
trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1986) I 23 • 
I cannot welcome the Other, not even with an acceptance 
that would be infinite. such is the new and difficult 
feature of the plot. The other, as neighbor, is the 
relation that I cannot sustain, and whose approach is 
death itself, the mortal proximity (he who sees God 
dies: for "dying" is one manner of seeing the 
invisible, of saying the ineffable. Dying is the 
indiscretion wherein God, become somehow and necessarily 
a god without truth, surrenders to passivity). 
In both cases, see Exodus 33:18-23. 
Moses said, "I pray thee, show me thy glory." And he 
said, "I will make all my goodness pass before you, and 
will proclaim before you my name 'The LORD'; and I will 
be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show 
mercy on whom I will show mercy. But," he said, "you 
cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live." 
And the LORD said, "Behold, there is a place by me 
where you shall stand upon the rock; and while my glory 
passes by I will put you in a cleft of the rock, and I 
will cover you with my hand until I have passed by; then 
I will take away my hand, and you shall see my back; but 
my face shall not be seen" (Revised Standard Version). 
It is interesting to note that Levinas refers to this 
passage from the Bible in his early articulations of the 
logic of the "trace." See "Meaning and Sense" and "The 
Trace of the Other." It is also interesting to note that a 
few lines after Blanchot writes "Whoever sees God dies" (and 
within the same paragraph) he uses the term "trace:" 
I say ~ flower! But in the absence where I mention it, 
through the oblivion to which I relegate the image it 
gives me, in the depths of this heavy word, itself 
looming up like an unknown thing, I passionately summon 
the darkness of this flower, I summon this perfume that 
passes through me though I do not breathe it, this dust 
that impregnates me though I do not see it, this-color 
which is a trace and not light (LDM 316/LRD 46). 
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Literature realizes, in its tragic endeavor "to become the 
revelation of what revelation destroys" (LDM 317/LRD 47), 
that its "step beyond" is inevitably "not beyond." In a 
passage that perhaps recalls Heidegger's remarks on the term 
"own" (eigen), Blanchet writes that literature "learns that 
it cannot go beyond itself towards its own end" (LDM 318/LRD 
47), towards its ownmost possibility-the "movement of 
negation" itself. One can step beyond "stepping" into the 
very possibility of "stepping" itself only by stepping, that 
is, the step beyond inevitably re-inscribes one in 
"stepping." This tragic step, this step/not beyond (1.§. pas 
au-delA), is the formal articulation, according to Blanchet, 
of those decisive moments in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
when work or production is discovered to be at a certain 
distance from the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
One of those decisive moments in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit is, according to Blanchet, the Revolution. 
"Revolution" or "revolutionary action" is likewise what 
Blanchet calls one of a writer's temptations. A writer's 
temptations are those decisive moments in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, those "decisive moments in history" (LDM 309/LRD 
38, emphasis added), which seem (at least on a first 
reading) to describe the very process of literary creation, 
the destructive act of transformation that is a step into 
the next stage of the dialectical progression. But these 
decisive moments are wrought with ambiguity. For example, 
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"revolution." In the writer, Blanchot writes, "negation 
[ ••. ]wishes to realize itself" (LDM 308/LRD 38). Blanchot 
continues: 
It is at this point that he encounters those decisive 
moments in history when everything seems put in 
question, when law, faith, the State, the world above, 
the world of the past~everything sinks effortlessly, 
without work, into nothingness. The man knows he has 
not stepped out of history, but history is now the void, 
the void in the process of realization; it is absolute 
freedom which has become an event. Such periods are 
given the name Revolution. At this moment, freedom 
aspires to be realized in the immediate form of 
everything is possible, everything can be done. A 
fabulous moment~and not one who has experienced it can 
completely recover from it, since he has experienced 
history as his own history and his own freedom as 
universal freedom. These moments are, in fact, fabulous 
moments: in them, fable speaks; in them, the speech of 
fable becomes action. That the writer should be tempted 
by them is completely appropriate. Revolutionary action 
is in every respect analogous to action as embodied in 
literature: the passage from nothing to everything, the 
affirmation of the absolute as event and of every event 
as absolute (LDM 309/LRD 38). 
Here again there is the ruination of action. 
People cease to be individuals working at specific 
tasks, acting here and only now: each person is 
universal freedom, and universal freedom knows nothing 
about elsewhere or tomorrow, or work or a work 
accomplished. At such times there is nothing left for 
anyone to do, because everything has been done (LDM 
309/LRD 38). 
Concomitant with this ruination of action is the negation of 
the particular reality of the individual. The fabulous 
moment in history when the writer experiences his or her 
"own freedom as universal freedom" (LDM 309/LRD 38, emphasis 
added) ushers in the Reign of Terror, for the decision to 
allow the universality of freedom to assert itself 
completely in him or her negates the particular reality of 
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his or her life (LDM 310/LRD 39). 
This is the meaning of the Reign of Terror. Every 
citizen has a right to death, so to speak: death is not 
a sentence passed on him, it is his most essential 
right; he is not suppressed as a guilty person~he needs 
death so that he can proclaim himself a citizen and it 
is in the disappearance of death that freedom causes him 
to be born. Where this is concerned, the French 
Revolution has a clearer meaning than any other 
revolution. Death in the Reign of Terror is not simply 
a way of punishing seditionaries; rather, since it 
becomes the unavoidable, in some sense the desired lot 
of everyone, it appears as the very operation of freedom 
in free men (LDM 309-310/LRD 39). 
At this decisive moment, Blanchot introduces, for the first 
time in his work, the distinction between death as 
possibility and death as impossibility. 
Death as an event no longer has any importance. During 
the Reign of Terror individuals die and it means 
nothing. In the famous words of Hegel, "It is thus the 
coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more 
significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or 
swallowing a mouthful of water." Why? Isn't death the 
achievement of freedom~that is, the riches moment of 
meaning? But it is also only the empty point in that 
freedom, a manifestation of the fact that such a freedom 
is still abstract, ideal (literary), that it is only 
poverty and platitude. Each person dies, but everyone 
is alive, and that really also means everyone is dead. 
But "is dead" is the positive side of freedom which has 
become the world: here, being is revealed as absolute. 
"Dying," on the other hand, is pure insignificance, an 
event without concrete reality, one which has lost all 
value as a personal and interior drama, because there is 
no longer any interior. It is the moment when I die 
signifies to me as I die a banality which there is no 
way to take into consideration: in the liberated world 
and in these moments when freedom is an absolute 
apparition, dying is unimportant and death has no depth. 
The Reign of Terror and revolution~not war~have taught 
us this (LDM 310/LRD 39-40). 
At this decisive moment in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in 
history, death as possibility, as the "richest moment; of 
meaning," is discovered to be at a certain distance from the 
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Ebenomenology of Spirit, .f.l:Qm history. It is discovered to 
be interrupted, or said otherwise, to be weakened--death as 
impossibility. It is at this decisive moment in history 
that a reading of the following passage from the Preface to 
the Phenomenology of Spirit becomes irreducibly ambiguous: 
"[T]he life of Spirit is [ ••• ] the life that endures [death) 
and maintains itself in it." 
Literature contemplates itself in revolution, it finds 
its justification in revolution, and if it has been 
called the Reign of Terror, this is because its ideal is 
indeed that moment when "life endures death and 
maintains itself in it" in order to gain from death the 
possibility of speaking and the truth of speech. This 
is the "question" that seeks to pose itself in 
literature, the "question" that is its essence (LDM 
311/LRD 41). 
Literature begins at the moment when it becomes a question, 
that is, at the moment when an initial reading of this line, 
which reads death as possibility, turns into a reading of 
this line which reads death as impossibility. Death, as 
this turning itself, leaves a trace of itself, I would 
suggest, in the production or performance of an interminable 
step/not beyond (le pas au-dela), an eternal step beyond 
that eternally returns. 
Literature is the very production or performance of 
the ambiguous step/not beyond. What "appears" in this 
production or performance of a step/not beyond is an 
irreducible ambiguity of being and nothingness (LDM 327, 
331/LRD 58, 62) Literature is the very production or 
performance of a trace of that which withdraws from ·c or,, 
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said otherwise, which infinity approaches) revelation-the 
"is not yet" or "dead time." 
This reading of "revolution" or "revolutionary action" 
raises the question of the proximity of this temptation and 
Blanchot's reading in L'entretien infini of nihilism in the 
work of Nietzsche. It is important to note that nihilism is 
another temptation of a writer named by Blanchot in 
"Literature and the Right to Death." 
As we know, a writer's main temptations are called 
stoicism, scepticism, and the unhappy consciousness. 
These are all ways of thinking that a writer adopts for 
reasons he believes he has thought out carefully, but 
which only literature has thought out in him. [ ••• ] A 
nihilist, because he does not simply negate this and 
that by methodical work which slowly transforms each 
thing: he negates everything at once, and he is obliged 
to negate everything, since he only deals with 
everything (LDM 308/LRD 37). 
Recall that "revolution" is a decisive moment in history 
when everything is called into question. "At this moment," 
Blanchot writes, "freedom aspires to be realized in the 
immediate form of everything is possible, everything can be 
done" (LDM 309/LRD 38). Nihilism is likewise a decisive 
event in history. 
Nihilism is an event achieved in history, and yet it is 
like a shedding off of history, a moulting period, when 
history changes its direction and is indicated by a 
negative trait: that values no longer have value by 
themselves. There is also a positive trait: for the 
first time, the horizon is infinitely opened to 
knowledge-"All is permitted." When the authority of 
old values is collapsed, this new authorization means 
that it is permitted to know all, there is no longer a 
limit to man's activity. "We have a still undiscovered 
country before us, the boundaries of which no one has 
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seen, a beyond to all countries and corners of the ideal 
known hitherto, a world so over-rich in the beautiful, 
the strange, the questionable, the frightful ••• 116 
Blanchot description of the achieving of this achievement, 
the realization of this extreme point or extreme form of 
nihilism, which corresponds to the achieving of science, is 
not unlike his description in "Literature and the Right to 
Death" of the destructive act of transformation, of the 
power of work which "realizes being in denying it, and 
reveals it at the end of the negation" (LDM 305/LRD 33) . 
(A]ll modern humanism, the work of science, and 
planetary development have as their object a 
dissatisfaction with what is, and hence the desire to 
transform being itself, to deny it in order to derive 
its power, and to make this power to deny the infinite 
movement of human mastery (EI 225/NN 126). 
But this passage, which describes the realization of the 
extreme point or extreme form of nihilism, only tells half 
of the story. It will be necessary to return to this 
passage and situate it within its proper context. 
Nietzsche writes the production of a step/not beyond 
into the very structure of On the Genealogy of Morals. The 
6Maurice Blanchot, L'entretien infini (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1969), 218-219, hereafter cited in the text as 
EI. / "The Limits of Experience: Nihilism," trans. John 
Leavey, in The New Nietzsche: Contemporary styles of 
Interpretation, ed. David B. Allison (New York: Dell, 1977), 
122, hereafter cited in the text as NN. The quotation at 
the end of this passage is from Friedrich Nietzsche, Die 
frohliche Wissenschaft, in Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 
ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1973), sec. 382. /The Gay Science, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), sec. 382. 
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genealogical progression through the three essays seemingly 
culminates in an overcoming of ressentiment, bad conscience, 
and the ascetic ideal. 
All great things bring about their own destruction 
through an act of self-overcoming [Selbstaufhebung]: 
thus the law of life will have it, the law of the 
necessity7 of "self-overcoming [Selbstilberwindung]" in 
the nature of life--the lawgiver himself eventually 
receives the call: "patere legein, guam ~ tulisti 
[submit to the law you yourself proposed]."8 
This necessary overcoming, this Aufhebung, is a "becoming 
conscious." It is the will to truth becoming conscious of 
itself. 
And here again I touch on my problem, on our problem, my 
unknown friends (for as yet I know of no friends): what 
meaning would our whole being possess if it were not 
this, that in us the will to truth becomes conscious of 
itself as A problem (GdM 428/GoM 161)? 
Def erring for a moment the question of why this "becoming 
conscious" is problematic, this passage provokes a question: 
as what does the will to truth become conscious of itself? 
Nietzsche answers this question in the final dramatically 
climactic lines of the text: 
we can no longer conceal from ourselves what is 
expressed by all that willing which has taken its 
direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred of the 
7
"Necessity" is highlighted in the complete critical 
edition of Nietzsche's work. This emphasis is not reflected 
in the English translation. 
8Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine 
Streitschrift, in Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. 
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1968), vol.VI, pt.2, 428, hereafter cited in the 
text as GdR / On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), 161, 
hereafter cited in the text as GoM. 
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human, and even more of the animal, and more still of 
the material, this horror of the senses, of reason 
itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing 
to get away from appearance, change, becoming, death, 
wishing, from longing itself~all this means~let us 
dare to grasp it~~ ~ .t.Q nothingness, an aversion to 
life, a rebellion against the most fundamental 
presuppositions of life: but it is and remains a will! 
.•• And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the 
beginning: man would rather will nothingness than not 
will (GdM 430/GoM 162-163).~ 
The will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a will to 
nothingness. But why would this "becoming conscious" be 
problematic? Why would it call the will to truth into 
question (GdM 419/GoM 153) rather than being merely the 
revelation of the most extreme form of nihilism, that 
extreme point where nihilism comes to an end in the 
conscious willing of nothingness, that is, the revelation of 
a moment in history when history is revealed in its truth? 
The will to truth becoming conscious of itself as a will to 
nothingness is problematic because the "step beyond," which 
reveals a concealed or unconscious evaluation as the truth 
of history, repeats the evaluative move characteristic of 
nihilism thereby reinscribing the "step beyond" nihilism 
into the "not beyond." The genealogist becomes inextricably 
implicated in the move of the ascetic priest. The 
genealogist, therefore, produces or performs an interminable 
step/not beyond, an eternal step beyond that eternally 
returns. 
Although the eternal return remains merely implicit in 
the structure of On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche 
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explicitly draws a connection between the eternal return and 
nihilism in one of the notes of what was to be The Will to 
Eower: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values~a text that 
Nietzsche refers to as a "work in progress" (GdM 427/GoM 
160) in the final pages of On the Genealogy of Morals. 
Let us think this thought in its most terrible 
form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet 
recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: 
"the eternal recurrence." 
This is the most extreme form of nihilism: the 
nothing (the "meaningless"), eternally! 9 
This passage tells one that the extreme form of nihilism is 
not merely that extreme point where nihilism comes to an end 
in the conscious willing of nothingness. The extreme form 
of nihilism is precisely where the possibility of coming to 
an end turns into the impossibility of coming to an end. 
Until now we thought Nihilism was tied to nothingness. 
How rash that was: Nihilism is tied to being. Nihilism 
is the impossibility of coming to an end and finding an 
outcome in this end. It tells of the impotence of 
nothingness, the false renown of its victories; it tells 
us that when we think nothingness, we are still thinking 
being. Nothing ends; all begins again, the other is 
still the same, midnight is only a covered-over noon, 
and the highest noon is the abyss of light from which we 
can never escape (EI 224/NN 226). 
This weakening of negation~which is also experienced at 
those decisive moments in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in 
history, when negation is discovered to be at a certain 
9Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente, in 
Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and 
Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 
vol.VIII, pt.1, 217 / The Will to Power: Attempt at a 
Revaluation of All Values, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 35-36. 
distance .fl:Qm the Phenomenology of Spirit, t!:mn 
history~will have profound consequences. Returning to a 
passage cited earlier: 
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[I]f, indeed, we want to admit that all modern humanism, 
the work of science, and planetary development have as 
their object a dissatisfaction with what is, and hence 
the desire to transform being itself, to deny it in 
order to derive its power, and to make this power to 
deny the infinite movement of human mastery~then it 
will appear that this kind of negative weakness, and the 
way that nothingness is undeniably unmasked as being, 
lay waste at one stroke to our attempts to dominate the 
earth and to free ourselves from nature by giving it a 
meaning~i.e., be denaturalizing or perverting it (EI 
225/NN 126). 
The extreme form of nihilism (the turning itself of 
possibility into impossibility) leaves a trace of itself in 
the production of the necessary yet impossible step beyond 
nihilism. It leaves a trace of itself in the production of 
an interminable step/not beyond, an eternal step beyond that 
eternally returns. 
This production is likewise traced in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. Zarathustra prophesies the overman as the 
overcoming of the nihilistic evaluations of man. This 
overcoming is, as I described earlier, formally repeated in 
the very structure of On the Genealogy of Morals. The 
overman, one could say, is the will to truth having become 
conscious of itself~that is, the overman is the one who 
consciously wills nothingness. 
[I]t his essential trait, the will, that would make the 
Overman the very form of Nihilism, rigorous and 
auster~for, according to Nietzsche's clear statement, 
"The will loves even more to will nothingness than not 
to will" [see Gdm 430/GoM 163]. The Overman is the one 
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in whom nothingness makes itself be willed and who, free 
for death, maintains this pure essence of will in 
willing nothingness. That would be Nihilism itself (EI 
222/NN 124). 
That would be the extreme point or extreme form of nihilism. 
But in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as in On the Genealogy of 
Morals, this step beyond is equivocal. Immediately 
following his announcement of the eternal return in "On the 
vision and the Riddle," Zarathustra encounters a young 
shepherd gagging on a heavy black snake. In "The 
convalescent" Zarathustra's remarks are reminiscent of this 
encounter: 
"The great disgust with man-::thi.§. choked me and had 
crawled into my throat; and what the soothsayer said: 
'All is the same, nothing is worth while, knowledge 
chokes.' A long twilight limped before me, a sadness, 
weary to death, drunken with death [eine todesmilde, 
todestrunkene Traurigkeit], speaking with a yawning 
mouth. 10 'Eternally recurs the man of whom you are 
weary, the small man.' 11 
Zarathustra's disgust arises, Blanchot writes, from his 
understanding that 
he will never definitively go beyond man's inadequacies, 
or that he will only be able to do this, paradoxically, 
by willing his return [retour]. But what does this 
return [retour) mean? It affirms that the extreme point 
of Nihilism is precisely where it is reversed [se 
renverse], that Nihilism is reversal itself [!.@ 
retournement m~me): it is the affirmation that, in 
1
°Here, perhaps, is Zarathustra's "experience" of death 
as the impossibility of dying. 
11Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein 
Buch filr Alle und Keinen, in Werke: Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), vol.VI, pt.1, 270 /Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1966), 219. 
passing from the DQ to the Y§..1., refutes Nihilism--even 
though it does nothing other than affirm it, at which 
point Nihilism is extended to all possible 
affirmations. 12 From this we conclude that Nihilism 
would be identical with the will to overcome Nihilism 
absolutely (EI 225/NN 126) •13 
The extreme point of nihilism is, I would suggest, the 
moment when death as possibility turns into death as 
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impossibility. It is, as that which exceeds the System, 
that which interrupts the step of the Hegelian Aufhebung, a 
moment that does not appear in itself, but that merely 
leaves a trace of itself. It leaves a trace of itself in 
the production of the going-over or transition (Uberqang) 
becoming, at the same time, a going-under or downgoing 
(Untergang), that is, it leaves a trace of itself in the 
production of an interminable step/not beyond, an eternal 
step beyond that eternally returns. The extreme point of 
nihilism, as reversal itself (as turning itself), leaves a 
trace of itself in the production or performance of a 
reversal, a return. 
The excessive nothingness of death could be 
characterized, I would suggest, by what Blanchot in The 
Space of Literature calls "the absence of time [l'absence de 
temps]" (SL 30-1). Like the excessive nothingness of death, 
12Including the affirmation of the overman: 
nothingness. 
13The last sentence of this passage is included in the 
French text as a footnote. 
it not only interrupts the step of the Hegelian Aufhebunq, 
it also leaves a trace of itself in the production of an 
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interminable step/not beyond that is (not) itself subject to 
the logic of the dialectic. 
The time of time's absence is not dialectical. In this 
time what appears is the fact that nothing appears. 
What appears is the being deep within being's absence, 
which is when there is nothing and which, as soon as 
there is something, is no longer. For it is as if there 
were not beings except through the loss of being, when 
being lacks. The reversal [Le renversement] which, in 
time's absence, points us constantly back to the 
presence of absence~but to this presence as absence, to 
absence as its own affirmation (an affirmation in which 
nothing is affirmed, in which nothing never ceases to 
affirm itself with the exhausting insistence of the 
indefinite)~this movement is not dialectical. 
Contradictions do not exclude each other in it; nor are 
they reconciled. Only time itself, during which 
negation becomes our power, permits the "unity of 
contraries." In time's absence what is new renews 
nothing; what is present is not contemporary; what is 
present presents nothing, but represents itself and 
belongs henceforth and always to return [retour) (EL 22-
23 /SL 30). 
This time of time's absence is a "dead time" (J.m temps 
mort). 
In the region we are trying to approach, here has 
collapsed into nowhere, but nowhere is nonetheless here, 
and this empty, dead time [le temps mort] is a real time 
in which death is present~in which death happens but 
doesn't stop happening, as if, by happening, it rendered 
sterile the time in which it could happen. The dead 
present is the impossibility of making any presence 
real~an impossibility which is present, which is there 
as the present's double, the shadow of the present which 
the present bears and hides in itself. When I am alone, 
I am not alone, but, in this present, I am already 
returning to myself in the form of Someone. Someone is 
there, where I am alone. The fact of being alone is my 
belonging to this dead time [ce temps mort) which is not 
my time, or yours, or the time we share in common, but 
Someone's time. Someone is what is still present when 
there is no one. Where I am alone, I am not there; no 
one is there, but the impersonal is: the outside, as 
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that which prevents, precedes, and dissolves the 
possibility of any personal relation. Someone is the 
faceless third person, the They of which everybody and 
anybody is part, but who is part of it? Never anyone in 
particular, never you and I. Nobody is part of the 
They. "They" belongs to a region which cannot be 
brought to light, not because it hides some secret alien 
to any revelation or even because it is radically 
obscure, but because it transforms everything which has 
access to it, even light, into anonymous, impersonal 
being, the Nontrue, the Nonreal yet always there. The 
They is, in this respect, what appears up very close 
when someone dies (EL 23-24/SL 31). 
"Dead time" marks a productionlessness, 14 it marks what 
Blanchot calls d~soeuvrement. It marks those decisive 
moments in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in history, when 
production and work are discovered to be at a certain 
distance from the Phenomenology of Spirit, from history. It 
marks those decisive moments when death as possibility turns 
into death as impossibility, when the following passage from 
the Preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit becomes 
irreducibly ambiguous: "[T)he life of Spirit is [ ••• ] the 
life that endures [death] and maintains itself in it" (PS 
19) • 1S 
14See chapter I of this dissertation for a description 
of productionlessness in Levinas' work. 
15The reading undertaken in this chapter~which merely 
raises the question of the proximity of Blanchot's reading 
in "Literature and the Right to Death" of "revolution" or 
"revolutionary action" in the work of Hegel to Blanchot's 
reading in L'entretien infini of nihilism in the work of 
Nietzsch~need to be supplemented with a reading of 
Blanchot's Le pas au-dela. This work explicitly addresses 
the question of the relationship of Hegel and Nietzsche. 
CHAPTER 3 
DEAD TIME: "A Fine Risk" 
How the adversity of pain is ambiguous! 
-Levinas 
Learn .tQ think ~ RA.in· 
-Blanchet 
Totality and Infinity calls for being read in a 
multiplicity of ways. Alphonso Lingis, the principle 
translator of Levinas into English, suggests that Totality 
and Infinity is "structured, classically, as a phenomenology 
in different strata, related as founding and founded" (OB 
xv). Granted, the structure, and often the vocabulary, of 
Totality and Infinity lends itself to such a reading. But 
such a reading risks domesticating the interruptions of 
Totality and Infinity. It risks the possibility of Totality 
and Infinity being too easily read and appropriated by, for 
example, ethics or theology. Furthermore, such a reading 
can only be undertaken if one does not heed Totality and 
Infinity's extratextual prefatory word. 
The word by way of pref ace which seeks to break through 
the screen stretched between the author and the reader 
by the book itself [ ••• ] belongs to the very essence of 
language, which consists in continually undoing its 
phrase by the forward or the exegesis, in unsaying the 
said, in attempting to restate without ceremonies what 
has already been ill understood in the inevitable 




But this once only prefatory word (or fore-word) which, in 
most cases, has to do all of the work of unsaying what is 
merely said in Totality and Infinity, obviously leaves the 
work vulnerable to be too easily read and appropriated. It 
was suggested in chapter I of this dissertation, however, 
that Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations is a notable 
exception to the lack of an intratextual production of what 
is announced extratextually by the prefatory word (or fore-
word). It was also suggested that this reading is perhaps 
not merely an anticipation of what Levinas will later 
formalize and write into the very production of Otherwise 
than Being, but moreover, that which teaches him the way to 
produce a work that responds to its own productionlessness. 
With this in mind it may perhaps be instructive to remain 
attentive to the way this reading plays both a decisive and 
a pervasive role, on innumerable levels, in the very 
structure of Totality and Infinity. 
In Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations "dead 
time" or the interval of the "is not yet" names the rapport 
sans rapport of the cogito and the infinite as well as the 
rapport sans rapport of the cogito and the evil genius or il 
Y....A· The reading of "dead time" in Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations undertaken in chapter I of this 
dissertation requires, however, a deformalization or 
concretization. This is undertaken especially in sections 
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II and III of Totality and Infinity where, I would suggest, 
"dead time" gets renamed at each successive stratum. The 
following passage from Derrida's "Violence and Metaphysics: 
An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas" is, with 
certain qualifications, a provisional characterization of 
the structure of Totality and Infinity. 
In Totality and Infinity the thematic development is 
neither purely descriptive nor purely deductive. It 
proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a 
beach: return and repetition, always, of the same wave 
against the same shore, in which, however, as each 
return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews 
and enriches itself • 1 
A reading of Totality and Infinity which begins with "dead 
time" will call into question a simple linear reading of 
sections II and III of Totality and Infinity and raise the 
question of the proximity of Totality and Infinity and 
Otherwise than Being. "Dead time" also names the "site" of 
a certain "relationship" of the infinite and the il y a. 
The interval of death, therefore, perhaps names what in 
Otherwise than Being is referred to as "a fine risk." 
Readings of Totality and Infinity frequently focus on 
the first thirty-three pages of Section III ("Exteriority 
and the Face"), taking the face as their point of departure. 
I would suggest that one begin with the body which, as will 
1Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay 
on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of· Chicago 
Press, 1978), 312 n.7. 
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become apparent in a moment, is not merely a "site" from 
which one can unproblematically "begin" anything. 
specifically, I would suggest that one begin with the 
equivocality of the lived body and the physical body, 
appearing in its most primordial form (Te! 212/TaI 235) in 
the postponement of death in a mortal will, in the interval 
of the "is not yet" or "dead time." 
This equivocation is first outlined in the first two 
parts of section II.B.-"Representation and Constitution" 
and "Enjoyment and Nourishment." The equivocation outlined 
here will not merely be left behind but re-described 
throughout not only section II, but also sections III and 
IV. 
Levinas begins the first two parts of section II by 
describing the movement proper to objectifying 
intentionality, and by establishing the proximity of the 
movement to what he, in other contexts, calls the first 
movement of Descartes' Meditations. He begins, 
specifically, by directing the readers attention to the 
privilege of representation that appeared with the first 
exposition of intentionality as a philosophical thesis. 
"The thesis that every intentionality is either a 
representation or founded on a representation dominates the 
Logische Untersuchungen and returns as an obsession in all 
of Husserl's subsequent work" (TeI 95/TaI 122). This 
pervasive domination of representation leads, Levinas 
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contends, to transcendental philosophy. 
The Husserlian thesis of the primacy of the objectifying 
act~in which was seen Husserl's excessive attachment to 
theoretical consciousness, and which has served as a 
pretext to accuse Husserl of intellectualism2 (as though 
that were an accusation!)~leads to transcendental 
philosophy, to the affirmation (so surprising after the 
realist themes the idea of intentionality seemed to 
approach) that the object of consciousness, while 
distinct from consciousness, is as it were a product of 
consciousness, being a "meaning" endowed by 
consciousness, the result of Sinngebung (Tel 95-96/TaI 
123). 
Levinas contends that despite the fact that the object of 
representation (noema), is, according to Husserlian 
phenomenology, to be distinguished from the act of 
representation (noesis), the object of 
representation~insofar as it is reduced to noemata that 
remain correlative to the act of representation~falls under 
2Levinas is here alluding to himself as an interpreter 
of Husserl. In Theorie de !'intuition dans la 
phenomenologie de Husserl (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 141. /The 
Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. Andre 
Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 94, 
Levinas writes: 
Let us indicate at once[ •.• ] that although intuition 
appears as a very broad notion which makes no 
presuppositions about the mode of existence of its 
object, one should not forget that, for Husserl, 
intuition is a theoretical act, and that inasmuch as 
other acts can reach being they must, according to the 
Logische Untersuchungen, be based on a representation. 
[ •.• ] If Ideen modifies, with respect to the Logische 
Untersuchungen, the thesis according to which 
representation is the basis of all acts, it does not 
modify it enough to forbid us to say that each position 
of being (thesis) includes a representative thesis. We 
must, therefore, observe first that, for Husserl, being 
is correlative to theoretical intuitive life, to the 
evidence of an objectifying act. This is why the 
Husserlian concept of intuition is tainted with -
intellectualism and is possibly too narrow. 
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the power of thought. Here Levinas establishes the 
proximity of this negative movement of the Husserlian epoche 
characteristic of representation (Tel 98/TaI 125) to the 
first movement of Descartes' Meditations. This reduction to 
noemata is, he writes, 
a question of what in Cartesian terminology becomes the 
clear and distinct idea. In clarity an object which is 
first exterior ~ giyen that is, is delivered over to 
him who encounters it as though it had been entirely 
determined by him. In clarity the exterior being 
presents itself as the work of the thought that receives 
it. Intelligibility, characterized by clarity, is a 
total adequation of the thinker with what is thought, in 
the precise sense of a mastery exercised by the thinker 
upon what is thought in which the object's resistance as 
an exterior being vanishes. This mastery is total and 
as thought creative; it is accomplished as a giving of 
meaning: the object of representation is reducible to 
noemata. The intelligible isprecisely what is entirely 
reducible to noemata and all of whose relations with the 
understanding reducible to those established by the 
light. In the intelligibility of representation the 
distinction between me and the object, between interior 
and exterior, is effaced. Descartes's clear and 
distinct idea manifests itself as true and as entirely 
immanent to thought: entirely present, without anything 
clandestine; its very novelty is without mystery. 
Intelligibility and representation are equivalent 
notions: an exteriority surrendering in clarity and 
without immodesty its whole being to thought, that is, 
totally present without in principle anything shocking 
thought, without thought ever feeling itself to be 
indiscreet. Clarity is the disappearance of what could 
shock. Intelligibility, the very occurrence of 
representation, is the possibility for the other to be 
determined by the same without determining the same, 
without introducing alterity into it; it is a free 
exercise of the same. It is the disappearanc.e, within 
the same, of the I opposed to the non-I (Tel 96-97/TaI 
123-124). 
There is then, according to Levinas, an essential 
correlation of intelligibility and representation (Tel 
99/TaI 127). 
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But this description of representation in Husserlian 
phenomenology is, like the description of the first movement 
of Descartes' Meditations, "detached from the conditions of 
its latent birth" (Tel 99/TaI 126). In Descartes' 
Meditations the certitude of consciousness~which is due to 
the clarity and distinctness of the cogito--is subtended by 
a second movement, by a "logical" order distinct from the 
chronological order. The clarity and distinctness of the 
cogito it subtended by the discovery of the infinite. With 
this discovery of a condition for what was otherwise taken 
in a first movement as indubitable of itself by itself, 
there is an inversion of order~the effect becomes the 
condition of the cause~that produces an irreducibly 
enigmatic "double origin," that produces separation. This 
inversion of order that produces separation is likewise 
operative in Levinas' description of representation and the 
elements one enjoys. 
Representation, like the first movement of Descartes' 
Meditations, is "a necessary moment of the event of 
separation" (Tel 95/TaI 122, emphasis added), but it is 
merely one of two necessary moments. Representation, like 
the first movement of Descartes' Meditations, is taken as an 
unconditioned condition. It "consists in the possibility of 
accounting for the object as though it were constituted by a 
thought, as though it were a noema" (Tel 101/TaI 128). This 
possibility reduces the represented to the unconditioned 
instant of thought. But the elements one enjoys subtend 
this movement of representation. In the enjoyment of the 
elements 
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the process of constitution which comes into play 
wherever there is representation is reversed. What I 
live from is not in my life as the represented is within 
representation in the eternity of the same or the 
unconditioned present of cognition (Te! 101/TaI 128). 
If one persists in using the language of representational 
thinking, that is, if one insists on describing this 
"phenomenon" in terms of constitution, one runs up against 
an enigma. 
If one could still speak of constitution here we would 
have to say that the constituted, reduced to its 
meaning, here overflows its meaning, becomes within [au 
sein de) constitution the condition of the constituting, 
or, more exactly, the nourishment of the constituting. 
This overflowing of meaning can be fixed by the term 
alimentation. The surplus over meaning is not a meaning 
in its turn, simply thought as a condition~which would 
be to reduce the aliment to a correlate represented. 
The aliment conditions the very thought that would think 
it as a condition. It is not that this conditioning is 
only noticed after the event [apr~s coup): the 
originality of the situation lies in that the 
conditioning is produced in the midst of [se produit au 
~ du] the relation between representing and 
represented, constituting and constituted~a relation 
which we find first in every case of consciousness (TeI 
101/TaI 128). 
That the constituted becomes within constitution the 
condition of the constituting, that the aliment as condition 
is produced in the midst of the relation between 
constituting and constituted, is and remains, for · 
representational thinking, enigmatic. The originality of 
the situation lies in the necessary yet impossible t~inking 
together of both representation as condition and the aliment 
as condition. It lies in the irreducible enigma of a 
"double origin"-of an enigma which is the trace of that 
which exceeds meaning, of a past that has never "traversed 
the present of representation" (TeI 103/TaI 130), of a 
future that is always yet to come. 
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Levinas situates this description of the production of 
separation within the context of the event of dwelling 
[l'evenement de demeurer]. The description of the event of 
dwelling in section II.0.-"The owelling"-will, like the 
description of separation first outlined in the first two 
parts of section II.B., be informed by Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations. Recalling the description of an 
inversion of order in section II.B.2., "Enjoyment and 
Nourishment," Levinas writes: 
Representation is conditioned. Its transcendental 
pretension is constantly belied by the life that is 
already implanted in the being representation claims to 
constitute. But representation claims to substitute 
itself after the event [apr~s coup) for this life in 
reality, so as to constitute this very reality. 
Separation has to be able to account for this 
constitutive conditioning accomplished [accompli] by 
representation-though representation be produced after 
the event (se produire apr~s coup] 3 (TeI 143/TaI 169). 
3It seems as though Levinas' use of the term 
"production" here merely indicates that representation is 
conditioned, that it is posterior to "life." The phrase 
"after the fact" only refers to the alternation between the 
two poles of a "double origin." Therefore, when Levinas 
writes "representation is produced after the event" he is 
ref erring to only one pole of the "double 
origin"-representation understood as comprehension-which 
can then, again "after the event," be called into question 
by the other pole-"life," the elements one enjoys (which 
are articulated by the critical essence of representation). 
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Any account of the event of separation, Levinas writes, has 
to be able to account for or accommodate the constitutive 
conditioning accomplished or produced by representation. It 
has to be able to account for or accommodate 
representation's accomplishment or production of an 
inversion of order, its accomplishment or production of 
being both constitutive, that is, condition, and 
conditioned. Separation has to be able to account for or 
accommodate representation's constituting, which moves on 
straight ahead, and its calling itself into question when it 
recognizes that what it constitutes is the condition of its 
constituting. That is, any account of the event of 
separation has to be able to account for or accommodate the 
distinction Levinas makes between knowledge or theory 
understood as comprehension and the critical essence of 
knowing which, in its tracing back to a condition of 
comprehension, calls comprehension into question. 
The theoretical, being after the event [apres QQYR], 
being essentially memory, is to be sure not creative; 
but its critical essence~its retrogressive movement~is 
no wise a possibility of enjoyment and labor. 4 It 
evinces a new energy, oriented upstream, counter-
current, which the impassiveness of contemplation 
expresses only superficially (TeI 143-144/TaI 169). 
The "relationship," or more precisely, the rapport sans 
4It is not entirely clear what Levinas means when he 
writes that the critical essence of the theoretical is not 
to be confounded with any possibility of enjoyment and 
labor. Perhaps he is reading enjoyment as freedom (TeI 
59/TaI 87), which is .:th§n called into question by the 
critical essence of knowing. 
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rapport, of these two inversely oriented aspects of thought 
is, I suggested in chapter II, formerly articulated by the 
two movements of Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations. 
These two distinct movements, the reader will recall, 
characterize the very meaning of separation (Tel 19/TaI 48). 
The event of separation is, therefore, able to account for 
or accommodate the ambiguity of representation as condition 
and conditioned in that it is produced by representation's 
accomplishment of this inversion of order. The event of 
separation both accounts for and is accounted for by 
representation's accomplishment of this inversion of order. 
There is a reciprocity here that calls into question 
Levinas' use of the language of causality. It raises the 
question: what accounts for what? This reciprocity is 
reflected in the next paragraph of the text where Levinas 
writes that the ambiguity of representation as condition and 
conditioned-which is articulated by the inversely oriented 
movements of comprehension and critique-:QQ.th "results from" 
and produces separation. 
That representation is conditioned by life, but that 
this conditioning could be reversed after the event 
[apres coup]-that idealism is an eternal 
temptation-results from the very event of separation, 
which must not at any moment be interpreted as an 
abstract cleavage in space. The fact of the after-the-
event [l'apres-coup] does show that the possibility of 
constitutive representation does not restore to abstract 
eternity or to the instant the privilege of measuring 
all things; it shows, on the contrary, that the 
production [la production] of separation is bound to 
time, and even that the articulation of separation in 
time is produced [.ii\ produit] thus in itself and-not 
only secondarily, for us (Tel 144/TaI 169). 
It is important to note that the reversal or inversion of 
the order of the elements one enjoys and representation is 
operative in both directions, though Levinas explicitly 
outlines only one direction in this passage. That is, 
representation as conditioned by the elements can be 
reversed after the event, but it is likewise the case that 
. 
representation as constitutive of the elements can be 
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reversed after the event. 5 The fact of the after-the-event 
does show, therefore, that constitutive representation is 
merely a possibility. It is merely .Qn@ possibility among 
the two possibilities of a "double origin," since it 
perpetually alternates with the elements one enjoys 
understood as a condition, it perpetually alternates with 
itself as conditioned. As merely one pole of a perpetually 
alternating double origin constitutive representation does 
not, therefore, "restore to abstract eternity or to the 
instant the privilege of measuring all things" (TeI 144/TaI 
169). This restoration is interrupted, perpetually. The 
fact of the after-the-event shows, moreover, that the 
production of separation is bound to time, it is bound to 
5This is attested to not only in the first two parts of 
section II.B. ("Representation and Constitution" and 
"Enjoyment and Nourishment"), but also in the opening 
sentence of the next paragraph in the text: 
The possibility of a representation that is constitutive 
but already rests on the enjoyment of a real completely 
constituted indicates the radical character of the 
uprootedness of him who is recollected in a home, where 
the I, while steeped in the elements, takes up its 
position before a Nature (TeI 144/TaI 169). 
92 
the perpetual recognition, after the fact (apris QQYD), of 
the condition of what in a first movement is taken to be a 
condition. It is again important to note that the 
production or performance of this inversion of order is 
operative, as was stated above, in both directions, 
perpetually. That the production of separation is bound to 
time recalls Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations. 
Drawing upon a passage in Totality and Infinity referring 
specifically to Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations, 
but equally applicable to the rapport sans rapport of the I 
of representation and the elements one enjoys, one could 
write: The ambiguity of what conditions what, revealing the 
I of representation and the elements one enjoys in turn 
without merging them, revealing them as two distinct moments 
of evidence mutually founding one another, characterizes the 
very meaning of separation. The separation of the I is thus 
affirmed to be non-contingent, non-provisional. The 
distance between me and the elements, radical and necessary, 
is produced in being itself (TeI 19/TaI 48). "Even the 
articulation of separation in time," Levinas continues, "is 
produced thus in itself and not only secondarily, for us" 
(TeI 144/TaI 169). It is not as though separation existed 
before it was articulated in time. Separation in itself is 
produced only in the event of articulation, only in the 
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event of producing or performing an inversion of order. 6 
What li produced "secondarily, for us," that is, what can be 
reflected upon (Tel 10, 25/Tal 40, 54) or known (Tel 144/Tal 
170), is an ambiguous or enigmatic "double origin." What li 
produced "secondarily, for us" is not the appearance of 
something (as is usually the case in the effectuation of 
production), but rather the equivocal trace of what 
withdraws from appearance-a separated being as "not yet" 
and an absolute exteriority as "not yet." This production 
obviously calls into question the designation "in itself," 
for separation can be something "in itself" only in being 
produced as an irreducibly enigmatic or ambiguous "double 
origin," that is, only in not being something "in itself." 
The next paragraph of the text explicitly situates 
this description of the event of separation within the 
context of the event of dwelling. 
The possibility of a representation that is constitutive 
but already rests on the enjoyment of a real completely 
constituted indicates the radical character of the 
uprootedness of him who is recollected in a home, where 
the l, while steeped in the elements, takes up its 
position before a Nature. The elements in and from 
which l live are also that to which l am opposed. The 
feat of having limited a part of this world and having 
closed it off, having access to the elements l enjoy by 
way of the door and the window, realizes 
extraterritoriality and the sovereignty of thought, 
6This articulation of separation, which is synonymous 
with the production of separation, is different from an 
articulation of separation that takes place after 
production, that is, after the progression through the two 
movements (eg. the description of the cogito as "not yet," 
the "posteriority of the anterior," etc., see esp. Tel 
25/Tal 54). 
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anterior to the world to which it is posterior. 
Anterior posteriorly: separation is not thus "known"; 
it is thus produced[~ produit] (Tel 144/Tal 169-170). 
Levinas draws upon his reading of Descartes' Meditations 
when he writes that extraterritoriality and the sovereignty 
of representational thinking, the feat of being disengaged 
from the world of the elements, is "anterior to the world to 
which it is posterior" (Tel 144/Tal 170). The effectuation 
of an incessant inversion of order that is the production of 
a "double origin" is dwelling. Dwelling is both the 
disengagement of representation gng the engagement of being 
steeped in the elements one enjoys, neither merely the 
disengagement of representation nm:. the engagement of being 
steeped in the elements one enjoys. The productionless 
production of separation or dwelling is marked or named by 
"dead time," the interval of the "is not yet." That is, the 
effectuation of the perpetual alternation characteristic of 
separation or dwelling articulates the "not yet" of 
disengagement and the "not yet" of engagement. 
Dwelling or separation is a "way of being" articulated 
by the body. "A being has detached itself from the world 
from which it still nourishes itself! [ .•• ] There is here an 
ambiguity of which the body is the very articulation" (Tel 
89/Tal 116). The body is the accomplishment 
(l'accomplissement, Tel 101, 102/Tal 128, 129) or production 
of the irreducibly enigmatic "double origin" of the 
disengagement of representation and the engagement of being 
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steeped in the elements one enjoys. 
The body naked and indigent identifies the center of the 
world it perceives, but conditioned by its own 
representation of the world, it is thereby as it were 
torn up from the center from which it proceeded, as 
water gushing forth from rock washes away that rock. 
[ ••• ]The body naked and indigent is the very reverting, 
irreducible to a thought, of representation into life, 
of the subjectivity that represents into life which is 
sustained by these representations and lives Qi. .tnmn; 
its indigence-its needs-affirm "exteriority" as non-
constituted, prior to all affirmation (TeI 100/TaI 127). 
The body is the effectuation of a perpetual inversion of 
order. 
The body is a permanent contestation of the prerogative 
attributed to consciousness of "giving meaning" to each 
thing; it lives as this contestation. The world I live 
in is not simply the counterpart or the contemporary of 
thought and its constitutive freedom, but a conditioning 
and an antecedence. The world I constitute nourishes me 
and bathes me. It is aliment and "medium" ["milieu"). 
The intentionality aiming at the exterior changes 
direction in the course of its very aim by becoming 
interior to the exteriority it constitutes, somehow 
comes from the point to which it goes, recognizing 
itself past in its future, lives from what it thinks 
(TeI 102/TaI 129). 
This incessant inversion of order that is the production of 
an irreducibly enigmatic "double origin" of representation 
and the elements one enjoys formally parallels, I would 
suggest, Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations. 7 
7It is interesting to note that despite the fact that 
Levinas establishes the proximity of Husserlian 
representation and the Cartesian clear and distinct idea 
(TeI 96-97/TaI 123-124), Levinas recognizes the superiority 
of Cartesian philosophy over Husserlian phenomenology 
insofar as Descartes puts limits on noematization. 
The body indigent and naked is [the) very changing of 
sense. This is the profound insight Descartes had when 
he refused to sense data the status of clear and 
distinct ideas, ascribed them to the body, and relegated 
them to the useful. This is his superiority over 
That the body's concrete articulation of the 
production of separation or dwelling formally parallels 
Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations is further 
substantiated in section II.D.5., "Labor, the Body, 
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consciousness," where Levinas thematizes two aspects of the 
body. These two aspects of the body~lived body and 
physical body~articulate two movements not formally unlike 
the two movements of Descartes' Meditations. 
Life is a body, not only lived body [corps propre], 
where its self-sufficiency emerges, but a cross-roads of 
physical forces, body-effect. In its deep-seated fear 
life attests this ever possible inversion of the body-
master into body-slave, of health into sickness. .1'.Q be 
g ~is on the one hand to stand [se tenir], to be 
master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand on 
the earth [se tenir IDll: terre], to be in the other 
[l'autre], and thus to be encumbered by one's body (Tel 
138/TaI 164). 
This distinction parallels, I would suggest, the two 
movements integral to the production of separation or 
dwelling~the independence of the I of representation and 
the dependence upon the elements. Earlier in Totality and 
Infinity Levinas describes dwelling in terms of "standing." 
Dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself [se 
tenir], not as the famous serpent grasping itself by 
biting onto its tail, but as the body that, on the earth 
exterior to it, holds itself up [se tient] and can. The 
"at home" [Le "~ soi"] is not a container but a site 
where I can, where, dependent on a reality that is other 
[autre], I am, despite this dependence or thanks to it, 
free (Tel 7/TaI 37). 
"Standing," taken in abstraction or "detached from the 
Husserlian phenomenology which puts no limit on 
noematization (Tel 102-103/TaI 129-130). 
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conditions of its latent birth" (TeI 99/TaI 126), 
articulates representational thinking. But "standing" is 
always already a "standing there," a standing on the earth, 
a being steeped in the elemental. Standing there, that is, 
"standing" not taken in abstraction, articulates "the 
radical character of the uprootedness of him who is 
recollected in a home" (TeI 144/TaI 169), for it articulates 
both the independence of the I of representation and the 
dependence upon the elements, neither merely one nor the 
other. As an articulation of the "not yet" of the I of 
representation and the "not yet" of the elemental, it is 
otherwise than merely "thinking." Hence, Levinas writes: 
Standing there (~ tenir] is precisely different from 
"thinking." The bit of earth that supports me is not 
only my object; it supports my experience of objects. 
Well-trampled places do not resist me but support me. 
The relation with my site in this "stance" ["tenue"] 
precedes thought and labor. The body, position, the 
fact of standing (se tenir]~patterns of the primary 
relation with myself, of my coincidence with 
myself~nowise resemble idealist representation (TeI 
111/TaI 138). 
Levinas is perhaps a bit too unequivocal when in this 
passage, he writes that the body, the fact of standing~both 
of which are characterized by the same irreducible 
equivocality~nowise resemble idealist representation, for 
"standing" (not taken in abstraction) is, as I suggested 
above, an articulation of both the independence of the I of 
representation and the dependence upon the elements, neither 
merely one nor the other. Therefore, rather than completely 
discounting idealist representation, it must be taken as one 
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moment (albeit, a moment vulnerable to an ever possible 
inversion) of the equivocation characteristic of the body, 
the fact of standing. Levinas himself seems to indicate 
this in the passage just cited when he writes: "The bit of 
earth that supports me is nQt QD.ly my object; it supports my 
experience of objects" {Tel 111/TaI 138, emphasis added). 
By conceding that the earth is not only an object of 
idealist representation he concedes, at least implicitly, 
that idealist representation plays some role in "standing." 
Another indication of this equivocality characteristic of 
"standing" is evident in the passage cited at the beginning 
of this paragraph: "To be A body is on the one hand to 
stand, to be master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to 
stand on the earth, to be in the other" {Tel 138/TaI 164). 
Here Levinas seems to make a distinction between "standing," 
detached from its concrete conditions (which articulates the 
independence of the I of representation), and "standing on 
the earth, in the other" (which articulates the dependence 
upon the elements). That the two movements integral to the 
production of separation or dwelling~the independence of 
the I of representation and the dependence upon the 
elements~parallel the distinction between the lived body 
and physical body is established in the following passage: 
To be at home with oneself in something other than 
oneself, to be oneself while living from something other 
than oneself, to live from ..• , is concretized in 
corporeal existence. "Incarnate thought" is not 
initially produced [~ produit] as a thought that acts 
on the world, but as a separated existence which affirms 
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its independence in the happy dependence of need. It is 
not that this equivocation amounts to two successive 
points of view on separation; their simultaneity 
constitutes the body. To neither of the aspects which 
reveal themselves in turn does the last word belong (TeI 
139/TaI 164-165). 
This passage not only re-articulates "the radical character 
of the uprootedness of him who is recollected in a home" 
(TeI 144/TaI 169), it is also reminiscent of Levinas' 
description of the "double origin" of the cogito and the 
infinite in Descartes' Meditations. In the passage just 
cited Levinas writes the following about the two aspects of 
the body: "To neither of the aspects which reveal 
themselves in turn (se r6velent tour ! tour] does the last 
word belong" (TeI 139/TaI 165). This is remarkably similar 
in form and vocabulary to the following passage: "The 
ambiguity of Descartes' first evidence, revealing the I and 
God in turn [r6v6lant, .tmu: ! tour] without merging them, 
revealing them as two distinct moments of evidence mutually 
founding one another, characterizes the very meaning of 
separation" (Tel 19/TaI 48). The two aspects of the 
body~lived body and physical body~articulate two movements 
not unlike the two movements of Descartes' Meditations. 
This irreducible ambiguity of the body~which 
articulates the "not yet" of the lived body and the "not 
yet" of the physical body, "a sector of an elemental 
reality" (TeI 140/TaI 165)~is, according to Levinas, 
consciousness. The description of consciousness as 
"disincarnation" in the following passage is not unlike the 
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description of dwelling as "uprootedness" (Tel 144/TaI 169). 
"Consciousness does not fall into a body-it is not 
incarnated; it is disincarnation-or, more exactly, a 
postponing of the corporeity of the body" (Tel 140/TaI 165-
166), the "not yet" of the physical body, the "not yet" of 
complete dependence upon the elements. To describe 
conscious as postponement is-as is the case in Levinas' 
description of the coqito in Descartes' Meditations as "not 
yet" or "not all at once" (Tel 25/TaI 54)-to describe it as 
always already in "relation" to the other. Consciousness, 
therefore, is produced in the effectuation of a "double 
origin." It is produced concretely, in the event of 
dwelling or separation. 
To be conscious is to be in relation with what .ili, but 
as though the present of what is were not yet [n'•tait 
pas encore] entirely accomplished and only constituted 
the future of a recollected being. To be conscious is 
precisely to have time-not to exceed the present time 
in the project that anticipates the future, but to have 
a distance with regard to the present itself, to be 
related to the element in which one is settled as to 
what is not yet (n'est pas encore] there. All the 
freedom of inhabitation depends on the time that, for 
the inhabitant, still always remains (Tel 140/TaI 166). 
It is perhaps misleading of Levinas to call the ambiguity of 
the body-that is, the event of dwelling or 
separation-consciousness, since this term carries so much 
sedimented philosophical baggage that threatens to still the 
ambiguity Levinas is attempting to articulate. 
Leaving aside the analyses of section II of Totality 
and Infinity for a moment, it is interesting and important 
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to note that in section III of Totality and Infinity Levinas 
joins this description of consciousness-that is, as 
perpetual postponement, as "not yet"-to the relationship of 
language, specifically to the role language as rapport sans 
rapport plays in objectification. 
Objectification is produced [se produit] in the very 
work of language, where the subject is detached from the 
things possessed as though it hovered over its own 
existence, as though it were detached from it, as though 
the existence it exists had not yet [ne ••. 6tait pas 
encore] completely reached it. This distance is more 
radical than every distance in the world. The subject 
must find itself "at a distance" [<<! distance>>] from 
its own being, even with regard to that taking distance 
that is inherent in the home, by which it is still in 
being. 8 For negation remains within the totality, even 
when it bears upon the totality of the world. In order 
that objective distance be hollowed out, it is necessary 
that while in being the subject be not yet in being [~ 
soit pas encore], that in a certain sense it be not yet 
[ne soit pA§ encore] born-that it not be in nature. If 
the subject capable of objectivity is not yet [n'est pas 
encore] completely, this "not yet" [<<pas encore>>], 
this state of potency relative to act, does not denote a 
less than being, but denotes time. Consciousness of the 
object-thematization-rests on distance with regard to 
oneself, which can only be time; or, if one prefers, it 
rests on self-consciousness, if we recognize the 
"distance from self to self" in self-consciousness to be 
"time." However, time can designate a "not yet" [<<pas 
encore>>] that nevertheless would not be a "lesser 
being"-it can remain distant both from being and from 
death-only as the inexhaustible future of infinity, 
that is, as what is produced (se produit] in the very 
relationship of language (Tel 184-185/TaI 209-210). 9 
8It seems that Levinas is here using the term "home" in 
a more traditional sense, rather than in the technical sense 
that he develops in that section of Totality and Infinity 
entitled "The Dwelling," where, as I suggested above, he 
describes the event of dwelling or separation as a concrete 
articulation of the interval of the "is not yet." 
9The phrases "at a distance" and "is not yet" refer, 
among other things, to Levinas' reading of Descartes; 
Meditations (see esp. Tel 25/TaI 54). In fact, Levinas' 
102 
Language-like consciousness, insofar as it "is not 
yet"-is, as I pointed out in chapter I of this 
dissertation, the rapport sans rapport of the subject and 
the il y a, and the rapport sans rapport of the subject and 
the infinite. 
The irreducible ambiguity of the body-returning again 
to the analyses of section II of Totality and 
Infinity-articulates "dead time." It articulates the 
interval of the "is not yet" that marks consciousness, that 
marks the event of dwelling or separation. This interval, 
marking the rapport sans rapport of the I of representation 
and the elemental can be characterized as enjoyment. 
Sensibility establishes a relation with a pure quality 
without support, with the element. Sensibility is 
enjoyment. The sensitive being, the body, concretizes 
this way .Q.f being, which consists in finding a condition 
in what, in other respects, can appear as an object of 
thought, as simply constituted (Tel 109/TaI 136). 
But the interval of the "is not yet," marking the rapport 
sans rapport of the I of representation and the elemental, 
can gt. the ~ time be characterized as menace and 
insecurity. 
The distance with regard to the element to which the I 
is given over menaces [menace] it in its dwelling only 
in the future (Tel 140/TaI 166). 
The dwelling, overcoming the insecurity [l'insecurite] 
of life, is a perpetual postponement [perpetual 
ajournement] of the expiratiop in which life risks 
foundering. The consciousness of death is the 
reading of Descartes' Meditations plays a significant role 
in the paragraphs immediately following the paragraph within 
which this passage is located. 
consciousness of the perpetual postponement 
[l'ajournement perp~tual] of death, in the essential 
ignorance of its date. Enjoyment as the body that 
labors maintains itself in this primary postponement 
[ajournement premier], that which opens the very 
dimension of time (Tel 139/Tal 165). 
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This menace or insecurity maintains itself, like enjoyment, 
in the primary postponement of death, that is, in "dead 
time," in the interval of the "is not yet." It is important 
to keep in mind, therefore, that the descriptions of the 
rapport sans rapport or "double origin" operative in section 
II of Totality and Infinity address the "relationship" of 
the I of representation and the elements, rather than the 
"relationship" of representation and enjoyment (as the text 
sometimes leads one to think), since enjoyment, I would 
suggest, is only one perspective on the "relationship" of 
representation and the elements, the other. 
The perfidious elemental-which "gives itself while 
escaping," which "on the one hand offers itself and 
contents, but which already withdraws, losing itself in the 
nowhere"-"opens up an abyss within [dans] enjoyment" (Tel 
115/Tal 141). Levinas joins this description of the 
elemental with his description of the il y a, the "there 
is," that he had himself offered in Existence and Existents 
and in Time and the Other. 
The nothingness of the future ensures separation: 
the element we enjoy issues in the nothingness which 
separates. The element I inhabit is at the frontier of 
a night. What the side of the element that is turned 
toward me conceals is not a "something" susceptible of 
being revealed, but an ever-new depth of absence, an 
existence without existent, the impersonal par 
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excellence. This way of existing without revealing 
itself, outside of being and the world, must be called 
mythical. The nocturnal prolongation of the element is 
the reign of the mythical gods. Enjoyment is without 
security. But this future does not take on the 
character of a Geworfenheit, for insecurity menaces 
[l'insecurite menace) an enjoyment already happy in the 
element, rendered sensitive to disquietude only by this 
happiness. 
We have described this nocturnal dimension of the 
future under the title there is [il ya). The element 
extends into the there is [il ya). Enjoyment, as 
interiorization, runs up against the very strangeness of 
the earth (Tel 116/TaI 142). 
The irreducibly ambiguous body, the sensitive being, 
articulates a rapport sans rapport-marked by "dead time," 
the interval of the "is not yet"-of the I of representation 
and the elements that can be characterized as either 
enjoyment or menace and insecurity. 
But this ambiguous characterization of the interval of 
the "is not yet" is multiplied by the fact that this same 
interval-an interval that is articulated, as I suggested 
above, by the event of dwelling or separation-likewise 
marks the rapport sans rapport of the I of representation 
and the Other. 
But the transcendence of the face is not enacted 
outside of the world, as though the economy by which 
separation is produced [se produit] remained beneath a 
sort of beatific contemplation of the Other [d'Autrui) 
(which would thereby turn into the idolatry that brews 
in all contemplation). The "vision" of the face as face 
is a certain mode of [une certaine fa9on de) sojourning 
in a home, or-to speak in a less singular fashion-a 
certain form of [une certaine forme de) economic life. 
No human or interhuman relationship can be enacted 
outside of economy; no face can be approached with empty 
hands and closed home. Recollection in a home open to 
the Other [Autrui)-hospitality-is the concrete and 
initial fact of human recollection and separation; it 
coincides [coYncide) with the Desire for the Other 
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[d'Autrui] absolutely transcendent. The chosen home is 
the very opposite of a root. It indicates a 
disengagement, a wandering [errance] which has made it 
possible, which is not a less with respect to 
installation, but the surplus of the relationship with 
the Other [Autrui], metaphysics {Tel 147/TaI 172). 
This rapport sans rapport of the I of representation and the 
other is characterized by Levinas as "ethics." 
Here, as in several other places in Totality and 
Infinity, one can locate a certain interruption of the 
text-an interruption of a simple step beyond section II 
("Interiority and Economy") into section III ("Exteriority 
and the Face"). It is an interruption that is gathered 
around "dead time," around the interval of the "is not yet." 
The irreducibly ambiguous body, the sensitive being, the 
separated being (these are all synonymous), articulates a 
rapport sans rapport with the "other" that can be 
characterized as enjoyment, menace/insecurity, or "ethics." 
Despite Levinas' attempts in Totality and Infinity to 
establish and maintain a distinction between the other as il 
y__g and the Other as infinite, there is slippage. "Dead 
time"-which marks a rapport sans rapport with the 
"other"-is a "risk." The slipperiness of the distinction 
between the other as il y a and the Other as infinite is a 
risk that is run in the opening of the interval of the "is 
not yet." 
The future of the element as insecurity [insecurite] is 
lived concretely as the mythical divinity of the 
element. Faceless gods, impersonal gods to whom one 
does not speak, mark the nothingness that bounds the 
egoism of enjoyment in the midst of [au sein de] of its 
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familiarity with the element. But it is thus that 
enjoyment accomplishes separation. The separated being 
must run the risk [courir le risque] of the paganism 
which evinces its separation and in which this 
separation is accomplished, until the moment that the 
death of these gods will lead it back to atheism and to 
true transcendence (Tel 115-116/TaI 142). 
The disturbing consequences of this "risk" are often 
overlooked in a too easy reading of Totality and Infinity, 
that is, a reading that would subordinate the il y a to a 
linear reading, a reading that would merely step beyond the 
il ya into "ethics," that would, for example, merely step 
beyond section II of Totality and Infinity into section III. 
In Otherwise than Being Levinas writes this "risk" (and its 
disturbing consequences) into the very structure of the 
work. 
In saying suffering signifies in the form of giving, 
even if the price of signification is that the subject 
run the risk [court le risgue] of suffering without 
reason. If the subject did not run this risk [ne 
courait pas ce risgue], pain would lose its very 
painfulness. Signification, as one-for-the-other in 
passivity, where the other is not assumed by the one, 
presupposes the possibility of pure non-sense invading 
and threatening signification. Without this folly at 
the confines of reason, the one would take hold of 
itself, and, in the heart of its passion, recommence 
essence. How the adversity of pain is ambiguous! The 
for-the-other (or sense) turns into by-the-other [Le 
pour-l'autre (ou le sens) va jusgu'au par-l'autre], into 
suffering by a thorn burning the flesh, but for nothing. 
It is only in this way that the for-the-other, the 
passivity more passive still than any passivity, the 
emphasis of sense, is kept from being for-oneself (AE 
64-65/0B 50). 
This ambiguity of the for-the-other (sense) and the by-the-
other (non-sense)~which are, respectively, I would suggest, 
analogous to the "relationships" that in Totality and 
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Infinity are characterized as "ethics" and 
menace/insecurity-suggests that one cannot simply step 
beyond the il y a into "ethics." This not only calls into 
question a too easy reading of Totality and Infinity, it 
likewise raises the question of the proximity of Totality 
and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. A closer reading of 
otherwise than Being will be necessary in the future. It is 
now necessary, however, to return to Totality and Infinity. 
The ambiguity of the other as il y a and the Other as 
infinite-an ambiguity gathered around "dead time" and 
articulated by the irreducibly ambiguous body, the sensitive 
being-is reiterated in that part of section III of Totality 
and Infinity entitled "The Ethical Relation and Time." In 
"The Ethical Relation and Time" the "other"-insofar as its 
rapport sans rapport with the subject can be characterized 
as menace and insecurity-is, I would suggest, expanded in 
section III of Totality and Infinity to encompass not only 
the elemental (as is the case in section II) but also the 
faceless other "encountered" in war and commerce. It is 
also important to note that in this part of Totality and 
Infinity the interval of the "is not yet," which marks the 
rapport sans rapport of the subject and the "other," is not 
only characterized as menace and insecurity (as well as 
enjoyment and "ethics"), but also as violence. "Violence 
bears upon only a being both graspable and escaping every 
hold" (TeI 198/TaI 223). It is, as I described above, the 
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body that concretely articulates this ambiguity. Here-as 
in that part of section II entitled "Labor, the Body, 
consciousness"-Levinas describes the body in terms of a 
series of irreducible distinctions such as lived 
body/physical body, body-master/body-slave, and 
health/sickness. 
The body exceeds the categories of a thing, but does not 
coincide with the role of "lived body" ["corps propre") 
which I dispose of in my voluntary action and by which I 
can. The ambiguity of corporeal resistance which turns 
into a means and from means turns into a resistance does 
not account for its ontological hmbris. The body in its 
very activity, in its for itself, 0 inverts into a thing 
to be treated as a thing. 11 This is what we express 
concretely in saying that it abides between health and 
sickness. Through it one not only fails to recognize, 
one can mistreat the "for itself" of the person; one 
does not only offend him, one coerces him. "I am 
anything you like," says Sganarelle, under the blows. 
One does not adopt successively and independently the 
biological point of view on it and the "point of view" 
which from the interior maintains it as a lived body; 
the originality of the body consists of the coinciding 
of two points of view. This is the paradox and the 
essence of time itself proceeding unto death, where the 
will is affected as a thing by the things-by the point 
of steel or by the chemistry of the tissues (due to a 
murderer or to the impotency of the doctors)-but gives 
itself a reprieve and postpones the contact by the 
against-death of postponement. The will essentially 
violable harbors treason in its own essence. It is not 
only offendable in its dignity-which would confirm its 
inviolable character-but is susceptible of being 
coerced and enslaved as a will, becoming a servile soul 
(Te! 205/TaI 229) . 
In the following passage, Levinas gathers together the three 
w"For itself" here refers to the lived body, the body-
master, health. 
11
"Thing" here refers to the physical body, the body-
slave, sickness. It refers to the body as "a sector of an 
elemental reality" (Te! 140/TaI 165). It does not refer to 
the body as a represented thing. 
109 
characterizations of the interval of the "is not yet" 
{enjoyment, menace/insecurity/violence, and "ethics"), while 
at the same time noting the "risk" that they each can drift 
into the other: 
The corporeity of the will must be understood on the 
basis of this ambiguity of voluntary power, exposing 
itself to the others [autres] in [dans] its centripetal 
movement of egoism. 12 The body is its ontological 
regime, and not an object. The body, where expression 
can dawn forth and where the egoism of the will becomes 
discourse and primal opposition, at the same time [en 
meme temps] conveys the entry of the I into the 
calculations of the Other [autrui] {Tel 206/TaI 229-
230) . 
"Dead time"-articulated by the irreducibly ambiguous 
body-is a "risk." The body, as the "site" of the rapport 
sans rapport with the "other," is the "site" of enjoyment, 
exposure to menace/insecurity/violence, and the "ethical" 
relation. Or, said in the language of Otherwise than Being, 
the body is, I would suggest, the "site" of enjoyment, the 
by-the-other (or non-sense), and the for-the-other (or 
sense). 
This irreducible ambiguity of the body is founded in 
mortality. 
It is in mortality that the interaction of the psychic 
and the physical appears in its primordial form. The 
interaction of the physical and the psychic, when 
approached from the psychic, posited as for itself or as 
causa sui, and from the physical, posited as unfolding 
in function of the "other," gives rise to a problem due 
to the abstraction to which the terms in relation are 
reduced. Mortality is the concrete and primary 
phenomenon. It forbids the positing of a for itself 
12The "centripetal movement of egoism" refers to enjoyment 
(see Tel 91, 116/TaI 118, 143). 
that would not be already delivered over to the Other 
and consequently be a thing. The for itself, 
essentially mortal, does not only represent things to 
itself, but is subject to them (Tel 212/TaI 235). 
The equivocality of the lived body and the physical body, 
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the psychic and the physical, appears in its most primordial 
form in the postponement of death in a mortal will, in the 
interval of the "is not yet" or "dead time." 
Levinas also addresses the question of the proximity 
of menace/insecurity/violence and "ethics" in an essay 
entitled "Transcendence and Evil." The essay is ostensibly 
a reading of Philippe Nemo's Job et l'exces du Mal. Levinas 
divides his reading into three moments: evil as excess, 
evil as intention, and evil as the hatred of evil. I will 
concentrate primarily on the third moment where the question 
of evil's proximity to good is raised. 
Levinas sums up the third and last moment-evil as the 
hatred of evil-as follows: 
[E]vil strikes me in my horror of evil, and thus 
reveals-or is already-my association with the Good. 
The excess of evil by which it is a surplus in the world 
is also our impossibility of accepting it. The 
experience of evil would then be also our waiting on the 
good-the love of God. 13 
This "movement leading from the 'horror of evil' to the 
13Emmanuel Levinas, "Transcendence et mal, " in De dieu 
qui vient a l'idee (Paris: Vrin, 1982), 203, hereafter cited 
in the text as TM. / "Transcendence and Evil," trans. 
Alphonso Lingis, in Emmanuel Levinas: Collected 
Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 
183, hereafter cited in the text as TE. · 
discovery of the Good[ •.. ] completes in a theophany the 
transcendence opened in the totality of the world by the 
concrete 'content' of evil" (TM 204/TE 184). In this 
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reversal or inversion of evil and of the horror of evil into 
an expectation of the Good "there can[ .•• ] be no question," 
Levinas thinks, "of a passage from Evil to the Good through 
the attraction of contraries" for "that would make but one 
more theodicy" (TM 203/TE 183). In "Useless Suffering" 
Levinas describes what he means by theodicy. 
Western humanity has [ ... ] sought for the meaning of 
this scandal [i.e., useless suffering] by invoking the 
proper sense of a metaphysical order, an ethics, which 
is invisible in the immediate lessons of moral 
consciousness. This is a kingdom of transcendent ends, 
willed by a benevolent wisdom, by the absolute goodness 
of a God who is in some way defined by his super-natural 
goodness; or a widespread, invisible goodness in Nature 
and History, where it would command the paths which are, 
to be sure, painful, but which lead to the Good. Pain 
is henceforth meaningful, subordinated in one way or 
another to the metaphysical finality envisaged by faith 
or by a belief in progress. These beliefs are 
presupposed by theodicy! such is the grand idea 
necessary to the inner peace of souls in our distressed 
world. It is called upon to make sufferings here below 
comprehensible. These will make sense by reference to 
an original fault or to the congenital f initude of human 
being. The evil which fills the earth would be 
explained in a 'plan of the whole'; it would be called 
upon to atone for a sin, or it would announce, to the 
ontologically limited consciousness, compensation or 
recompense at the end of time. These supra-sensible 
perspectives are invoked in order to envisage in a 
suffering which is essentially gratuitous and absurd, 
and apparently arbitrary, a signification and an 
order. I4 
14Emmanuel Levinas, "Useless Suffering" trans. Richard 
Cohen, in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, 
ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 
1988) ' 160-161. 
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Levinas acknowledges that Nemo himself is likewise sensitive 
to this problem when he rhetorically asks: "Does not the 
philosophical contribution of all this Biblical exegesis 
consist in making it possible to go as it were beyond the 
reciprocal appeal of terms that negate one another, beyond 
dialectics" (TM 203/TE 183, emphasis added)? This is made 
possible not only because evil, as Nemo delimited it in the 
first two moments of the book, is not any kind of negation, 
but also because Nemo is sensitive to the Nietzsche's 
warning against the spirit of ressentiment, that is, a good 
that would signify only a repayment for evil or a vengeance. 
With this in mind Nemo describes the expectation of the Good 
as a thought that would think more than it thinks. The 
soul, torn up from the world and awakened to itself by evil, 
the soul beyond satisfaction and recompense, "expects an 
awaited that infinitely surpasses expectancy" (TM 204/TE 
183-184). But despite Levinas' praise for this "very 
profound" formulation that makes it possible to go beyond 
the reciprocal appeal of contrary terms that negate one 
another, beyond dialectics, he rhetorically asks: "Does 
[the movement leading from the 'horror of evil' to the 
discovery of the Good in Nemo's book] not lead to but the 
opposite of evil, and to a goodness of simple pleasure, 
however great it be" (TM 204/TE 184)? That is, does it 
not lead, however superlative or excessive the good may be, 
to a goodness that merely compensates for the evil, to a 
113 
play of good and evil. 
The notion of "play" designates, for Nemo, the 
relation of the soul with God. "Play" cannot however, 
according to Levinas, be deduced from the disproportion 
between expectation and the expected, i.e., the 
disproportion between God and the thought that thinks God. 
Moreover if play is deduced from the disproportion between 
God and the thought that thinks God then one risks, 
according to Levinas, reinscribing this "very profound" 
formulation within a theodicy where the expectation of the 
Good would be reduced to the dialectical play of good and 
evil (understood as contraries) "in which the wholly-
otherness of God (would no longer be expected but rather] 
would become visible" (TM 203/TE 183). To illustrate this 
point Levinas cites the following passage from Job et 
l'exces du Mal: "The excess of beatitude alone will answer 
to the excess of evil" (TM 204/TE 184). Levinas suggests 
that Nemo uses two different senses of "excess" in this 
passage in order to maintain the privileged signification of 
evil around which his whole book is constructed. 
The excess of evil does not mean an excessive evil, 
whereas the excess of beatitude remains a superlative 
notion. For if it were necessary to already see in 
beatitude, as such, an excess, evil would not have the 
privileged signification about which Nemo's whole book 
is constructed (TM 204/TE 184, emphasis added). 
But according to Levinas, there is always already also an 
excess of good as well as an excess of evil. 
This prompts Levinas to propose, in the form of a 
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rhetorical question, an alternative understanding of the 
movement leading from the "horror of evil" to the discovery 
of the Good that does not lead to the opposite of evil, to a 
goodness of simple pleasure. 
Does not the Good that is awaited in this "awaiting 
which aims at infinitely more than this awaited" 
maintain a relationship less remote with the evil which 
suggests it, while differing from it with a difference 
more different than opposition (TM 204-205/TE 184, 
emphasis added)? 
The relationship that the Good maintains with evil is 
therefore, according to Levinas, less remote and at the same 
time more different than a relationship of mere opposition. 
And while both Nemo and Levinas recognize a disproportion 
between expectation and the expected, Levinas has certain 
reservations about designating it with the notion of "play." 
He will choose instead to designate it with the notions of 
command and prescription. 
Levinas hints at this alternative designation of the 
disproportionate relationship between expectation and the 
expected when he raises "the problem of the relationship 
between the suffering of the self and the suffering which a 
self can experience over the suffering of the other man" (TM 
205/TE 184)~a problem which never appears on the foreground 
of Nemo's commentary on the book of Job. 15 Is there not a 
question of this problematical relationship, Levinas asks, 
15This passage parallels the inversion from the fear of 
death into the fear of committing murder delimited by 
Levinas in Totality and Infinity. 
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in the "Where were you when I founded the earth?" of Job 
38:4? 
This passage, at the beginning of the discourse 
attributed to God, "reminds Job of his absence at the hour 
of creation" (TM 205/TE 184). But how are we to understand 
this absence? This passage has commonly been understood as 
an almost satirical retort to the impudence of Job--Where 
were you? 16 But, Levinas rhetorically asks, does this 
passage "only set forth a theodicy in which the economy of a 
harmonious and wisely arranged whole harbors evil only for a 
look limited to a part of this whole" (TM 205/TE 184, my 
emphasis)? That is, does the suffering of the self as a 
self exposed to evil merely take hope in and await the 
ultimate good (understood as the contrary of evil) that lies 
beyond its limited look? Rather than the traditional 
reading of this passage-"Where were you?"-Levinas reads 
"Where were you?" and asks: 
Might one not understand in this "Where were you?" a 
denunciation of being wanting, which can have meaning 
only if the humanity of man is fraternally solidary with 
creation, that is, is responsible for what was neither 
one's self nor one's work, and if this solidarity and 
this responsibility for everything and for all, which 
cannot occur without pain, is the spirit itself (TM 
205/TE 184)? 
This reading, which sets forth a theophany rather than a 
16In fact, according to Levinas' reading of Nemo' s 
interpretation of Job, this is how Nemo would read this 
passage (despite the exceptional relationship he sets up 
between the soul and evil). Therefore, according to 
Levinas, in this instance, Nemo and the tradition are 
agreed. 
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theodicy, denounces a look limited to a part of a harmonious 
and wisely arranged whole. It even denounces a look that 
is, according to Levinas, delimited by Nemo--a look that, 
having been torn out of the world by evil, merely waits on 
the opposite of evil, the goodness of simple pleasure. The 
theophany set forth in this reading differs, therefore, from 
the theophany that Levinas believes Nemo sets f orth~a 
theophany that risks being reduced to "one more theodicy" 
(TM 203/TE 183), to a mere "play" of contraries within a 
totalized economy. 
The "suffering of the self" as a self exposed to evil 
always already involves or is equiprimordial with "the 
suffering which a self can experience over the suffering of 
the other man." In fact, according to Levinas, a "suffering 
of the self" that is not equiprimordial with the "suffering 
which a self can experience over the suffering of the other 
man" never truly "expects an awaited that infinitely 
surpasses expectancy," never truly expects a good that would 
not signify a repayment for evil or a vengeance, a good 
beyond recompense. 
The pain of the transgressive responsibility brought 
out in Levinas' reading circumvents a reading of the good 
inherent in the Nietzschean idea of ressentiment. It marks 
the "relationship" of "the suffering of the self and the 
suffering which a self can experience over the suffering of 
the other man." 
117 
Levinas elaborates on this disturbing affliction 
called pain in a passage that constitutes, I believe, the 
denouement of his reading of Nemo's Job et l'exc~s du Mal. 
That in the evil that pursues me the evil suffered by 
the other man afflicts me, that it touches me, as though 
(comme si] from the first the other was calling to me, 
putting into question my resting on myself and my 
conatus essendi, as though (comme si] before lamenting 
over my evil here below, I had to answer for the 
other~is not this a breakthrough of the Good in the 
"intention" of which I am in my woe so exclusively aimed 
at (TM 206/TE 185)? 
The phrase "as though" (comme si] plays a key role in 
Levinas' reading of Descartes Meditations. It articulates a 
thinking in two times. Specifically, with respect to 
Levinas reading of Descartes' Meditations, it articulates 
the undecidability or equiprimordiality of the cogito and 
the infinite. 
In the passage in question the "as though" (comme si] 
articulates Levinas' reading of Job 38:4, that is, the 
undecidability or equiprimordiality of the suffering of the 
self and the suffering which a self can experience over the 
suffering of the other man, both of which are likewise 
characterized by ambiguous double origins. The "as though," 
therefore, articulates a "relationship" of good and evil 
that is simultaneously "less remote" and "more different" 
than a relationship of opposition. It is "as though" the 
double origin characteristic of the relationship between the 
soul and evil were the double origin characteristic of the 
relationship between the soul and good. 
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Earlier in the essay Levinas delimited the exteriority 
or transcendence in evil using language strikingly similar 
to the language he uses in his reading of Descartes' 
Meditations to describe the ambiguous "relationship" of the 
cogito and the evil genius/il y a. 
In its malignancy as evil, evil is an excess. While the 
notion of excess evokes first the quantitative idea of 
intensity, of a degree surpassing measure, evil is an 
excess in its very quiddity. This notion is very 
important: evil is not an excess because suffering can 
be terrible, and go beyond the endurable. The break 
with the normal and the normative, with order, with 
synthesis, with the world, already constitutes its 
qualitative essence. Suffering qua suffering is but a 
concrete and quasi-sensible manifestation of the non-
integratable, the non-justifiable. The "quality" of 
evil is this very non-integratability, if we can use 
such a term; this concrete quality is defined by this 
abstract notion. Evil is not only the non-integratable; 
it is also the non-integratability of the non-
integratable (TM 197-198/TE 180). 
Evil, like the idea of the infinite, exceeds the very 
thought that would think it. In fact, Levinas uses the term 
"transcendence"-a term otherwise reserved for the 
infinite-in his description of evil. 
In the appearing of evil, in its original phenomenality, 
in its quality, is announced a modality, a manner: not 
finding a place, the refusal of all accommodation 
with ••. , a counter-nature, a monstrosity, what is 
disturbing and foreign of itself. And in this sense 
transcendence (TM 198/TE 180)! 
Evil is only insofar as it exceeds every thought that thinks 
it. Evil tears one out of the world as unique and ex-
ceptional-as a soul (TM 201/TE 182). The ex- in ex-
ceptional testifies to the ex-cess of evil that overflows 
the very thought that would think it. It testifies, that 
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is, to the incompleteness of soul in its completeness. For 
by virtue of chronological time the soul-by thinking that 
which exceeds thought-"is not yet." 
With this in mind, one is in a position to see how the 
"as though" articulates in the passage in question, a 
"relationship" of 1) the double origin characteristic of the 
"relationship" of the soul and evil, and 2) the double 
origin characteristic of the "relationship" of the soul and 
good, that is simultaneously "less remote" and "more 
different" than a relationship of opposition. When Levinas 
writes ... 
That in the evil that pursues me the evil suffered by 
the other man affects me, that it touches me, as though 
[comme si] from the first the other was calling to me, 
putting into question my resting one myself and my 
conatus essendi, as though [comme si] before lamenting 
over my evil here below, I had to answer for the 
other-is not this a breakthrough of the Good in the 
"intention" of which I am in my woe so exclusively aimed 
at (TM 206/TE 185)? 
... one reads, I would suggest, the following: That in the 
evil that infinitely approaches me-that in the ex-ceptional 
relationship of myself and the evil that ex-ceeds my 
thinking of it-the evil suffered by the other man afflicts 
me, that it touches me, as though from the first the "other" 
that calls to me, that puts my resting on myself and my 
conatus essendi into question were the personal other that 
faces me rather than the anonymous faceless other of evil, 
as though before lamenting over my evil here below I had to 
answer for the "other." The personal "other" that faces me 
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and the anonymous faceless "other" of evil maintain-by way 
of the "as though"-a relationship simultaneously "less 
remote" and "more different" than a relationship of 
opposition. 
CHAPTER 4 
OTHERWISE THAN JUSTICE AND DEAD TIME 
Signification signifies in justice, but also, more 
ancient than itself and than the equality implied 
by it, justice passes by justice in my responsibility 
for the other, in my inequality with respect to him 
for whom I am a hostage. 
-Levinas 
"All that exists is just and unjust 
and equally justified in both." 
That is your world! A world indeed!-
-Nietzsche 
By turning itself into an inability to reveal 
anything, literature is attempting to become 
the revelation of what revelation destroys. 
This is a tragic endeavor. 
-Blanchet 
Death is, on the one hand, the very possibility of 
grasping the possible, the power of assumption. Death is, 
on the other hand, an absolute alterity that approaches 
without ever being assumable. It "is not yet." Death, as 
approach, as postponement, is called "dead time." Earlier I 
suggested that a reading of Levinas that is not attentive to 
"dead time"-which is marked by or leaves a trace of itself 
in the performance or production of a "double origin"-risks 
domesticating the interruptions located within his work. It 
risks the possibility of being too easily read and 
appropriated. For example, a close reading of justice and 
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responsibility in the work of Levinas-that is, the step 
beyond justice into responsibility- reveals that Levinas' 
idea of responsibility cannot be easily appropriated by 
ethics or politics. Responsibility exceeds the order of 
measure and reason. It merely leaves an enigmatic or 
ambiguous trace of itself in this order of just boundaries. 
Levinas' reading of responsibility moves at the limit of the 
ethical language of justice. 
Nietzsche's reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound in 
The Birth of Tragedy likewise moves at the limit of the 
ethical language of justice. Reading justice in Nietzsche 
alongside justice in Levinas will, I would suggest, 
raise-seemingly despite Levinas' intentions-the question 
of the proximity of Nietzsche and Levinas. This is a 
question that would not even be considered in a too easy 
reading of Levinas that sometimes seeks to appropriate his 
work for a post-Nietzschean ethics or politics. 
Earlier I suggested that the ambiguity of the other as 
il y a and the other as infinite is gathered around "dead 
time," that is, death understood as an absolute alterity 
that infinitely approaches. This is evident even within 
that section of Totality and Infinity explicitly concerned 
with death-"The Will and Death." In that section Levinas 
writes: 
Death threatens me from beyond. This unknown that 
frightens, the silence of the infinite spaces that 
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terrify, comes from the other, and this alterity, 
precisely as absolute, strikes me in an evil design or 
in a judgment of justice (Te! 210/TaI 234). 
"Evil design" refers, I would suggest, to the rapport sans 
rapport of the subject and the other as il y a, which is 
characterized by Levinas as menace/insecurity/violence. 
"Judgment of justice" refers, I would suggest, to the 
rapport sans rapport of the subject and the other as 
infinite, which is characterized by Levinas as "ethics." 
While chapter 3 of this dissertation pointed out that 
"dead time" can concretely be characterized as enjoyment, 
menace/insecurity/violence, or "ethics," the reading 
undertaken in that chapter concentrated primarily on the 
first two alternatives. Still more needs to be said, 
however, about the third alternative-"ethics," that is, the 
rapport sans rapport characterized by a "judgment of 
justice." What does Levinas mean by "ethics" or "judgment 
of justice"? And what prevents these familiar and 
traditional ideas from being too easily read and 
appropriated? 
In that part of Totality and Infinity entitled "The 
Truth of the Will" Levinas makes a distinction between this 
"judgment of justice" and the "judgment of history." His 
remarks on this distinction can best be understood when read 
alongside the distinction he makes between comprehension and 
critique, which is instantiated in his reading of Descartes' 
Meditations. Briefly, the "judgment of history" is "a 
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verdict set forth impersonally and implacably out of 
universal principles" (Tel 222/TaI 244), particularly, the 
universal principle of justice. This judgment, set forth in 
the visible (Tel 220/TaI 243), is of the order of the 
comprehension. The "judgment of justice," set forth by the 
invisible, is articulated by the order of critique. It is, 
therefore, not so much a judgment inspired by a universal 
principle of justice as it is an indictment of justice, of 
the order of comprehension. There is a shift of the 
genitive from subjective genitive (read: the judgment 
pronounced .Qy justice) to objective genitive (read: the 
judgment pronounced upon justice). This judgment, coming 
from the absolute alterity of the other (Tel 210/TaI 234), 
is often referred to by Levinas as a "judgment of God," that 
is, a judgment pronounced by the infinite. 
The judgment of justice, coming from the absolute 
alterity of the other, indicts my arbitrary freedom (Tel 
222/TaI 245), it calls the arbitrary dogmatism of 
comprehensions' free exercise into question (Tel 13/TaI 43). 
That is, it effects a critical movement, a discovery of a 
condition for what is otherwise taken to be unconditioned, a 
justification of comprehensions' freedom (Tel 58-59/TaI 86) 
which consists in recognizing in the other a right over the 
unconditioned egoism of comprehension (Tel 10/TaI 40), in 
recognizing one's own injustice. But in this inversion of 
the movement of comprehension characteristic of critique, in 
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this justification of freedom, this recognition of the 
other, this attempt to be just, one becomes, paradoxically, 
more unjust. Levinas writes: 
The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual 
immensity, but g responsibility increasing in the 
measure that it is assumed; duties become greater in the 
measure that they are accomplished. The better I 
accomplish my duty the fewer rights I have; the more I 
am just the more guilty I am (Tel 222/TaI 244). 
The attempt to be just, that is, the recognition of the 
other as the condition of what is otherwise taken to be 
unconditioned, is inevitably reinscribed back into the order 
of comprehension. One is inevitably guilty of the arbitrary 
dogmatism of comprehension's free exercise, of its non-
recognition of the other. This move is, in turn, again 
vulnerable to the judgment of justice, that is, to the 
critical movement's justification of comprehension's 
freedom. There is an incessant "step beyond" that is 
incessantly "not beyond." The more I am just the more 
guilty or unjust I am. There is here the performance or 
production of a perpetual alternation characteristic of 
Levinas' formal thematizations of skepticism and the saying 
of the otherwise than being in Otherwise than Being, both of 
which, as was suggested in chapter I of this dissertation, 
heavily draw upon Levinas' reading of Descartes' 
Meditations. This perpetual alternation between two poles 
of a "double origin" is a trace of that which exceeds the 
universal principle justice governing the "judgment of 
history." 
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The judgment of justice that indicts my arbitrary 
freedom does not, therefore, simply "seal my [as well as the 
other's) pure and simple entry into the universal order" 
(Te! 222/TaI 245), that is, an order impersonally and 
implacably governed by a universal principle of justice, as 
is the case in the "judgment of history." There is, rather, 
a shift, as I suggested earlier, in the way one reads the 
genitive in "judgment of justice"-a shift from subjective 
genitive (read: the judgment pronounced .Qy justice) to 
objective genitive (read: the judgment pronounced upon 
justice). In the name of justice, insofar as it is 
understood as a universal principle, one is summoned to step 
beyond justice. In the justification of the arbitrary 
dogmatism of comprehension's free exercise, in the 
recognition of the other, that is, in the inversion of order 
characteristic of the movement of critique, there is the 
production or performance of a trace of that which exceed 
justice. 
In reality, justice does not include me in the 
equilibrium of its universality; justice summons me to 
go beyond the straight line of justice, and henceforth 
nothing can mark the end of this march; behind the 
straight line of the law the land of goodness extends 
infinite and unexplored, necessitating all the resources 
of a singular presence. I am therefore necessary for 
justice, 1 as responsible beyond every limit fixed by an 
1The term "justice" here seems to indicate that which 
exceeds justice understood as a universal principle. The 
term undergoes slippage in this passage insofar as it 
summons me to go beyond justice understood as a universal 
principle. It is, therefore, somewhat confusing to use the 
term "justice" to name that which exceeds it. Levinas 
objective law. The I is a privilege and an election. 
The sole possibility in being of going beyond the 
straight line of the law, that is, of finding a place 
lying beyond the universal, is to be I (Tel 223/TaI 
245) . 
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The interminability of the march beyond the universality of 
objective law, of the step beyond justice, refers to the 
perpetual alternation outlined in the previous paragraph. 
It refers to the perpetual alternation between the 
singularity of the "I" and the other that incessantly calls 
the "I" into question. The singularity of the "I" is 
necessary for the production or performance of a trace of 
that which exceeds the objective law, the universal 
principle of justice. The "I" which effects this production 
is, therefore, the sole possibility of the invisible 
manifesting itself in being. 
The invisible must manifest itself if history is to lose 
its right to the last word, necessarily unjust for the 
subjectivity, inevitable cruel. But the manifestation 
of the invisible can not mean the passage of the 
invisible to the status of the visible; it does not lead 
back to evidence. It is produced (se produit] in the 
goodness reserved to subjectivity, which thus is subject 
not simply to the truth of judgment, but to the source 
of this truth. The truth of the invisible is 
ontologically produced (se produit] by the subjectivity 
which states it. For the invisible is not the 
"provisionally invisible," nor what remains invisible 
for a superficial and rapid glance, and which a more 
attentive and scrupulous investigation would render 
visible, nor what remains unexpressed as hidden 
movements of the soul, nor what, gratuitously and 
lazily, is affirmed to be a mystery (Tel 221/TaI 243). 
should perhaps reserve the term "responsibility" to name 
this "relationship" with excess. This distinction between 
justice and responsibility, merely alluded to in Totality 
and Infinity, is decisively drawn, as will become apparent 
in a moment, in Otherwise than Being. 
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The truth of the invisible is produced by the subjectivity 
that effects the production, by the "I" that is called into 
question, by the "I" that, for example, proceeds through the 
two movements of Descartes' Meditations effecting the 
production of a "double origin," that is, a trace of the 
invisible in the visible. 2 The invisible manifests itself 
only as an irreducible ambiguity or enigma, only as the 
performance of a perpetual alternation that perpetually 
interrupts the visible. This performance or production of a 
perpetual alternation that perpetually interrupts the 
visible, interrupts any firm position from which one could 
make ethical or political evaluations (of, for example, 
justice or injustice), while, at the same time, not 
absolving one of the necessity (not to say, the 
inevitability) of making such evaluations. 
The distinction between justice and that which exceeds 
it (responsibility), merely alluded to in Totality and 
Infinity, is decisively drawn in Otherwise than Being. 
Recall that in the name of justice, insofar as it is 
understood as a universal principle, one is summoned to step 
beyond justice, or, to be more precise, one produces or 
performs a trace of that which exceeds justice. That which 
exceeds justice, the invisible, manifests itself only as an 
2See chapter 1 of this dissertation for a description 
of production and the role it plays in Levinas' reading of 
Descartes' Meditations. 
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irreducible ambiguity or enigma, only as the performance of 
a perpetual alternation that perpetually interrupts the 
visible, the order of justice-an order which stills this 
perpetual alternation, fixes this irreducible ambiguity or 
enigma of the I and the other under a universal principle. 
In that part of Otherwise than Being entitled "From the 
Saying to the Said, or the Wisdom of Desire" Levinas is 
likewise concerned-as the title suggests, albeit in the 
terms "said" and "saying"-with the rapport sans rapport of 
the order of justice and the responsibility that exceeds the 
order of justice but nonetheless leaves a trace of itself in 
its interruption of this order. For example, Levinas 
writes: 
Signification signifies in justice, but also, more 
ancient than itself and than the equality implied by it, 
justice passes by justice in my responsibility for the 
other, in my inequality with respect to him for whom I 
am a hostage {AE 201/0B 158). 
On the one hand, signification, the one-for-the-other of 
responsibility, signifies or leaves a trace of itself in the 
said, in the order of justice. on the other hand, justice 
passes by justice, that is, in the name of justice one is 
summoned to step beyond justice, or, to be more precise, one 
produces or performs a trace of that which exceeds justice. 
Responsibility signifies or leaves a trace of itself in the 
order of justice; the order of justice, as the site of this 
trace of responsibility, signifies responsibility. 
This reciprocity is again echoed in the final 
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sentences of that part of Otherwise than Being entitled 
"Sense and the There Is." Here it is set within the context 
of philosophy's role in both conveying and (inevitably) 
betraying or thematizing the saying of the otherwise than 
being, the absolute one-for-the-other of responsibility, and 
its recognition of this conveying and betraying as an 
incessant alternation that is the trace of that which 
exceeds thematization, that is, its reduction of this 
conveying and (inevitable) betraying to difference (see 
"separation" in Totality and Infinity) . 
Philosophy serves justice by thematizing the difference 
and reducing the thematized to difference. It brings 
equity into the abnegation of the one for the other, 
justice into responsibility. Philosophy, in its very 
diachrony, is the consciousness of the breakup of 
consciousness. In an alternating movement, like that 
which leads from skepticism to the refutation that 
reduces it to ashes, and from its ashes to its rebirth, 
philosophy justifies and criticizes the laws of being 
and of the city, and finds again the signification that 
consists in detaching from the absolute one-for-the-
other both the one and the other (AE 210/0B 165). 
The last sentence of this passage draws a parallel between 
the alternating movement of skepticism and refutation of 
skepticism and the step/not beyond justice that I described 
in previous paragraphs~a step/not beyond that is the 
performance or production of a trace of that which exceeds 
justice, the absolute one-for-the-other of responsibility. 
In the passage "philosophy justifies and criticizes the laws 
of being and the city" the terms "justify" and "criticize" 
are synonyms that parallel the "step beyond" characteristic 
of skepticism (abstracted, momentarily, from the other pole 
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of the alternating movement, that is, the refutation of 
skepticism). They refer to what in Totality and Infinity is 
called the movement of critique~the inversion or calling 
into question of the movement of thematization, the 
discovery of a condition for what is otherwise taken to be 
unconditioned, the justification of the movement of 
comprehension (Te! 58-59/TaI 86). The passage "philosophy 
[ ... ] finds again the signification that consists in 
detaching from the absolute one-for-the-other both the one 
and the other" parallels the "not beyond" characteristic of 
the refutation of skepticism, the recognition of the 
contradiction, the thematization of the difference between 
the one and the other which ensures their coexistence or 
contemporaneousness. This alternating movement can help to 
clarify the first sentence of the passage cited above: 
"Philosophy serves justice by thematizing the difference and 
reducing the thematized to difference." "Thematizing the 
difference" is the inevitable betrayal of the conveying of 
the other, which ensures the coexistence of the different 
terms. Recall that conveying and betraying (that is, the 
reflection, "after the event," on the statement that conveys 
the other) are the two times integral to the production of a 
contradiction. "Reducing the thematized to difference" is 
the recognition of this conveying and betraying (at least in 
the cases of skepticism and the saying of the otherwise than 
being) as a trace of that which exceeds thematization, that 
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is, as the performance or production of an incessant 
alternation of conveying and betraying, rather than merely 
the "arbitrary halt" at the betrayal or refutation of the 
signification. This is the case if one reads reduction as 
the inverse of production. I would suggest that reduction 
is the recognition, and therefore the re-performance or re-
production after the fact, of the performance of an 
incessant alternation between conveying and betraying, of 
the production of a trace of that which exceeds reason. 
In the "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," which accompanies 
the 1886 edition of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes: 
"[T]he whole book knows only an artistic meaning and crypto-
meaning behind all events. 113 Nietzsche introduces this 
provocative statement by referring to both the preface to 
the book and the book itself. 
Already in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner, art, 
and not morality, is presented as the truly metaphysical 
activity of man. In the book itself the suggestive 
sentence is repeated several times, that the existence 
of the world is justified [gerechtfertigt] only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon (GT 11/BT 22). 
This suggestive sentence, repeated on two occasions in the 
3Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragodie. Oder: 
Griechenthum und Pessimismus, in Werke: Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), vol.III, pt.1, 11, 
hereafter cited in the text as GT / The Birth of Tragedy. 
Or: Hellenism and Pessimism, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, 1967), 22, hereafter cited in the text 
as BT. 
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book itself , 4 immediately calls one's attention to the 
curious juxtaposition of "the existence of the world" and 
"aesthetic phenomenon." A hasty reading of this sentence 
may in fact completely overlook Nietzsche's choice of the 
word "justified." 
Before hastily moving to the curious juxtaposition of "the 
existence of the world" and "aesthetic phenomenon"-as if 
each term of this juxtaposition were beyond question-one 
should ask the following questions: Why does Nietzsche call 
attention to the word "justified" by emphasizing it? What 
is the significance of "justification" or "justice" for 
Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy? How does this 
signification affect the way one reads the sentence in 
question? And why does Nietzsche use a word so blatantly 
loaded with "moral" overtones when, in the preceding 
sentence, he writes that "art, and not morality, is 
presented [in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner) as 
the truly metaphysical activity of man"? 
The most significant treatment of "justice" in The 
4This sentence appears in section 5 ("[I)t is only as 
an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are 
eternally justified [gerechtfertigt]," GT 43/BT 52) and in 
section 24 ("[E]xistence and the world seem justified 
[gerechtfertigt) only as an aesthetic phenomenon," GT 148/BT 
141). It is not immediately clear what Nietzsche intended 
by altering the text from "existence and the world" in the 
book to "existence of the world" in the "Attempt at Self-
Criticism" (unless, of course, it was merely an oversight) . 
In section 24 Nietzsche also writes: "Quite generally, 
only music, placed beside the world, can give us an idea of 
what is meant by the justification [Rechtfertigung) Of the 
world as an aesthetic phenomenon" (GT 148/BT 141). 
Birth of Tragedy occurs in the context of Nietzsche's 
reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound. 5 This reading 
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moves, on innumerable levels, at the margin of justice, at 
the limit of justification. Like Prometheus, Nietzsche's 
reading does not merely transgress the limit, the Apollinian 
just boundary between just and unjust. It moves at the 
margin of justice, at the limit of justification. The 
limit, the just boundary, functions, but as it functions, it 
is interrupted. 
Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound begins: "This is the 
world's limit that we have come to; this is the Scythian 
country, an untrodden desolation. 116 This line not only 
locates the drama geographically at the "world's limit," it 
also alludes to the location of the movement of the 
Prometheus myth~justice's limit. 
In the Greek world justice (dike) was understood in 
terms of limits or boundaries. One was justified and the 
established order was maintained if one observed the 
5It is interesting to note that the figure of the 
unbound Prometheus adorns the title page of the original 
1872 edition of The Birth of Tragedy. 
6Aeschylus, Prometheus Desmotes, in Septem ouae 
Supersunt Tragoediae, ed. Denys Page (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), 287-329, lines 1-2 /Prometheus 
Bound, trans. David Grene, in The Complete Greek Tragedies, 
ed. David Grene and Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1959), vol.1, 303-351, lines 1-2, 
hereafter cited in the text as PB followed by the line 
number. 
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measures or limits fixed by Apollo, "the god of 
individuation and of just boundaries" (GT 67/BT 72). 
Nietzsche writes: 
Apollo, as ethical deity, exacts measure of his 
disciples, and, to be able to maintain it, he requires 
self-knowledge. And so, side by side with the aesthetic 
necessity for beauty, there occur the demands "know 
thyself" and "nothing in excess"; consequently 
overweening pride and excess are regarded as the truly 
hostile demons of the non-Apollinian sphere, hence as 
characteristics of the pre-Apollinian age~that of the 
Titans; and of the extra-Apollinian world~that of the 
barbarians (GT 36/BT 46). 7 
These limits demanded by the Delphic god Apollo, and the 
concomitant understanding of justice, play a key role in 
Nietzsche's reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound. 
The movement in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound at the 
limit or margin of justice is most manifest in the way 
Prometheus exceeds this limit. Prometheus' titanic love for 
human beings defied the Delphic admonition "nothing in 
excess." On one occasion the Chorus says: "Your mind was 
yours, not his [Zeus'], and at its bidding you regarded 
mortal men too high [sebei thnatous agan], Prometheus" (PB 
543-4). Regard or reverence is properly said of a human 
7The demands "nothing in excess" and "know thyself" are 
well represented in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound. Allusions 
to the demand "nothing in excess" appear in line 72 ("I am 
forced to do this; do not keep urging me [meden ... agan].") 
and in line 327 ("Now I will go and try if I can free you: 
do you be quiet, do not talk so much [med,agan 
labrostomei]. 11 ). An allusion to the demand "know thyself" 
appears in line 309 ("Yes, I see, Prometheus, and I want, 
indeed I do, to advise you for the best, for all your 
cleverness. Know yourself [gign6ske sauton] and reform your 
ways to new ways, for new is he that rules among the· 
Gods.") . 
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being's worship of the gods. Prometheus' regard for human 
beings not only inverts the natural order, it is excessive. 
on another occasion Prometheus laments: "You see me a 
wretched God in chains, the enemy of Zeus, hated of all the 
Gods that enter Zeus' palace hall, because of my excessive 
love [ten lian philoteta] for Man" (PB 119-23). 8 
Another motif by which the movement at the limit or 
margin of justice is most manifest in Prometheus Bound is 
transgression. Prometheus' theft of fire is a sin, an 
error, a transgression (hamartia). In the opening lines of 
the drama Might reminds Hephaestus of the sin that brought 
them to the high craggy rocks at the world's limit. 
[I]t was your flower, the brightness of fire that 
devises all, that he stole and gave to mortal men; this 
is the sin [hamartias] for which he must pay the Gods 
the penalty [dounai diken] 9~that he may learn to endure 
and like the sovereignty of Zeus and quit his man-loving 
disposition" (PB 7-11). 
Cognate verbal forms of hamartia appear throughout the 
tragedy. For example, Hermes describes Prometheus in the 
following manner: "You, subtle-spirit, you bitterly 
80ther examples of excess as a motif to characterize 
Prometheus appear in line 180 ("You are free of tongue, too 
free [agan g'eleutherostomeis]."), and in lines 318-9 ("This 
is what you pay, Prometheus, for that tongue of yours which 
talked so high and haughty [tes agan hypsegorou glosses]."). 
9Dike, in this line and in line 614 ("O spirit that has 
appeared as a common blessing to all men, unhappy 
Prometheus, why are you being punished [tou diken pascheis 
tade]?"), means specifically "punishment" or "penalty," but 
by using this word Aeschylus also implies that Prometheus' 
punishment is a result of dike and was thus caused by a 
transgression of dike. See Michael Gagarin, ~schylean Drama 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 208 n.49. 
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overbitter, you that sinned [examartonta] against the 
immortals, giving honor to the creatures of a day, you thief 
of fire" {PB 944-7). On one occasion, the Chorus says to 
Prometheus: "Shame it were for one so wise to fall in error 
[examartanein]" {PB 1039). On another occasion, the Chorus 
asks: "Do you not see how you have erred [hemartes]" {PB 
259-60)? Prometheus replies: "I have known all that you 
have said: I knew, I knew when I transgressed [hekon hekon 
hemarton] nor will deny it. In helping man I brought my 
troubles on me" (PB 265-7). 10 
The smith Hephaestus, a sympathizer, connects these 
motifs of excess and transgression with justice (dike). 
Such is the reward you reap of your man-loving 
disposition. For you, a God, feared not the anger of 
the Gods, but gave honors to mortals beyond what was 
just [pera dikes]. Wherefore you shall mount guard on 
this unlovely rock, upright, sleepless, not bending the 
knee (PB 28-32). 
Prometheus gave beyond what was just, in excess of what was 
justified. He transgressed the limit of justice, and 
therefore was punished. 
The "content and soul" of Aeschylus' interpretation of 
the Prometheus myth is, according to Nietzsche, the 
affiliation the titanic artist feels with the audacity of 
10Another cognate verbal form of hamartia is spoken by 
Io: "Son of Kronos, what fault, what fault [hamartousan] 
did you find in me that you should yoke me to a harness of 
misery like this, that you should torture me so to madness 
driven in fear of the gadfly" {PB 576-81). See also PB 112, 
563, 620. 
138 
the transgressive move of the Titan Prometheus. 
In himself the Titanic artist found the defiant faith 
that he had the ability to create men and at least 
destroy Olympian gods, by means of his superior wisdom 
which, to be sure, he had to atone for with eternal 
suffering. The splendid "ability" of the great genius 
for which even eternal suffering is a slight price, the 
stern pride of the artist~that is the content and soul 
of Aeschylus' poem (GT 64/BT 70). 
Aeschylus' transgressive creation is characterized by what 
Nietzsche calls "the profoundly Aeschylean demand for 
iustice [Gerechtigkeit]" (GT 64/BT 70). 
The immeasurable suffering of the bold "individual" on 
the one hand and the divine predicament and intimation 
of a twilight of the gods on the other, the way the 
power of these two worlds of suffering compels a 
reconciliation, a metaphysical union~all this recalls 
in the strongest possible manner the center and main 
axiom of the Aeschylean view of the world which 
envisages Moira enthroned above gods and men as eternal 
justice [ewige Gerechtigkeit] (GT 64/BT 70). 
In the name of "the profoundly Aeschylean demand for 
justice" Aeschylus audaciously places not only the world of 
the titanic individual (the Titan Prometheus, as well as the 
titanic Greek artist), but also the divine Olympian world on 
the scales of his justice. This "demand for justice" 
compels a reconciliation, a metaphysical union, of these two 
worlds in the name of an "eternal justice." 
But insofar as Aeschylus' interpretation is taken 
merely as a defiant creation (that has to be atoned for with 
suffering) characterized by a profound "demand for justice" 
that compels reconciliation, it does not penetrate into the 
abysmal depth of the myth's terror. 
But Aeschylus' interpretation of the myth does not 
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exhaust the astounding depth of its terror. Rather the 
artist's delight in what becomes, the cheerfulness of 
artistic creation that defies all misfortune, is merely 
a bright image of clouds and sky [ein lichtes Wolken-
und Himmelsbild] mirrored in a black lake of sadness {GT 
64/BT 70). 
In a passage that specifically applies to Sophocles' 
interpretation of the Oedipus myth, but that is equally 
applicable to Aeschylus' interpretation of the Prometheus 
myth, Nietzsche writes: 
If this explanation does justice to the poet one may yet 
ask whether it exhausts the contents of the myth~and 
then it becomes evident that the poet's whole conception 
is nothing but precisely that bright image [Lichtbild] 
which healing nature projects before us after a glance 
into the abyss {GT 62/BT 68). 
In another passage that specifically applies to the 
Sophoclean hero, but that is equally applicable to the 
Aeschylean hero, Nietzsche writes: 
But suppose we disregard the character of the hero as it 
comes to the surface, visibly~after all, it is in the 
last analysis nothing but a bright image [Lichtbild] 
projected on a dark wall, which means appearance through 
and through; suppose we penetrate into the myth that 
projects itself in these lucid reflections: then we 
suddenly experience a phenomenon that is just the 
opposite of a familiar optical phenomenon {GT 61/BT 67). 
Nietzsche's reading of Prometheus Bound penetrates into the 
myth. It penetrates into Aeschylus' interpretation of the 
myth insofar as this interpretation is taken merely as a 
defiant creation (that has to be atoned for with suffering) 
characterized by a profound "demand for justice" that 
compels a reconciliation. That is, it penetrates into 
Aeschylus' interpretation of the myth insofar as this 
interpretation remains attentive only to the transgression 
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of the limit of justice drawn by Apollo, and not to the 
movement at the margin of justice. By attending to the 
tragedy's transformation into an inability to reveal 
anything, Nietzsche is attending to the tragedy's attempt to 
become the revelation of what revelation destroys. This is, 
as Blanchet points out, a tragic endeavor. 
The presupposition of the Prometheus myth produces, 
according to Nietzsche, a painful and irresolvable 
contradiction, rather than a reconciliation. 
The presupposition of the Prometheus myth is to be found 
in the extravagant value which a naive humanity attached 
to fire as the true palladium of every ascending 
culture. But that man should freely dispose of fire 
without receiving it as a present from heaven, either as 
a lightning bolt or as the warming rays of the sun, 
struck these reflective primitive men as sacrilege, as a 
robbery of divine nature (GT 65/BT 70-1). 
Thus, Nietzsche continues, "the very first philosophical 
problem"-the acquisition of fire-"immediately produces a 
painful and irresolvable contradiction [einen peinlichen 
unlosbaren Widerspruch] between man and god" (GT 65/BT 71), 
between a human world and a divine world. 
The best and highest possession mankind can acquire is 
obtained by sacrilege and must be paid for with 
consequences that involve the whole flood of sufferings 
and sorrows with which the offended divinities have to 
afflict the nobly aspiring race of men (GT 65/BT 71). 
With this "sublime view of active sin [die erhabene Ansicht 
von der activen Stinde]" as the characteristically Promethean 
virtue, "the ethical basis for pessimistic tragedy has been 
141 
found: the justification [Rechtfertiqunq] 11 of human evil, 
meaning both human guilt and the human suffering it entails" 
(GT 65/BT 71). 
The painful and irresolvable contradiction at the heart 
of the world reveals itself, to a reader who is not inclined 
to interpret away the misfortune, as 
a clash of different worlds, e.g., of a divine and a 
human one, in which each, taken as an individual, has 
right [Recht] on its side, but nevertheless has to 
suffer for its individuation, being merely a single one 
beside another (GT 66/BT 71). 
For example, the clash between Prometheus and Zeus is (as is 
the case in most Aeschylean conflicts) a matter of right or 
dike on both sides. The dike on Zeus' side results from 
Prometheus' theft of fire, which, as was pointed out above, 
even Prometheus admits was a transgression (PB 265-7). 
Prometheus' theft, as the smith Hephaestus points out, went 
"beyond what was just [pera dikes]" (PB 30). Prometheus 
must consequently pay the penalty (diken) for his 
transgression (PB 9 and 614) . 12 Prometheus does not deny 
that some penalty is justified, but he and his sympathizers 
do protest the severity of the punishment. At the end of 
the tragedy Prometheus even accuses Zeus of acting without 
dike: "In a single word, I am the enemy of all the Gods 
that gave me ill for good [ekdikos]" (PB 976) and "O Holy 
11The word "justification" is emphasized in the complete 
critical edition of Nietzsche's work. The English 
translation does not reflect this emphasis. 
12See note 9 . 
mother mine, o Sky that circling brings the light to all, 
you see me, how I suffer, how unjustly [ekdika)" (PB 
1093) . 13 In addition, Prometheus' theft of fire is (from 
the side of Titan Prometheus, as well as the titanically 
striving human being) justifiable as an act of compassion 
and generosity. 
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Each side, therefore, taken as an individual, claims 
the support of dike, each claims to have right on its side. 
Focusing for a moment on the titanic individual (the Titan 
Prometheus, as well as the titanically striving human being) 
it becomes apparent that 
[i)n the heroic effort of the individual to attain 
universality, in the attempt to transcend the curse of 
individuation and to become the one world-being, he 
suffers in his own person the primordial contradiction 
[Urwiderspruch] that is concealed in things, which means 
that he commits sacrilege and suffers (GT 66/BT 71). 
In transgressing the limit of individuality (the just 
boundary, that the ethical deity Apollo determines, between 
a human world and a divine world), the titanic individual 
does not merely transgress the limit. The titanic 
individual simultaneously suffers the painful and 
irresolvable contradiction that the acquisition of fire is 
both just and unjust, neither merely just nor unjust. That 
is, the titanic individual simultaneously interrupts the 
very limit between just and unjust that would determine the 
transgression. The titanic individual (the Titan 
13See Gagarin, ~schylean Drama, 134. 
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Prometheus, as well as the titanically striving human being) 
moves, therefore, at the margin of justice. This movement 
is revealed by a "double reading" that articulates the 
performance or production of the painful and irresolvable 
contradiction at the heart of the world. This "double 
reading" articulates the necessity of thinking together what 
is impossible to think together-the limit or just boundary 
determined by the ethical deity Apollo and the simultaneous 
transgression and interruption of this limit. 
Aeschylus' interpretation of the Prometheus 
myth-insofar as it is taken as a defiant creation (that has 
to be atoned for with suffering) characterized by a profound 
"demand for justice" that compels reconciliation-does not 
exhaust, as Nietzsche points out, the astounding depth of 
its terror. Nietzsche's reading penetrates into the myth. 
The equivocal "double reading" of the myth that articulates 
the performance or production of the painful and 
irresolvable contradiction at the heart of the world is the 
necessary and inevitable effect of a penetration into the 
myth, of "a glance into the inside and terrors of nature" 
(GT 61/BT 67). It is a trace of the myth's abysmal terror. 
Nietzsche concludes his reading of Aeschylus' 
Prometheus Bound by identifying the equivocal "double 
reading" of the myth with the Apollinian and Dionysian 
duality. "Whoever understands [the) innermost kernei of the 
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Prometheus story-namely, the necessity of sacrilege imposed 
upon the titanically striving individual14-must also 
immediately [zugleich) feel how un-Apollinian this 
pessimistic notion is" (GT 66/BT 72), that is, how 
Dionysian, or otherwise than ethical, 15 this ethical basis 
for pessimistic tragedy is. 
Nietzsche goes on to clarify this equivocal "dual 
nature" of Aeschylus' Prometheus-an equivocality that 
highlights the interruptive character of Nietzsche's earlier 
declaration that with the "sublime view of active sin" as 
the characteristically Promethean virtue, "the ethical basis 
for pessimistic tragedy has been found: the justification 
of human evil, meaning both human guilt and the human 
suffering it entails" (GT 65/BT 71) . The ethical deity 
Apollo, Nietzsche reminds us, "wants to grant repose to 
individual beings precisely by drawing boundaries between 
them and by again and again calling these to mind as the 
most sacred laws of the world, with his demands for self-
knowledge and measure" (GT 66/BT 72) . But this Apollinian 
14The titanic individual striving for "[t]he best and 
highest possession mankind can acquire" necessarily commits 
sacrilege. "The necessity of sacrilege imposed upon the 
titanically striving individual" arises from the "painful 
and irresolvable contradiction between man and god" (GT 
65/BT 71), the "primordial contradiction that is concealed 
in things" (GT 66/BT 71). 
15The Dionysian is not, strictly speaking, un-Apollinian 
or unethical for (as will become apparent below) it is not 
merely opposed to the Apollinian. It is, therefore, more 
appropriate to write "otherwise than Apollinian" and 
"otherwise than ethical." 
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demand for just boundaries is interrupted by the Dionysian. 
Lest this Apollinian tendency congeal the form to 
Egyptian rigidity and coldness, lest the effort to 
prescribe to the individual wave its path and realm 
might annul the motion of the whole lake, the high tide 
of the Dionysian destroyed from time to time all those 
little circles in which the one-sidedly Apollinian 
"will" had sought to confine the Hellenic spirit. The 
suddenly swelling Dionysian tide then takes the separate 
little wave-mountains of individuals on its back, even 
as Prometheus' brother, the Titan Atlas, does with the 
earth. This Titanic impulse to become, as it were, the 
Atlas for all individuals, carrying them on a broad 
back, higher and higher, farther and farther, is what 
the Promethean and the Dionysian have in common. 
In this respect, the Prometheus of Aeschylus is a 
Dionysian mask, while in the aforementioned profound 
demand for justice [Gerechtigkeit]u Aeschylus reveals 
to the thoughtful his17 paternal descent from Apollo, 
the god of individuation and of just boundaries 
[Gerechtigkeitgrenzen]. So the dual nature of 
Aeschylus' Prometheus, his nature which is at the same 
time [zuqleich] Dionysian and Apollinian, might be 
expressed thus in a conceptual formula: "All that 
exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both 
[Alles Vorhandene ist qerecht und unqerecht und in 
beidem gleich berechtiqt]." 
That is your world! A world indeed!-- (GT 66-7/BT 
72) 
This conceptual formula expresses Prometheus' movement at 
the margin of justice. The Aeschylean/Promethean "demand 
for justice"-which reveals Aeschylus' and Prometheus' 
paternal descent from the ethical deity Apollo-reveals an 
ethical basis for pessimistic tragedy that is, at the same 
time, otherwise than Apollinian, and therefore, otherwise 
than ethical. It is more appropriate to write "otherwise 
than Apollinian" and "otherwise than ethical" because the 
16Nietzsche is referring to "the profoundly Aeschylean 
demand for justice" mentioned on GT 64/BT 70. 
17That is, both Aeschylus' and Prometheus'. 
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Dionysian is not merely opposed to the Apollinian. The 
Dionysian-otherwise than the ethical deity Apoll~is both 
ethical and unethical, neither merely ethical nor unethical. 
Moreover, the Aeschylean/Promethean "demand for 
justice"-which reveals Aeschylus' and Prometheus' paternal 
descent from Apollo, "the god of individuation and of just 
boundaries"-reveals a justification of human evil that is, 
at the same time, otherwise than Apollinian, and therefore, 
otherwise than g justification, because both sides have 
right on their side, both sides are justified. or, said 
otherwise, the theft of fire is both just and unjust, 
neither merely just nor unjust. The Dionysian not only 
transgresses the limit determined by the Apollinian, it 
simultaneously interrupts the very limit that would 
determine the transgression. Aeschylus' and Prometheus' 
Apollinian "demand for justice" according to a "first 
reading" reveals, according to a "second reading," the 
simultaneous transgression and interruption of justice. 
That is, it reveals the Dionysian not only as that which is 
unjust, but also as that which effects an irresolvable 
undecidability of "unjust" and "just." It "reveals" the 
Dionysian, which exceeds the Apollinian "demand f.or 
justice." One could say the Dionysian is excess (Ubermass, 
GT 37/BT 46) itself, were not the very operation of the 
determination "itself" interrupted by the excess. The 
Dionysian can, therefore, be written only under 
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erasure-:DJ11nysial[. "Writing under erasure" is a gesture of 
writing that articulates the withdrawal from revelation of 
what is "revealed" according to a "second reading." What 
always already withdraws from revelation inevitably gets 
reinscribed into the order of limits or just boundaries 
determined by Apollo, but it leaves a trace of itself in the 
necessary yet impossible "double reading" of the myth 
expressed by Nietzsche's irresolvably contradictory 
conceptual formula: "All that exists is just and unjust and 
equally justified in both." 
A final note: The interruption of justice does not 
justify injustice. It is not as if the Dionysian is merely 
opposed to the Apollinian, as if it is merely the lack of 
boundaries. Rather, it indicates that one's system of 
justice (one's system of evaluations) does not make one 
just. The performance of the "double reading" transforms 
justice into the impossibility of being just (or unjust). 
It interrupts any firm position from which one could make 
evaluations (of justice or injustice), while, at the same 
time, not absolving one of the necessity (not to say, the 
inevitability) of making such evaluations, and specifically, 
of enacting Aeschylus' and Prometheus' Apollinian "demand 
for justice." 
With this reading of justice one can begin to read the 
following suggestive sentence: "The existence of the world 
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is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon." Nietzsche 
calls attention to justice as if to suggest that one can 
read the existence of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon 
only if one reads it alongside the transformation of justice 
effected in the text. It is as if the transformation of 
justice outlined above effects (or is effected by) a 
transformation of art. A detailed outline of this 
transformation would exceed the scope of this essay, but one 
can catch a glimpse of it in Nietzsche's reading of 
Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound where, as was pointed out above, 
Nietzsche identifies the equivocal "double reading" of the 
myth with the Apollinian and Dionysian duality~the two art 
deities of the Greeks around whom the innumerable 
transformations of art effected in The Birth of Tragedy are 
gathered. 18 
Nietzsche's reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound 
attempts to rethink~and, in a sense, to liberate~the 
concept of justice. Here, perhaps for the first time (to 
refer to a phrase in Nietzsche's "Attempt at a Self-
Criticism"), a pessimism "beyond good and evil," beyond just 
and unjust, is suggested. At the risk of moving far too 
quickly, I would suggest that, perhaps, Levinas' idea of 
justice is not unlike the just boundaries characteristic of 
18For a more detailed account of these transformations 
see John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of 
Tragedy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
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the Apollinian order and that Levinas' idea of 
responsibility is not unlike the excessive Dionysian, which 
interrupts the just boundaries of the Apollinian order and 
merely leaves an enigmatic or ambiguous trace of itself in 
that order. Perhaps. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE CLEARING AND DEAD TIME: 
Re-reading Heidegger's Being and Time 
In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," 
first published in 1966, Heidegger writes of his 
attempt, undertaken again and again since 1930, to give 
the questioning in Being and Time a more originary 
[anfanglicher] form. This means: to submit the 
beginning [Ansatz] of the question in Being and Time to 
an immanent critique. 1 
He indicates that through this undertaking "the name of the 
task of Being and Time gets changed" (SD 61/TB 55). But 
into what is it changed? Heidegger answers this question 
with a question: "Does the name for the task of thinking 
then read instead of Being and Time: clearing and presence 
[Lichtung und Anwesenheit]" (SD 80/TB 73)? The change here 
is not, however, the result of an external critique 
undertaken in the name of transcending Being and Time, but 
rather the result, as Heidegger has already indicated, of an 
immanent critique~a critique that is already in play in 
Being and Time itself. 
This immanent critique decisively turns, I would 
1Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tilbingen: Max 
Niemeyer, 1969), 61, hereafter cited in the text as SD. /On 
Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1979), 55, hereafter cited in the text as TB. 
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suggest, upon the doubling of death--death as possibility 
turning into death as impossibility. Recall the 
introduction of this dissertation which pointed out that 
Levinas and Blanchot consistently read death in Being and 
Time as merely possibility. The doubling of death calls, 
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therefore, for re-reading these readings of Being and Time. 
I would suggest that this doubling~which delimits the 
project of fundamental ontology, that is, both limits it and 
makes it possible2~not only opens the space/time of the 
clearing (Lichtung), but also raises the question of the 
proximity of the clearing and the "dead time" (le temps 
mort) of Levinas and Blanchot. 
The existential analytic of Dasein, undertaken in the 
name of fundamental ontology, is delimited by a series of 
crucial distinctions~ontic/ontological, 
existentiell/existential, inauthentic/authentic, etc. That 
reading of Being and Time that has come to be known as the 
"existential" reading reads these distinctions as 
distinctions, that is, as two separate, distinguishable ways 
of being. This reading~which, I would suggest, inevitably 
characterizes the "first reading" of a doubled re-reading of 
Being and Time~reads the task of the existential analytic 
and, therefore, fundamental ontology, as merely a step 
2See John Sallis, Delimitations~Phenomenology and the 
End of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1986) • 
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beyond the first pole of each distinction into the second 
pole. The analysis of death that opens the second division 
of Being and Time affirms, according to the "existential" 
reading, the possibility of the existential analytic by 
affirming the possibility of completing this step, that is, 
by bringing to light Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-
Being-a-whole. "By pointing out that Dasein has an 
authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, the existential 
analytic acquires assurance as to the constitution of 
Dasein's primordial Being" (SZ 234/BT 277). But this 
reading-a reading that reads death merely as 
possibility-repeats, as Levinas and Blanchot point out, the 
most familiar and traditional of steps. 
The question of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-
Being-a-whole is already anticipated in the opening section 
of the first division. Heidegger's "exposition of the task 
of a preparatory analysis of Dasein" begins by sketching two 
characteristics of Dasein-"the priority of 'existentia' 
over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine 
[die Jemeinigkeit]" (SZ 43/BT 68). Heidegger qualifies his 
choice of the term "existence" (Existenz) to designate 
Dasein's comportment to its Being by pointing out that the 
term "does not and cannot have the ontological significance 
of the traditional term 'existentia'" (SZ 42/BT 67). It 
designates, rather, what Heidegger calls Dasein's 
potentiality-for-Being (Seinkonnen). Heidegger writes: 
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That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an 
issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost 
[eigensten] possibility. In each case Dasein is its 
possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just 
as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-
at-hand would (SZ 42/BT 68). 
Weaving in the other characteristic of Dasein, mineness, 
Heidegger introduces the issue of authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit). The passage continues: 
And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own 
possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself 
and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win 
itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as 
it is essentially something which can be authentic 
[eigentliches]~that is, something of its own~can it 
have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of 
Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these 
expressions have been chosen terminologically in a 
strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any 
Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness 
[Jemeinigkeit] (SZ 42-43/BT 68). 
The question of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-
whole, anticipated in the opening of the first division and 
"completed" in the opening chapters of the second division, 
delimits the movement of the existential analytic. 
In the analysis of "Being-in" the word clearing 
(Lichtung) decisively comes into play with respect to the 
question of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-
whole. As essentially ex-isting, as "being-there," that is, 
as the site (the "there," the "Da") where its own Being 
(Sein) is disclosed, Dasein is itself the clearing 
(Lichtung). 
When we talk in an ontically figurative way of 
the lumen naturale in man, we have in mind nothing other 
than the existential-ontological structure of this 
entity, that it is in such a way as to be its "there". 
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To say that it is 'illuminated' ["erleuchtet"] means 
that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared (qelichtet] in 
itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way 
that it is itself the clearing [Lichtung]. Only for an 
entity which is existentially cleared [gelichteten] in 
this way does that which is present-at-hand become 
accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its 
very nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it. 
If it lacks its "there", it is not factically the entity 
which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this 
entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness 
[Erschlossenheit] (SZ 133/BT 171). 
As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein's way of Being lies 
existentially, Heidegger writes, in one constituent of the 
clearing~understanding (Verstehen) (SZ 143/BT 183). 
The crux of Heidegger's analysis of understanding is 
his precise characterization of this existentiale as 
projection (Entwurf). Drawing upon his earlier analysis of 
the worldhood of the world, Heidegger writes: "With equal 
primordiality the understanding projects [entwirft] Dasein's 
Being both upon its 'for-the-sake-of-which' [Worumwillen] 
and upon significance [Bedeutsamkeit], as the worldhood of 
its current world" (SZ 145/BT 185). Proximally and for the 
most part Dasein is projected upon significance, upon the 
"relational totality" (SZ 87/BT 120) that structures a 
world. Recall that the world is structured by the Being of 
the ready-to-hand (involvement), that is, by the manifold 
context of assignments and references of an "in-order-to" 
visible to circumspection (Umsicht). From the world, Dasein 
is, in turn, given back to itself, disclosed to itself. 
Dasein can understand itself in terms of the possibilities 
of an "in-order-to" that structure a world. But this 
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particular projection and subsequent disclosure does not let 
possibilities be as possibilities. Being out for something 
concernfully, which characterizes Dasein's comportment to 
the world, is not a comportment toward the possible as 
possible. In the analysis of death Heidegger writes: 
"Being towards" a possibility-that is to say, towards 
something possible-may signify "Being out for" 
something possible, as in concerning ourselves with its 
actualization. Such possibilities are constantly 
encountered in the field of what is ready-to-hand and 
present-at-hand-what is attainable, controllable, 
practicable, and the like. In concernfully Being out 
for something possible, there is a tendency to 
annihilate the possibility of the possible by making it 
available to us. But the concernful actualization of 
equipment which is ready-to-hand (as in producing it, 
getting it ready, readjusting it, and so on) is always 
merely relative, since even that which has been 
actualized is still characterized in terms of some 
involvements-indeed this is precisely what 
characterizes its Being. Even though actualized, it 
remains, as actual, something possible for doing 
something; it is characterized by an "in-order-to". 
What our analysis is to make plain is simply how Being 
out for something concernfully, comports itself towards 
the possible: it does so not by the theoretico-
thematical consideration of the possible as possible, 
and by having regard for its possibility as such, but 
rather by looking circumspectively away 
(umsichtiq ... wegsieht] from the possible and looking at 
that for which it is possible [das Woftir-moglich) (SZ 
261/BT 305). 
Even though the concernful actualization of the ready-to-
hand is merely relative, insofar as it remains situated 
within the referential totality of an "in-order-to," the 
sense of the possible operative in the circumspection that 
guides concern remains confined within the horizon of 
actualization. Being out for something concernfully, 
comports itself toward the possible-that is, toward the 
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ready-to-hand which is as being possible, which is only 
insofar as it is situated within the referential totality of 
an "in-order-to"3-by looking circumspectively away from the 
possible as such and by looking at that for which it is 
possible, that is, at that for which it is the possible 
actualization. This looking-away from the possible to its 
possible actualization is what Heidegger calls expecting 
( Erwarten) . 
Expecting is not just an occasional looking-away [ein 
Wegsehen] from the possible to its possible 
actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that 
actualization [ein Warten auf diese]. Even in 
expecting, one leaps away from the possible and gets a 
foothold in the actual. It is for its actuality that 
what is expected is expected. By the very nature of 
expecting, the possible is drawn into the actual, 
arising out of the actual and returning to it (SZ 262/BT 
306). 
Heidegger contrasts expecting, which essentially confines 
possibility within the horizon of actuality, to anticipation 
(Vorlaufen), which frees possibility, lets possibility be as 
possibility. 
The issue of anticipation is anticipated in the 
analysis of understanding. Recall that the understanding 
not only projects Dasein upon significance, but also, and 
with equal primordiality, upon its "for-the-sake-of-which." 
The "for-the-sake-of-which," as the analysis of the 
3For example, the pencil is most properly the pencil 
not as an object present-at-hand but when it is situated 
within the referential totality of an "in-order-to," that 
is, when it is used "in-order-to" write,. which is done "in-
order-to" to finish the dissertation, which is done ''in-
order-to11 ... 
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worldhood of the world indicates, refers to that being, 
Dasein, characterized essentially by its potentiality-for-
Being (Seinkonnen). It refers to that being which "grounds" 
the "in-order-to" of significance (SZ 83-88/BT 114-22). 
Therefore, not only is Dasein projected upon significance, 
that is, upon the possibilities of an "in-order-to" that 
structure a world, it is also projected upon possibilities 
understood with respect to its potentiality-for-Being, that 
is, its ownmost possibilities, possibilities as 
possibilities. From both of these possibilities Dasein is 
given back to itself, disclosed to itself. 
Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as 
long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, 
Dasein always has understood itself, and always will 
understand itself in terms of possibilities (SZ 145/BT 
185). 
Heidegger is perhaps a bit too unequivocal in the next 
passage of the text which describes projection solely in 
terms of projection upon possibilities as possibilities. I 
would suggest that Dasein's projection upon significance is 
a projection that does not let possibilities be as 
possibilities. 
Furthermore, the character of understanding as 
projection is such that the understanding does not grasp 
thematically that upon which it projects~that is to 
say, possibilities. Grasping it in such a manner would 
take away from what it projected its very character as a 
possibility, and would reduce it to the given contents 
which we have in mind; whereas projection, in throwing, 
throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and 
lets it be as such. As projecting, understanding is the 
kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities 
as possibilities (SZ 145/BT 185). · 
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Heidegger goes on to characterize the two-sided self-
disclosure that is correlative to its two-sided self-
projection~that is, its projection upon the possibilities 
of an "in-order-to" that structure a world and its 
projection upon its ownmost possibilities~in terms of 
authenticity and inauthenticity. 
Understanding can devote itself primarily to the 
disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, 
proximally and for the most part, understand itself in 
terms of its world. Or else understanding throws itself 
primarily into the "for-the-sake-of-which"; that is, 
Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either 
authentic, arising out of one's own Self as such, or 
inauthentic (SZ 146/BT 186). 
These two forms of projective understanding are analogous to 
what one might call authentic and inauthentic possibility. 
The negative determination of possibility 
characteristic of Heidegger's analysis of understanding is 
positively supplemented in a relatively short passage from 
that section of Being and Time entitled "Pre-sketch 
[Vorzeichnung] of the existential-ontological structure of 
death." The analysis of death in Being and Time arises in 
response to the question of whether or not the existential 
analytic of Dasein undertaken in Division I is complete, 
whether or not it has grasped Dasein as a whole. But this 
demand for the completion of the existential analytic seems 
"manifestly inconsistent" (SZ 236/BT 279) with the analysis 
of care which forms the structural whole of Dasein. The 
"primary item" in the structure of care is the "ahead-of-
159 
itself" {Sichvorweg), which obviously harkens back to the 
potentiality-for-Being central to the analysis of 
understanding {SZ 191-2/BT 236). 
The 'ahead-of-itself' [>>Sichvorweg<<], as an item in 
the structure of care, tells us unambiguously that in 
Dasein there is always something still outstanding 
[aussteht], which, as a potentiality-for-Being 
[Seinkonnen] for Dasein itself, has not yet become 
'actual'. It is essential to the basic constitution of 
Dasein that there is constantly something still to be 
settled [eine standige Unabgeschlossenheit] {SZ 236/BT 
279). 
The inconsistency, therefore, is this: as soon as Dasein is 
wholly itself, Dasein is not. 
[A]s soon as Dasein 'exists' in such a way that 
absolutely nothing more is still outstanding in it, then 
it has already for this very reason become "no-longer-
Being-there" [Nicht-mehr-da-sein]. Its Being is 
annihilated when what is still outstanding in its Being 
has been liquidated {SZ 236/BT 280). 
This inconsistency would preclude the possibility of 
grasping Dasein as a whole save for Heidegger's 
reservations: the argument giving rise to the inconsistency 
is not only merely formal, it also inadvertently posits 
Dasein as something merely present-at-hand. "Have we, in 
our argument," Heidegger asks, "taken 'Being-not-yet' and 
the 'ahead' in a sense that is genuinely existential" {SZ 
237/BT 280)? In fact, rather than simply precluding the 
analysis, this inconsistency~the necessary yet impossible 
coincidence of being and nonbeing~forms, as will become 
apparent throughout the course of the analysis, the 
essential element of the death analysis that calls for 
thinking. 
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Heidegger then establishes, within the context of an 
analysis of the possibility of experiencing the death of 
others, that death is not merely an event (Begebenheit). In 
the wake of the seeming inconsistency of Dasein itself 
getting access to the phenomenon of death, this analysis 
arises as an alternative means of getting access to the 
phenomenon. But Heidegger concludes that despite "the fact 
that one Dasein can be represented [Vertretbarkeit] by 
another" (SZ 239/BT 283), the possibility of representing 
breaks down completely in the phenomenon of death. "No one 
can take the Other's dying away from him" (SZ 240/BT 284). 
I am, with respect to the phenomenon of death, 
unrepresentable. This impossibility of substitution is due 
to the mineness (Jemeiniqkeit) of death. 
By its very essence, death is in every case mine 
[meine], in so far as it 'is' at all. And indeed death 
signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the 
very Being of one's own Dasein is an issue. In dying, 
it is shown that mineness [Jemeinigkeit] and existence 
are ontologically constitutive for death. Dying is not 
an event; it is a phenomenon to be understood 
existentially (SZ 240/BT 284). 
With this passage Heidegger again returns to the 
prescription~as he did when he expressed reservations about 
the "manifest inconsistency" between the demand for the 
completion of the existential analytic and the analysis of 
the structure of care~that death is a phenomenon to be 
understood existentially. 
In order to get a genuinely existential conception of 
the phenomenon of death it is necessary, therefore, to 
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determine the way that death belongs to existence. 
According to the analysis of the structure of care, Dasein's 
existence consists in its being always already "ahead of 
itself." Dasein always already projects ahead to what it 
not yet is. But, Heidegger asks, is this "not-yet" which 
belongs to Dasein as long as it is, to be interpreted, as it 
was previously, as still outstanding {Ausstand) {SZ 242/BT 
286)? That which is still outstanding is, for example, the 
remainder yet to be received in order to pay off or settle a 
debt. When the debt is paid off, that which is still 
outstanding gets liquidated. To be still outstanding means, 
therefore, that what belongs together is not yet all 
together. Heidegger concludes that "[~]ntities for which 
anything is still outstanding have the kind of Being of 
something ready-to-hand" {SZ 242/BT 286-7). But the lack-
of-togetherness that belongs to any such entities cannot 
define the "not-yet" which belongs to Dasein with respect to 
its possible death. Here Heidegger again reiterates the 
"manifest inconsistency" referred to earlier. 
That Dasein should be together only when its "not-yet" 
has been filled up is so far from the case that it is 
precisely then that Dasein is no longer. Any Dasein 
always exists in just such a manner that its "not-yet" 
belongs to it {SZ 243/BT 287) . 
Heidegger then addresses two examples of entities to which 
one could presumable say the "not-yet" belongs, in order to 
determine, at least in a negative way, Dasein's peculiar 
"not-yet." The not yet full moon is "not-yet" in the sense 
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of "not-yet" perceptible. But this "not-yet" pertains only 
to the way one perceptually grasps that which is already 
actual. Dasein's "not-yet" is not, however, something 
provisionally and occasionally inaccessible to perception. 
It is not yet actual. "Dasein must, itself, become-that is 
to say, be-what it is not yet" (SZ 243/BT 287). The "not-
yet" of the ripe fruit is, unlike the "not-yet" of the full 
moon, a "not-yet" of becoming. The fruit becomes ripe, and 
that becoming ripe belongs to the being of the fruit. 
"Correspondingly," Heidegger notes, "as long as Dasein is, 
it too is already its "not-yet" (SZ 244/BT 288). But when 
·the fruit becomes ripe, it fulfills itself, it actualizes 
its possibilities. Dasein does not, however, fulfill its 
possibilities with its death. On the contrary, its death is 
the moment when its possibilities are taken away. 
Heidegger then distinguishes the senses of ending 
characteristic of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand things 
and the sense of ending characteristic of Dasein. 
(J]ust as Dasein is already its "not-yet", and is its 
"not-yet" constantly as long as it is, it is already its 
end too. The "ending" which we have in view when we 
speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-
end (Zu-Ende-sein], but a Being-towards-the-end (Sein 
zum Ende] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which 
Dasein takes over as soon as it is. "As soon as man 
comes to life, he is at once old enough to die' (SZ 
245/BT 289). 
The "not-yet" of death, considered existentially, has, 
therefore, the character of something towards which Dasein 
comports itself. Immediately preceding the passage that 
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lies at the center of Heidegger's analysis of death, 
Heidegger modifies this existential characterization of the 
"not-yet." Death, he writes, is something impending 
(Bevorstand) (SZ 250/BT 293-4). 
The passage that lies at the center of Heidegger's 
analysis of death can, for heuristic purposes, be divided 
into five parts. It begins: 
Death is a possibility-of-Being [Seinsmoglichkeit] which 
Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With 
death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being [in seinem eigensten Seinkonnen] 
(SZ 250/BT 294). 
Death is a possibility that Dasein has always to take 
over~that is, a possibility upon which, using terminology 
introduced in the analysis of understanding, Dasein must 
project itself. In fact, it is the only possibility upon 
which Dasein has no choice but to project itself. 
Projecting itself upon this possibility Dasein stands before 
itself in its potentiality-for-Being~that is, it is given 
back to itself, disclosed to itself, from that possibility. 
This possibility, as the only possibility upon Dasein must 
project itself, is Dasein's ownmost possibility. 
The passage continues: 
This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less 
than Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Its death is the 
possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there [die 
Moglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-dasein-konnens]. If Dasein 
stands before itself [seiner selbst sich bevorsteht] as 
this possibility, it has been fully assigned [verwiesen] 
to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being [eigenstes· 
Seinkonnen]. When it stands before itself in this way, 
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all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone 
(SZ 250/BT 294). 
What is at issue for Dasein in its projection upon this 
possibility, and its being disclosed to itself from this 
possibility, is, as the analysis of anxiety shows, nothing 
within-the-world but rather being-in-the-world as such. 
What is at issue is Dasein's no-longer-being-able-to-be-
there. What is more, not only does this projection and 
self-disclosure banish Dasein from present-at-hand and 
ready-to-hand entities within-the-world, it exiles Dasein 
fully, that is, it undoes the Dasein-with of others. To 
project upon this possibility and to be disclosed from 
it~that is, to stand before itself~is, at the same time, 
to be in utter exile. This possibility is non-relational. 
The passage continues: 
This ownmost non-relational [un-beztiglich] possibility 
is at the same time the uttermost one [die ausserste]. 
As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip 
[tiberholen] the possibility of death. Death is the 
possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein (SZ 
250/BT 294). 
This part of the passage follows almost directly from the 
previous parts~since death is Dasein's ownmost, non-
relational possibility, it is the extreme possibility. 
Death is that possibility that delimits~that is, both 
limits and makes possible~possibilities. This possibility 
is unsurpassable, not to be outstripped. 
The passage continues by gathering together the three 
determinations of death that have emerged: 
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Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is 
one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not 
to be outstripped. As such, death is something 
distinctively impending (SZ 250-1/BT 294). 
The possibility of death is distinctive in that it is 
otherwise than any impending possibility within-the-world. 
The passage concludes by emphasizing that the 
possibility of death is not only g mode of disclosedness, 
but, in a certain sense, a privileged mode. 
Its existential possibility is based on the fact that 
Dasein is essentially disclosed [erschlossen] to itself, 
and disclosed, indeed, as ahead-of-itself [Sich-vorweq]. 
This item in the structure of care has its most 
primordial concretion in Being-towards-death (SZ 251/BT 
294) . 
The ahead-of-itself, one should note, is that moment in the 
structure of care that corresponds to the analysis of 
understanding. Death, as the most originary concretion of 
this structure, delimits~that is, both limits and makes 
possible~this structure. This delimitation, moreover, is 
the doubling of death upon which turns the re-reading of 
Being and Time. 
The first movement of this doubling is marked by 
Dasein's return to itself. Projection upon and disclosure 
from this possibility serve to draw Dasein back from 
dispersion to a certain unity with itself, to a certain 
wholeness. This possibility~which marks the condition of 
the possibility of possibility--discloses Dasein in its 
ownmost. 
The second movement of this doubling effects an 
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interruption of the first movement. For that possibility 
which discloses Dasein in its ownmost is, at the same time, 
the possibility that banishes Dasein to utter exile, that 
separates it not only from others and the world, but also 
from itself. This possibility marks, therefore, not only 
the condition of the possibility of possibility, but at the 
same time, the condition of the impossibility of 
possibility. Death as possibility turning into death as 
impossibility. One is here called to think together that 
which is impossible to think together-Dasein is (being) and 
is not (nonbeing), it is itself in being other, it is 
ownmost and othermost, it is homecoming in exile. 4 
In both "The Trace of the Other" and "Meaning and 
Sense" Levinas implicitly casts Heidegger's philosophy as 
one ultimately characterized by homecoming. For example, in 
a passage from "Meaning and Sense"-a passage whose context 
obviously indicates that he is referring, among other 
philosophers, to Heidegger-Levinas writes: "Philosophy's 
itinerary remains that of Ulysses, whose adventure in the 
world was only a return to his native island-complacency in 
the Same, an unrecognition of the other."5 Levinas, 
4See John Sallis, "Mortality and Imagination: 
Heidegger and the Proper Name of Man," in Echos: After 
Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). 
5Emmanuel Levinas, "La signification et le sens," in 
Humanisme de l'autre homme (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 
1972), 40. /"Meaning and Sense," in Emmanuel Levinas: 
Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 91. 
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however, wishes to oppose the story of Abraham to the myth 
of Ulysses. In "The Trace of the Other" he writes: "To the 
myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we wish to oppose the 
story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for a yet 
unknown land, and forbids his servant to even bring back his 
son to the point of departure. " 6 Levinas' choice of the 
word "oppose" is perhaps a bit too polemical since the 
"relation" of homecoming to exile can never be one merely of 
opposition. In more careful formulations Levinas himself 
speaks of a homecoming in exile that is not unlike the 
reading of Heidegger's analysis of death offered in the 
previous paragraphs. For example, in the chapter entitled 
"Substitution" from Otherwise Than Being Levinas writes: 
If the return to self proper to cognition, the original 
truth of being, consciousness, can be realized, it is 
because a recurrence of ipseity has already been 
produced [produite]. This is an inversion in the 
process of essence, a withdrawing from the game that 
being plays in consciousness. It is g withdrawal in-
oneself which is an exile in oneself, without a 
foundation in anything else, a non-condition. This 
withdrawal excludes all spontaneity, and is thus always 
already effected, already past (AE 135/0B 106-107, 
emphasis added). 
These provisional remarks serve only to raise the question 
of the proximity of Heidegger and Levinas. The doubling of 
death~which gives rise to the call to necessarily yet 
6Emmanuel Levinas, "La trace de l'autre," in En 
decouvrant !'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: 
Vrin, 1982), 191. /"The Trace of the Other," trans. 
Alphonso Lingis, in Deconstruction in Context: Literature 
and Philosophy, ed. Mark Taylor (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986), 348. 
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impossibly think together homecoming and exile-likewise 
raises the question of the proximity of Heidegger and 
Blanchet with respect to Blanchot's "double death." It is 
now necessary, however, to return for a moment to the 
reading of Heidegger's death analysis. 
The doubling of death is both the condition of the 
possibility and the impossibility of fundamental ontology. 
This doubling of death, on the one hand, effects the 
possibility of fundamental ontology, it establishes the 
distinctions (so crucial to the existential analytic) as 
distinctions-ontic/ontological, existentiell/existential, 
inauthentic/authentic, etc. But, on the other hand, it is 
ruinous of not only the possibility of fundamental ontology 
(insofar as it is understood as merely a step from one term 
of the distinction to another), but also, of the very 
language of possibility itself. The distinctions of the 
existential analytic-which, according to the "existential" 
reading, set the stage for the most familiar and traditional 
of steps-can, therefore, no longer be understood as merely 
distinctions. One could perhaps say, as Levinas does in a 
completely different context, that there is a rapport sans 
rapport-a relation without relation-between the terms of 
each distinction. That is, the latter "term" of each 
distinction infinitely approaches (or withdraws). 
This doubling of death opens the space/time of the 
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clearing (Lichtung). But Levinas and Blanchot do not read 
this doubling (at least in those places where Heidegger is 
explicitly named). I would suggest, however, that this 
doubling of death not only opens the space/time of the 
clearing, but also raises the question of the proximity of 
this clearing and the "dead time" of Levinas and Blanchot. 7 
7Having suggested this, it is immediately necessary to 
add a note of reservation. This re-reading of Heidegger's 
Being and Time merely serves as a way to problematize a too 
easy reading of the work of Levinas or Blanchot that would 
proclaim that they have unambiguously stepped beyond the 
work of Heidegger. It must be emphasized, however, that it 
merely raises the question of the proximity of the work of 
Heidegger and the work of Levinas and Blanchot. It does not 
seek to synthesize them. Given time, it would be necessary 
to supplement this reading with a reading that would remain 
attentive to differences between the works of Heidegger, 
Levinas, and Blanchot. For example, it would be necessary 
to take into account (among a host of other works) Levinas' 
Otherwise than Being and his essay "Mourir pour ... " in 
Heidegger. Questions ouvertes (Paris: Osiris, 1988), ·as well 
as Blanchot's The Space of Literature. 
AFTERWARD 
This afterward serves to unsay what was said in the 
dissertation, it serves as a corrective to what may have 
been ill understood in the dissertation. 
This dissertation is composed of five relatively self-
contained chapters gathered together only by the logic of 
approach-the "is not yet" or "dead time." The logic of 
approach serves as a way to problematize a too easy reading 
of the works of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, and 
Blanchot-a reading, for example, that proclaims that one of 
these thinkers has unambiguously stepped beyond one of the 
others. It must be emphasized, however, that it merely 
raises the question of the proximity of the work of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, and Blanchot. It does not 
seek to synthesize them. Given time, it would be necessary 
to supplement this reading with a reading that would remain 
attentive to differences between the works of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Levinas, and Blanchot. 
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